7/11/18: Taiwan’s Role in Countering CCP Political Warfare

Night View of Taiwan President's Office with red tint at sunset

Wednesday, July 11, 2018
1:30 PM – 3:00 PM
Elliott School of International Affairs
**B12**
1957 E St. NW, Washington, DC 20052

This event is co-sponsored with the Global Taiwan Institute. This event is free and open to the public and media.

night view of taiwan presidential office building

Event Description:

The Trump administration’s 2017 National Security Strategy warned that adversaries “are using information tools in an attempt to undermine the legitimacy of democracies.” Indeed, there is a growing consensus that the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is currently engaged in a comprehensive coercive campaign that utilizes political warfare to influence and undermine democracies through coercive, corrupt, and covert means. The impact of China’s authoritarian influence is being felt throughout the world, but most visibly in Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Czech Republic, United States, and Taiwan. To be clear, the government in Taiwan has the longest experience contending with CCP political warfare than any other governments. Consequently, Taipei’s counter-measures to this emerging challenge deserves careful study. Please join GTI and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the George Washington University on July 11 for a timely discussion with a panel of experts: Toshi Yoshihara (Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments), Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian (The Daily Beast), and Shanthi Kalathil (National Endowment for Democracy).

Please direct questions or concerns to Global Taiwan Institute Program Associate Marzia Borsoi-Kelly.

** Media that would like to bring additional crew members or equipment, please contact Ms. Borsoi-Kelly directly.

Panelists

Toshi Yoshihara is a Senior Fellow at CSBA. Previously he held the John A. van Beuren Chair of Asia-Pacific Studies at the U.S. Naval War College where he taught strategy for over a decade. He was also an affiliate member of the China Maritime Studies Institute at the War College. Dr. Yoshihara has been a visiting professor of international politics at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University since 2012. He has also taught as a visiting professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy, University of California, San Diego and as a visiting professor in the Strategy Department at the U.S. Air War College. He has served as a research analyst at the Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, RAND, and the American Enterprise Institute. Dr. Yoshihara has testified before the Defense Policy Board, the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. He is the recipient of the Navy Meritorious Civilian Service Award in recognition of his scholarship on maritime and strategic affairs at the Naval War College.

Bethany Allen-Ebrahimian is a Security Reporter at The Daily Beast and previously a contributing reporter at Foreign Policy. She was previously an assistant editor at Foreign Policy’s China channel Tea Leaf Nation. Bethany has appeared on CNN, C-SPAN, BBC, Al Jazeera, PRI, and Deutsche Welle, among other outlets, and her work has also appeared in The New York Times, The Washington Post, and The Atlantic. She covered the 2017 German federal elections as a correspondent in Berlin and has also reported from Russia, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Austria, China, Japan, and Taiwan. She was a 2017 Arthur F. Burns Fellow in Berlin, a 2016 Jefferson Fellow at the East-West Center, and a 2015 fellow with the International Reporting Project. Before joining Foreign Policy, she lived and worked in China for more than four years. She holds an M.A. in East Asian studies from Yale University and a graduate certificate from the Hopkins-Nanjing Center for Chinese and American Studies. Bethany speaks and reads Chinese.

Shanthi Kalathil is Director of the International Forum for Democratic Studies. Her work has focused primarily on issues pertaining to democratization, development, and the impact of information and communication technology, with a particular emphasis on Asia. Previously in her career, she served as a senior Democracy Fellow at the U.S. Agency for International Development, an associate with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a non-resident associate with the Institute for the Study of Diplomacy at Georgetown University, and as a consultant for the World Bank, the Aspen Institute, and other international affairs organizations. Kalathil has appeared on media including NPR, BBC, VOA, RFA, C-SPAN, and others, and has authored or edited numerous policy and scholarly publications, including Diplomacy, Development and Security in the Information Age (Institute for the Study of Diplomacy, 2013), Developing Independent Media as an Institution of Accountable Governance (The World Bank, 2008), and (with Taylor C. Boas) Open Networks, Closed Regimes: The Impact of the Internet on Authoritarian Rule (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2003). A former Hong Kong-based staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal Asia, Kalathil lectures on international relations in the information age at Georgetown University. She holds degrees from U.C. Berkeley and the London School of Economics and Political Science.

Event Gallery

6/23/2018: Christina Fink Publishes Article on “Myanmar: Religious Minorities and Constitutional Questions”

portrait of Christina Fink in professional attire

Dr. Christina Fink recently published her article on “Myanmar: Religious Minorities and Constitutional Questions” for Asian Affairs, vol. 49, issue 2, June 2018.

Abstract

This article examines the experience of religious minorities in Myanmar between 2011 and 2017 in the context of the 2008 constitution and a new system of governance. It highlights the precarity of religious minorities and argues that neither the constitution nor the state were reliable sources of protection or redress during this period. The first section considers the multiple identities of religious minorities with regard to citizenship and national belonging. The second section elucidates how an enabling environment for Buddhist nationalism emerged and what types of actions state and non-state actors have taken with regard to religious minorities. The final section addresses the 2008 constitution and rule of law in Myanmar in order to understand the challenges for religious minorities in securing justice and protection.

6/20/2018: Robert Sutter Discusses “Black Swan” of China’s High-Tech Rise in PacNet Commentary

Robert Sutter, pictured in professional attire

Black Swan Trips Alarm, Fouls Moderate Outlook on China’s Rise

By Robert Sutter

This excerpt is from Dr. Sutter’s article, which was originally published in PacNet #41, part of CSIS’ Pacific Forum, on June 20, 2018

I have long had a moderate outlook on China’s rise, a view that did not fundamentally change despite widely publicized challenges China poses to US leadership. The constraints on and limitations of China’s actual power and influence remain substantial. China is not dominant in Asia and is not in a position to undertake global leadership, replacing the United States. The US retains the capacity to counter or otherwise deal with China’s challenges.

Unfortunately, my thinking did not take sufficient account of China’s headlong advance to control the advanced technological industries seen as essential to US power.

 

6/25/18 – 6/26/18 Janet Steele talks about the role of Islam in Journalism in Southeast Asia

portrait of Janet Steele in professional attire
Janet Steele in professional attire

On Monday, June 25, Dr. Janet Steele will participate in a panel discussion on how Islam is shaping media coverage in Southeast Asia. The panel discussion is a part of the International Media Conference hosted by the East-West Center in Singapore.

On Tuesday, June 26th, Dr. Steele will hold a research presentation at the Institute for Southeast Asian Studies on her latest book –  Mediating Islam: Cosmopolitan Journalisms in Muslim Southeast Asia.

 

Summer 2018 Language Fellow – Opening of the New American Institute in Taiwan Complex

Barrier gates block off sections of a busy street

 

Two proud supporters of Taiwanese independence protesting the R.O.C. government
Two proud supporters of Taiwanese independence protesting the R.O.C. government
Police matched if not outnumbered the protestors/supporters outside the new AIT complex
Police matched if not outnumbered the protestors/supporters outside the new AIT complex

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

June 12, 2018

I have now been in Taipei, Taiwan for a little more than a week. While I have finally acclimated to the time difference, I have a feeling the same will never be true regarding the weather. Nevertheless, I am incredibly grateful for this opportunity to spend a summer studying Chinese at National Taiwan University’s International Chinese Language Program (ICLP). Without the generous grant from the Sigur Center, I would likely never have had the chance again to devote so much of my time to improving my language abilities.

While most of the Asia policy world was focusing on the Trump-Kim summit in Singapore, another important change in U.S. policy towards East Asia was occurring in Taipei. I, along with scores of elderly Taiwanese avidly advocating for Taiwanese independence stood outside the new American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) complex for its dedication ceremony. While the ceremony itself was closed to the public, members of Taiwan’s Independence Party arrived by the bus load proudly waving their pan-green independence flags and American flags. As far as I could tell, I was the youngest participant by at least 40 years.

Seeing so many eager citizens declare their love for their own country and the U.S. instilled within me mixed emotions. It was heartwarming to see these elderly Taiwanese celebrating this perceived improvement in Taiwan-U.S. relations. Just thirty years ago, Taiwan was still authoritarian. The chance to peacefully petition their government would have been unthinkable decades ago. An elderly man screamed at a row of police that instead of retaliating, just stoically stood in place. Seeing such active participation in Taiwan’s nascent democracy was truly an incredible spectacle. Conversely, being aware of the immense political obstacles that prevent Taiwanese independence made me realize that they will likely never see what they most desire in their lifetimes.

The new AIT complex finally finished years behind schedule and cost more than $250 million USD. One can only wonder if it was a coincidence that the complex’s dedication ceremony fell on the same day when China and the rest of East Asia were so focused on the Trump-Kim summit. The truth is, the new complex does not signal increased U.S. support for Taiwan. Despite rumors that high ranking officials such as Mike Pompeo or John Bolton would attend the ceremony, a lower ranking official was sent instead. Ostensibly, the U.S. refrained from sending anyone too controversial to avoid upsetting China. Since Trump took office, however, the U.S. has done more vis-à-vis Taiwan than it had in the past fifteen years. Small steps like the Taiwan Travel Act and the opening of the new AIT compound may signify more changes to come during the Trump administration. It is incredibly exciting to have the opportunity to be on the ground in the heart of Taiwan during this time of change.

 

Alex Bierman profile picture with brick background
Alex Bierman, M.A. Security Policy Studies 2019
Sigur Center 2018 Asian Language Fellow
National Taiwan University, Taiwan

Alex Bierman is a M.A. candidate in Security Policy Studies focusing on East Asian security and cyber security. His interests include U.S. policy towards East Asia, Cross-Strait policy, and Chinese politics.

5/8/18: Reset and Realism in India-China Relations

Prime Minister Modi shaking hands with President Xi Jinping
Prime Minister Modi shaking hands with President Xi Jinping

Reset and Realism in India-China Relations

By Deepa M. Ollapally

Originally published by China-India Brief #115, Centre on Asia and Globalisation, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, on April 25, 2018 – May 8, 2018. Original publication

 

Following a season of diplomatic tensions and a military face-off in Doklam, China and India seem to have embarked on a different path in Wuhan. Many observers have called the surprise informal summit in April 2018 between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and President Xi Jinping in the Chinese city a “reset” in India-China relations. With this, the American practice of the “reset” idea with Russia and China has now arrived in South Asia. It has been met with both criticism and praise, with international relations analysts of the realist ilk most critical of India. Why is the concept of “reset” so highly popularized, and conversely, how well does the realist critique hold up in the case of India-China relations?

Reset and Great Power Relations

It is hardly surprising that the idea of a reset in great power relations captures the popular imagination. A deteriorating trend in relations between major rival states is unsettling. When it happens between large and important territorial foes, it is even more so. When contentious behaviour begins to lead to a clear downward spiral, the biggest challenge for state leaders is how to change course; a reset seems to have become a choice diplomatic tool in recent years. US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton even gave her Russian counterpart an actual red reset button in 2009 after a particularly fraught year.

But for those whose thinking is shaped by the realist theory of international relations (especially as postulated by John Mearsheimer), showing any sign of weakness is even more dangerous than correcting course. In the case of India and China, they argue that the competition between the adversaries is structural in nature, something that a simple reset cannot fix. Further, realists assert that the benefits of a reset right now will only go in favour of China—five times richer and three times more militarily powerful than India. They criticize the Indian government for not holding out for real moves by Beijing to settle their disputed border and even more importantly, taking into account India’s huge discomfiture with the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) section of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Most of all, they lament the reset as an indication of India caving in or appeasing China despite having shown signs of willingness to finally “stand up” to its rival in 2017—militarily in Doklam and diplomatically by boycotting the BRI Summit.

While the realist argument has a certain intuitive persuasiveness, on closer inspection it has several shortcomings that need to be kept in mind when looking at the India-China “reset.” First of all, realism takes away leadership agency and suggests that structural factors have to be determining at all costs. Secondly, it downplays the balance of interests between India and China that may dominate balance of power considerations at this particular conjuncture. And thirdly, it does not sufficiently take into account the global uncertainty unleashed by President Donald Trump and its impact on Indian strategic options.

Realism and its Shortcomings on the Reset

The underlying pessimism of conventional realist theory is rooted in the importance given to international power structure and, by extension, the lack of capacity on the part of individual leaders to determine outcomes. President Richard Nixon’s historic reset with China in 1972 most graphically calls into question this assertion. Not only that, Nixon managed to effectively confer great power status on a country that was not much different from other developing countries in Asia, with high rates of poverty and resource scarcity and no global economic position to speak of. Constructivists would suggest that the meaning of particular structures can be shaped or interpreted by leaders in different ways . In other words, leaders are not doomed to be prisoners of structure or pessimistic realist thinking for that matter. Xi is in an especially powerful position to make major policy changes after consolidating his position with the lifting of term limits. Given the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)’s image as being tough on foreign policy, Modi may be in the unique position of being able to engineer closer ties to China even after Doklam and CPEC. And when Xi gives “strategic guidance” to the military to maintain peace on the Himalayan border where China has some advantage, and Modi agrees to a joint economic project in Afghanistan where India has great credibility, it could portend real change.

Realism’s emphasis on balance of power variables invariably overlooks the possibility that balance of interests on other issues can be as important or even more important. For both countries, reaching developed country status in a comprehensive manner is an enduring objective. This is especially important for India, and under both Congress and BJP governments since 1991, the strategic edge of India’s engagement with Southeast and East Asia has remained economic. The widening trade deficit with China has dampened Indian enthusiasm on the economic front. Realists will point out that growing economic ties have not translated into more cooperative strategic behavior by China and that the logic of military competition is more compelling. At the same time, it could be countered that the only viable way to address this is through dialogue, not stand offs as the hard realists would have it. A downward spiraling military competition is certainly not going to solve the economic imbalances, and it could very well derail India’s development priority.

Finally, the role of the United States in Asia’s regional security environment is highly uncertain under President Donald Trump. The so-called structural factors that realists like to see as fixed, with inevitable US-China geopolitical competition and a resulting US-India security partnership, could experience flux along the way. The latest US National Security Strategy has termed China “revisionist,” but it is certainly not beyond Trump to do his own reset of US-China relations in the future. A certain extent of de-coupling of the India-US and India-China relations may be in order to keep India’s strategic options open. At the global multilateral level, India and China have their own strong reasons for cooperation, from climate change to trading regimes to non-interventionism.

Ultimately, realists do not have an attractive strategy for India if it wants to stop the downward slide in relations with its next-door neighbor. The option of a dangerous spiral is apparently not acceptable to the leaders of the two states, whatever risks the realists are willing to take. With a reset, Xi and Modi might just have created an opportunity to change the terms of engagement between their two countries, even if Modi cannot change India’s structural power gap with China any time soon.

 

Deepa M. Ollapally is Research Professor of International Affairs and Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, George Washington University, Washington DC.

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.

6/15/18: Shawn McHale Receives Prestigious Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Research Fellowship

headshot of Shawn McHale in professional attire

Dr. Shawn McHale has been announced as a recipient of The Robert H. N. Ho Family Foundation Research Fellowship in Buddhist Studies 2018 – a prestigious award affiliated with the American Council of Learned Societies. His research project with the fellowship – titled “Crossing the Mahayana-Theravada Frontier: Vietnamese-Khmer Relations and the Vietnamese Search for ‘Original’ Theravada Buddhism in Cambodia, 1930-1989” – will investigate one of the most important developments in modern Vietnamese Buddhism, the search for “Phat giao nguyen thuy” – “original” or Theravada Buddhism.

6/19/18: NBR-Sigur Center Roundtable: Implications of DPRK Diplomacy for Taiwan

taipei skyline at sunset
taipei skyline at sunset

Tuesday, June 19, 2018
12:00 PM – 2:00 PM

The Elliott School of International Affairs
State Room – 7th Floor
1957 E St., NW Washington, DC 20052

This event is co-sponsored by The National Bureau of Asian Research and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies

 

The National Bureau of Asian Research and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies cordially invite you to a panel discussion with experts examining the implications of recent North Korean diplomatic developments for Taiwan, cross-Strait relations, and U.S.-Taiwan relations.

Light lunch will be available.

Agenda:

12:00 PM – 12:30 PM: Registration and Lunch
12:30 PM – 12:45 PM: Welcome Remarks and Introduction
12:45 PM – 2:00 PM: Panel Discussion and Q&A

Panelists:

Patrick Cronin, Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program, Center for a New American Security

Robert Sutter, Professor of Practice of International Affairs; Director, B.A. Program in International Affairs, The George Washington University

Followed by discussant remarks by Tiffany Ma, Senior Director, BowerGroup Asia and Nonresident Fellow, The National Bureau of Asian Research

ModeratorAlison Szalwinski, Director for Political and Security Affairs, The National Bureau of Asian Research

**Final speaker list to be confirmed**

About the Panelists:

headshot of patrick cronin in professional clothesPatrick M. Cronin is a Senior Advisor and Senior Director of the Asia-Pacific Security Program at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). Previously, he was the Senior Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies (INSS) at the National Defense University, where he simultaneously oversaw the Center for the Study of Chinese Military Affairs. Prior to leading INSS, Dr. Cronin served as the Director of Studies at the London-based International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  At the IISS, he also served as Editor of the Adelphi Papers and as the Executive Director of the Armed Conflict Database. Before joining IISS, Dr. Cronin was Senior Vice President and Director of Research at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS).

 

headshot of tiffany ma in professional clothing

Tiffany Ma is a senior director at BowerGroupAsia, where she manages BGA’s client relationships and engagements. She directs analysis and activities designed to advise Fortune 500 companies on public policy issues, regional geopolitics and stakeholder management. Prior to joining BGA, Tiffany was the senior director for political and security affairs at NBR in Washington, D.C., where she led major initiatives on geopolitical and international security affairs in the Asia-Pacific that regularly convened senior government officials and specialists from across the region. She began her career as a research associate at the Project 2049 Institute, an Asia security think tank based in Arlington, Virginia, and has also worked at the International Crisis Group in Beijing, the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, and the Lowy Institute in Sydney.

 

Robert Sutter, pictured in professional attireRobert Sutter is Professor of Practice of International Affairs at the Elliott School of George Washington University beginning in 2011. He also serves as the school’s Director, Program of Bachelor of Arts in International Affairs. A Ph.D. graduate in History and East Asian Languages from Harvard University, he has published 20 books, over 200 articles and several hundred government reports dealing with contemporary East Asian and Pacific countries and their relations with the United States. Sutter’s government career (1968-2001) involved work on Asian and Pacific affairs and US foreign policy for the Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of State, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Additional information forthcoming. We look forward to seeing you at the discussion!

Summer 2018 Field Research Fellow – Exploring the CCP Revolutionary History at Nanjing, Jiangsu Province

Jiangsu Provincial Archive front of the building

picture of the Jiangsu Provincial Archives buildingResearching the history of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and associated topics is inherently difficult. First and foremost, every historian of the CCP has to deal with the limited accessibility of archival materials in mainland China. When I began my research trip in Nanjing and at the Jiangsu Provincial Archive, I was surprised to learn that, in contrast to common perceptions, the sources for the revolutionary period (pre-1949) was even more strictly administered than the early PRC period (1950s). In the beginning, they would not allow me to see anything and there is even no archival fond catalog available for the revolutionary period (while there are plenty for early 1950s). After some detailed inquiry about my research topic and suggesting some published primary sources at the archive, I was finally allowed to see three archival fonds, for which I’m truly grateful.

In addition to the limited accessibility, the archivists later told me that during the 1950s, the CCP leadership ordered all materials related to the revolutionary period to be transferred from provincial archives to the central archives. Though the provincial archives certainly didn’t give up everything, there is indeed serious limitations on what scholars can get by using what was left at the provincial level.

Why is the revolutionary period so sensitive for the CCP? Some may suggest that the revolutionary period was violent. But the early PRC period also witnessed much violence such as the “suppressing counter-revolutionaries” campaign. The issue here is legitimacy. For the CCP, its victory in the revolutionary period an important source of its legitimacy. In the CCP’s jargon, its victory and ruling party status is “history’s choice” (lishi de xuanze) and “people’s choice” (renmin de xuanze). Therefore, the party would not allow those revisionist interpretations of the revolutionary period which might undermine its historical legitimacy. The CCP’s sensitivity is not misplaced. Even in mainland China, there are challenges to the party’s interpretations of the revolutionary period. Some suggest that the CCP didn’t fight the Japanese during the Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and others doubt the actuality of some revolutionary and anti-Japanese heroes. The party called these revisionist interpretations of the revolutionary period “historical nihilism” (lishi xuwuzhuyi). This particular political sensitivity of the revolutionary period should receive the attention of every responsible scholar in the field. It is the academic community’s responsibility to maintain high scholarly standards, especially for these sensitive topics.

photo of Zhongtian Han outdoors

Zhongtian Han, Ph.D. History 2021
Sigur Center Summer 2018 Field Research Grant Fellow
People’s Republic of China

Zhongtian Han is a history Ph.D. student interested in modern East Asia and strategic studies. His research focuses on the strategic history of modern China and Japan.