A graphic for North Korea, Japan, and Biopolitics of Repatriation

5/4/23 | Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture: North Korea, Japan and Biopolitics of Repatriation

Thursday, May 4, 2023

4:30 PM – 6:00 PM ET

Lindner Commons, 602

Elliott School of International Affairs

1957 E Street NW Washington, D.C. 20052

On December 14, 1959, amidst much fanfare and tears, the first repatriation boat carried thousands of Koreans from Niigata, Japan, to Cheongjin, North Korea. In the remaining two weeks of December 1959 alone, a total of three trips were made, transporting 2,942 persons to North Korea. Between 1959 and1984, a total of 93,340 persons were relocated from Japan to North Korea. This number included Koreans who had moved from Korea to Japan during the colonial period and their descendants, including family members who had been born in Japan, as well as some 1,830 Japanese spouses; including the descendants of Japanese spouses, the estimate total of about 6,800 Japanese citizens were repatriated to North Korea over the course of this process. Most Koreans who repatriated from Japan to North Korea originated from southern provinces in the peninsula, i.e., today’s South Korea. Reflecting recent declassification of the International Committee for Red Cross papers, scholars have revisited this issue, yet questions remain: how should we understand this phenomenon? In this presentation, Sonia Ryang approaches this question from multiple angles and addresses the issues of power and forms of life.

Registration is free and open to the public.

This event will be recorded and will be available on the Sigur Center YouTube channel after the event.

Speaker

Sonia Ryang was born in Japan to Korean parents and grew up speaking both Korean and Japanese. Ryang received a Ph.D. degree in Social Anthropology from Cambridge University, England, and worked as a Research Fellow at the Research School for Pacific and Asian Studies, the Australian National University, before being appointed as Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Johns Hopkins University. Ryang moved to the University of Iowa as an endowed chair of Korean Studies and professor of Anthropology. At Iowa, she directed the Center for Asian and Pacific Studies and also served as the Director of Academic Programs in the University of Iowa International Programs. She came to Rice in 2014 as the Director of the Chao Center for Asian Studies; after six years of directorship, she joined the Department of Transnational Asian Studies, her home department.

She has been elected the President of the Society for East Asian Anthropology (2020-2022).

Sonia Ryang is a social anthropologist by training, having obtained her PhD from Cambridge University in 1995. She began her anthropological career with research on the Korean minority in Japan as her primary focus of investigation. While, in many senses, this field of research continues to constitute the core of her work, she now also concerns herself with a much broader set of conceptual and ontological questions pertaining to human existence, encompassing ethnic minorities, diaspora, totalitarianism, ideology, romantic (and other forms of) love, language, food, and, more recently, science. While her books explore a wide range of themes, they are all underpinned by a desire to explore and elucidate the socio-historical functions and materiality of ideas that humans have created and subjected themselves to through the self-imposition of various rules, codes, and institutions. While this human journey has been marked by countless demonstrations of imagination and ingenuity, it has also witnessed innumerable examples of tragic error and loss. Sonia’s scholarship tries to address these. Thus, it is unequivocally interdisciplinary and cross-disciplinary in nature and orientation, combining area studies, literature, history, gender studies, diaspora and transnational studies, philosophy, and ethics, among others. Geographically, she has focused on Korea (North and South) and Japan (the Korean diaspora in Japan) throughout her career. More recently, envisioning the concept of transnational Asia, she has begun to explore the best means by which the boundaries between Asia and Asian America can be undone, for, when viewed from multiple angles, such a distinction is rapidly becoming an artificial one.

With the grant funding by the National Science Foundation (Proposal ID: BCS-1357207) Sonia Ryang has recently finished a project which forms the sequel to her 2012 book on North Korea’s cultural logic, Reading North Korea: An Ethnological inquiry (Harvard University Press, 2012). The book, based on this research, will be published from the University of Hawaii Press in 2021, under the title Reading North Korea. With the Academy of Korean Studies funding (AKS-2020-R24) Sonia Ryang is currently working on a research that reconsiders the repatriation of Koreans from Japan to North Korea (1959 through 1984).

Moderator

Gregg A. Brazinsky works on U.S.-East Asian relations and East Asian international history. He is interested in the flow of commerce, ideas, and culture among Asian countries and across the Pacific. He is proficient in Mandarin Chinese and Korean. He is the author of two books: Winning the Third World (2017), which focuses on Sino-American Rivalry in the Third World and Nation Building in South Korea (2007), which explores U.S.-South Korean relations during the Cold War. Currently, he is working on two other book projects. The first examines American nation-building in Asia during the Cold War. The second explores Sino-North Korean relations between 1949 and 1992 and focuses specifically on the development of cultural and economic ties between the two countries. He has received numerous fellowships to support his research including the Kluge Fellowship from the Library of Congress, the Smith Richardson Foundation junior faculty fellowship, and a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson Center. Professor Brazinsky also currently serves as the director of the George Washington Cold War Group.

As director of the Asian Studies Program, Professor Brazinsky has attracted some of the brightest students from around the country and the world who share a commitment to pursuing careers related to Asia. He helped to launch a special mentoring program for Asian Studies MA students and has worked to expand fellowship and professional opportunities for students in the program.

Sigur Center logo with line art of Asian landmarks
event banner for the 2022 Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture

4/4/2022 | The 25th Annual Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture with Prasenjit Duara

Worldviews and Planetary Politics: Gardens, Jungles and Oceans

Monday, April 4, 2022

5:00 PM – 6:30 PM EDT

Lindner Family Commons

1957 E ST NW Room 602

NOTE: All non-GW affiliated attendees must comply with GW’s COVID-19 policy in order to attend this event, including full vaccination and masking indoors.

About the Event

Contemporary world politics is structured around the world order of nation-states in turn founded largely upon a Newtonian cosmology and an associated worldview. I develop a conceptual framework around the ‘epistemic engine’ which organizes and circulates the cosmological and institutional structures of Enlightenment modernity. Subsequently, I explore how the imperial Chinese world order– functional until at least the late 19th century–reveals a different cosmology shaping a different world order and politics. I also explore the contemporary PRC view of the world order probing the extent to which its historical experiences can be seen to re-shape the hegemonic epistemic engine. In the final section, I draw from a paradigm of ‘oceanic temporality’ to grasp counter-finalities generated by the epistemic engine on the earth and the ocean itself. Can the counter-flows of social movements allow us to imagine what Katzenstein calls a post-Enlightenment, hyper-humanist cosmology?

Speaker

headshot of Prasenjit Duara in professional attire

Prasenjit Duara is the Oscar Tang Chair of East Asian Studies at Duke University. He was born and educated in India and received his PhD in Chinese history from Harvard University. He was previously Professor and Chair of the Dept of History and Chair of the Committee on Chinese Studies at the University of Chicago (1991-2008). Subsequently, he became Raffles Professor of Humanities and Director, Asia Research Institute at National University of Singapore (2008-2015).

In 1988, he published Culture, Power and the State: Rural North China, 1900-1942 (Stanford Univ Press) which won the Fairbank Prize of the AHA and the Levenson Prize of the AAS, USA. Among his other books are Rescuing History from the Nation (U Chicago 1995), Sovereignty and Authenticity: Manchukuo and the East Asian Modern (Rowman 2003) and most recently, The Crisis of Global Modernity: Asian Traditions and a Sustainable Future (Cambridge 2014). He has edited Decolonization: Now and Then (Routledge, 2004) and co-edited A Companion to Global Historical Thought with Viren Murthy and Andrew Sartori (John Wiley, 2014). His work has been widely translated into Chinese, Japanese, Korean and the European languages.

Moderator

Gregg Brazinsky in professional attire

Gregg Brazinsky (he/him) is Professor of History and International Affairs. He is director of the Asian Studies Program, acting director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, and acting co-director of the East Asia National Resource Center. He is the author of two books: Nation Building in South Korea: Koreans, Americans, and the Making of a Democracy and Winning the Third World: Sino-American Rivalry during the Cold War. His articles have appeared in numerous journals including Diplomatic History and the Journal of Korean Studies. He has written op-eds for The Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune and several other media outlets. He is currently working on two books. The first explores American nation building in Asia–especially Japan, Taiwan, and South Korea. The second explores Sino-North Korean relations during the Cold War.

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logo of the Elliott School of International Affairs at GW
event banner with stock image of Chinese buildings at night; text: 14th Annual Conference on China's Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations

11/5/2021 | 14th Annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations

One Currency, Two Markets: China’s Attempt to Internationalize the Renminbi

Friday, November 5, 2021

9:30 AM – 11:00 AM EDT

Zoom Event

The Institute for International Economic Policy is pleased to invite you to the 14th annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations. This year, the conference will take place as a virtual series. This conference is co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research (GW-CIBER).

In this event, HKU’s Edwin Lai will discuss his recent book titled “One Currency, Two Markets: China’s Attempt to Internationalize the Renminbi.” In this book he discusses economic analysis of the future of the international monetary system and the USD, and the rising importance of the RMB. It points out the unsustainability of the dollar standard in the long run, that China has unique incentives to internationalize its currency, and how Hong Kong plays an important role. It explains the real reasons for China to internationalize its currency, including using external commitments to force financial sector reforms (‘daobi’ in Chinese). It applies economic theories accessible to laymen to establish that financial development and openness are crucial for RMB internationalization to succeed, and that greater exchange rate volatility is inevitable due to the ‘open-economy trilemma’. Employing the ‘gravity model’, the book predicts quantitatively that the RMB is likely to be a distant third payment currency after the USD and the euro, but surpassing the Japanese yen in the next decade.

Speaker

Edwin Lai posing for photo leaning on a wall with arms crossed

Edwin Lai is Professor of Economics at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology since July 2009, and later jointly appointed as the Director of the Center for Economic Development and jointly appointed as Professor in the Division of Public Policy. He was Senior Research Economist and Adviser at the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas of the Federal Reserve System of the USA, from August 2007 to June 2009. Before that he was Assistant Professor at Vanderbilt University, Associate Professor at City University of Hong Kong and Associate Professor at Singapore Management University. His main research areas are international economics, industrial organization, growth and internationalization of renminbi. He is a leading scholar in the study of intellectual property rights in the global economy. He has published in American Economic Review, RAND Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Journal of International Economics and other highly respected journals in economics.

Prof. Lai has been a consultant to the World Bank, visiting scholar/fellow with Boston University, Princeton University, Kobe University, CESifo (University of Munich), Hitotsubashi University and Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research. He is Associate Editor of Review of International Economics (Wiley Publisher), a Fellow of the CESifo Research Network (U of Munich) and a board member of Asia-Pacific Trade Seminars (APTS) Group. He obtained his B.Sc. in engineering from University of Hong Kong and A.M. and Ph.D. in economics from Stanford University.

logos of the Institute for International Economic Policy, GW Center for International Business and Education, and the Sigur Center for Asian Studies
blue banner with gold border; text: 2021 GW Mid-Autumn Festival virtual celebration

09/24/2021: Mid-Autumn Festival Party

Friday, September 24, 2021

12:00 PM – 1:00 PM EDT

Zoom Event

The George Washington University is pleased to present the 2021 Mid-Autumn Festival Virtual Celebration in special partnership with the GW Asian and Pacific Islander Alumni Network. Grab a few mooncakes and a cup of tea this lunch break and ZOOM into our celebration of the largest Asian holiday in the fall! This Mid-Autumn Festival, we will learn about how GW students celebrate this large traditional holiday as well as have the treat of seeing them showcase their talent.

This free virtual event will be held in English and is open to the public.

Program:

  • Opening Remarks by Patrick Realiza, Chair of the GW Asian and Pacific Islander Alumni Network
  • Presentation from Immanuel Kim, Korea Foundation and Kim-Renaud Associate Professor of Korean Literature and Culture Studies, and Angela Kim of the Gangwon Province Dance Troupe
  • Chinese Presentation by Gabriel Young, Chair of the GW Chinese American Student Association
  • Japanese Presentation by Jennifer Swanson, Practitioner of Omotesenke Japanese Tea Ceremony for 8 years

The program begins at 12:00pm EDT on Friday, September 24th. Registered guests will receive an email with instructions for joining the webinar prior to the event. Registration closes at 12:00pm EDT on September 24th, 24 hours before the event begins. Media inquiries must be sent to gwmedia@gwu.edu in advance. If you need specific accommodations, please contact gsigur@gwu.edu with at least 3 business days’ notice.

This event will be jointly hosted by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies, CCAS Global Initiatives, the GW Institute for Korean Studies, the Department of East Asian Languages and Literatures, and the East Asia National Resource Center.

headshot of patrick realiza

Patrick Realiza is a strategic communications and public relations professional based in the Washington, DC area. He is the current Chair of the GW Asian and Pacific Islander Alumni Network, where he actively leads and facilitates in the development and creation of programs and initiatives, overall administration, and communications strategies on behalf of the alumni network. Aside from his role in the GW Alumni Association, Mr. Realiza also is an active leader in the arts, serving as the Executive Director and Editor-in-Chief of the Mid Atlantic Foundation for Asian Artists, Inc. (MAFFAA), a regional-based arts foundation aimed at the presentation and preservation of Asian and Asian-American arts and culture in the United States. Mr. Realiza also concurrently holds various other leadership posts within the Government of the District of Columbia and the United Nations Association of the National Capital Area (UNA-NCA).

Sigur Center logo with line art of Asian landmarks
banner with pictures of protests in asia; text: Democracy in Action: Past and Present Movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Myanmar

06/28/2021: Democracy in Action: Past and Present Movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Myanmar

Sigur Center logo with Asian landmark icons outline art

Monday, June 28, 2021

8:00 PM – 9:30 PM EDT

 

Tuesday, June 29, 2021

8:00 AM – 9:30 AM CST (UTC + 8)

 

WebEx Events

banner with pictures of protests in asia; text: Democracy in Action: Past and Present Movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Myanmar
Please join us for a panel to discuss past and present movements in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Myanmar.

 

About this event

As democratic forces continue to face serious setbacks in Hong Kong and Myanmar, we look at these two protest movements and the new mechanisms of protest and mobilization against a previously successful movement in Taiwan. What lessons can be drawn from Taiwan’s transformation to an uninterrupted and unfettered democracy?

Leading experts on Hong Kong, Myanmar and Taiwan will discuss comparative demographics of the popular movements, grassroots strategies, traditional and new social media, and political mobilization.

 

The webinar begins at 8pm EDT on Monday / 8am in Taipei on Tuesday. Check your local time by selecting the event date and your time zone. Registered guests will receive an email with instructions for joining Webex prior to the event. Registration closes at 8pm EDT on June 27th, 24 hours before the event begins. Media inquiries must be sent to gwmedia@gwu.edu in advance. If you need specific accommodations, please contact gsigur@gwu.edu with at least 3 business days’ notice.

This event is on the record, open to the public, and will be recorded. Questions can be sent in advance to gsigur@gwu.edu with subject “Democracy in Action”

 

Speakers

Panelists

Michael Hsiao, Chairman of Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation:

“Taiwan’s Democratic Legacy and Role of Dangwai Journal in Popular Mobilization”

 

Kharis Templeman, Program Manager, Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific, Stanford University:

“Changing Dynamics of the Democracy Movement in Hong Kong”

 

Christina Fink, Professor of Practice of International Affairs, GWU:

“Understanding Myanmar’s Spring Revolution”

 

Discussant

Syaru Shirley Lin, Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics, University of Virginia Miller Center of Public Affairs

 

Moderator

Deepa Ollapally, Research Professor of International Affairs & Associate Director of Sigur Center, GWU

 

 

Speaker Bios

Dr. Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao posing with a portrait of a Taiwanese figure outside a library in Taiwan

Hsin-Huang Michael Hsiao is the Adjunct Research Fellow of Institute of Sociology, in Academia Sinica and Chair Professor of Hakka Studies, National Central University. He is also the chairman of Taiwan-Asia Exchange Foundation (TAEF), Executive Committee of Center for Southeast Asian Studies (CSEAS), National Cheng-Chi University and Consortium of Southeast Asia Studies in Asia (SEASIA). He currently serves as Senior Advisor to the President of Taiwan since 2016. Most recently, he is the Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopedia of Taiwan Studies to be published by Brill in 2022. His recent publications are: New Social and Political Trends in Hong Kong and Taiwan (co-editor, 2020); The Networks of the Hakka Ethnic Associations in Southeast Asia (co-editor, 2020); Taiwan Studies Revisited (co-editor, 2019); and Middle Class, Civil Society and Democracy in Asia (editor, 2019).

professional headshot of Kharis Templeman with blurred background

Kharis Templeman is Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, where he manages the Project on Taiwan in the Indo-Pacific, and a lecturer at Stanford’s Center for East Asian Studies. His areas of expertise include democratic transitions and consolidations, comparative parties and elections, and the politics of Taiwan. He is the editor (with Larry Diamond and Yun-han Chu) of Taiwan’s Democracy Challenged: The Chen Shui-bian Years (2016) and Dynamics of Democracy in Taiwan: The Ma Ying-jeou Years (2020). His other peer-reviewed research has been published in Comparative Political Studies, Ethnopolitics, The Taiwan Journal of Democracy, International Journal of Taiwan Studies, and The APSA Annals of Comparative Democratization, along with several book chapters. He has also written articles for the Brookings Institution, Atlantic Council, Taiwan Insight, and The Diplomat. Dr. Templeman is a member of the U.S.-Taiwan Next Generation Working Group, a 2019 National Asia Research Program (NARP) Fellow at the National Bureau of Asian Research (NRB), and a country coordinator for the Varieties of Democracy project, and from 2016-18 he led the American Political Science Association’s Conference Group on Taiwan Studies (CGOTS). He holds a B.A. (2003) from the University of Rochester and a Ph.D. (2012) in political science from the University of Michigan.

Twitter: @kharisborloff 

portrait of Christina Fink with blue background

Christina Fink is a professor of International Affairs at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs.  She is a cultural anthropologist who has combined teaching, research, and development work throughout her career, much of which has focused on Myanmar and Thailand. She received her B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University and her M.A. and Ph.D. in Social/Cultural Anthropology from the University of California at Berkeley. She is the author of Living Silence in Burma: Surviving Under Military Rule (2009) as well as more recent journal articles and book chapters on political reform, state-society relations, and land rights in Myanmar. 

Discussant

professional headshot of Syaru Shirley Lin with grey background

Syaru Shirley Lin is Compton Visiting Professor in World Politics at the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia and a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy Program at the Brookings Institution. She is also an Adjunct Professor of Global Political Economy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Chair of the Asia-Pacific Hub of the Commission on Reform for Resilience, which is reviewing the response to the COVID pandemic. Her book, Taiwan’s China Dilemma, was published in English in 2016 and in Chinese in 2019. She is now researching five East Asian economies caught in the high-income trap. Her analysis and commentary frequently appear in English and Chinese media. Previously a partner at Goldman Sachs, she specialized in the privatization of state-owned enterprises in Asia and spearheaded the firm’s investments in technology start-ups including Alibaba and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation. She currently serves on the boards of Goldman Sachs Asia Bank, Langham Hospitality Investments and the Focused Ultrasound Foundation. She is also a member of the Hong Kong Committee for Pacific Economic Cooperation. A graduate of Harvard College, she earned her masters and doctorate from the University of Hong Kong after retiring from Goldman Sachs.

Twitter: @syaru

Moderator

Portrait of discussant, Deepa Ollapally

Deepa M. Ollapally is Research Professor of International Affairs and the Associate Director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs, The George Washington University. She directs the Rising Powers Initiative, which tracks foreign policy debates in major powers of Asia and Eurasia. She is a specialist on Indian foreign policy, India-China relations, Indo-Pacific regional and maritime security, and comparative foreign policy outlooks of rising powers and the rise of nationalism in foreign policy. Ollapally is the author of five books including Worldviews of Aspiring Powers (Oxford, 2012) and The Politics of Extremism in South Asia (Cambridge 2008). Her current research focuses on maritime and regional security in the Indo-Pacific. She is currently writing a book on Big Power Competition for Influence in the Indo-Pacific. She has won grants from Carnegie Corporation, MacArthur Foundation, Smith Richardson Foundation, Rockefeller Foundation and Asia Foundation for work related to India and Asia. She has held senior positions in the policy world including US Institute of Peace, Washington DC and National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India. She is a frequent commentator in the media, including appearances on CNN, BBC, CBS, PBS and Reuters TV.

Twitter: @DeepaOllapally

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11/14/2020: J.LIVE Talk 2020

J Live Talk logo

Saturday, November 14, 2020

5:00 PM EST

Live competition livestreamed via Youtube 

J.LIVE (Japanese Learning Inspired Vision and Engagement) Talk was founded in 2015 as a college-level Japanese language presentation competition that emphasizes a comprehensive range of learned communication skills. This year, J. LIVE Talk is adding a high school division for the first time. Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, there will have a special online competition on Zoom, which will be live-streamed on YouTube.

J.LIVE Talk evaluates the dynamism, vision and level of engagement of each participant’s presentation, which can include audio-visual materials, audience interaction, and other innovations that enhance his or her talk in a manner similar to the TED (Technology, Entertainment, and Design) talks.

The competition aims to provide a platform for Japanese language learners to:

  • showcase their proficiency in Japanese
  • polish their presentation skills
  • share ideas from their unique perspectives and
  • connect with the larger Japanese-affiliated community.

The competition consists of a preliminary round, the semifinal round, and the final round. The entrants should send in a short video on a designated topic by October 8th. Two different panels of judges will narrow down the field to 18 semifinalists and subsequently to 9 finalists. The final round consisting of 9 live presentations will be held online on Saturday, November 14, 2020. This year’s awards will be gift cards and certificates.

This event is on the record and open to the public. Your photo or video may be taken during the event for education or promotional purposes. For general inquiries or questions regarding participation, please contact Executive Coordinator Mitsuyo Sato at info@jlivetalk.com.

event flyer with photos of Korean American protesters; text: The 28th Hahn Moo-sook Colloquium in the Korean Humanities From Enmity to Empathy: African American and Korean American Communities since the 1992 Los Angeles Riots

11/6/2020: The 28th Annual Hahn Moo-Sook Colloquium in the Korean Humanities

flyer for the 28th Hahn Moosook Colloquium

Friday, November 6, 2020

3:00 PM – 5:00 PM EST

Virtual Event via Zoom

“From Enmity to Empathy: African American and Korean American Communities since the 1992 Los Angeles Riots” reflects the current social injustice and the Black Lives Matter movement in the US. This year’s HMS colloquium will examine the myriad ways that race impacts Korean/Korean-American, African-American, and the African diasporic communities, in terms of the important conversation on racism and social injustice.
 
In doing so, we begin examining from the 1992 LA riots and how the two communities have evolved since then. The speakers will examine Black-Korean tensions, what it means to be Korean-American in relation to multicultural politics and race, how we can situate Asian/Korean-American experiences within the context of the black-white paradigm, how the music genre of R&B and hip hop has brought the two communities closer through K-pop, and how the collaboration of cultural production influences and interrogates their respective cultures.
 

Honorable Speaker
Caroline Laguerre-Brown, GW

Moderator
Jisoo M. Kim, GWIKS

Speakers
Abu Kadogo, Spelman College
Crystal Anderson, George Mason University
Edward T. Chang, University of California, Riverside
Kyeyoung Park, University of California, Los Angeles

 

 

05/05/2016: The 21st Annual Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture: China’s Rise and the Challenge to East Asian Security with Professor Thomas J. Christensen

Thursday, May 5, 2016

5:30 PM – 7:00 PM EDT

Harry Harding Auditorium – Room 213

Elliott School of International Affairs

1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052

About the Event

Concerns that a rising China will attempt to drive America from East Asia or even become a global superpower rival of the United States are both common and misplaced. But China is already powerful enough to destabilize a region of great importance to the United States and the world. China’s impressive growth in military power projection capability and its ability to put at greater risk forward deployed U.S. forces and bases in Asia pose complex challenges for the United States and its allies and security partners. The situation is not as severe or as dangerous as the Cold War. China is not an adversary of the United States. But a combination of geography, psychology, domestic politics, and military technologies renders coercive diplomacy in 21st century EastAsia even more complicated than it was between the superpower camps in the last three decades of the Cold War. The United States and its regional partners face significant and growing difficulties in dissuading China from attempting to solve its many sovereignty disputes through coercion or the use of force. A successful strategy will require a strong U.S. regional presence combined with assurances that the purpose of that presence is not to prevent China’s continued rise to prominence on the international stage.

 

Thomas J. Christensen is William P. Boswell Professor of World Politics of Peace and War and Director of the China and the World Program at Princeton University. At Princeton he is also faculty director of the Masters of Public Policy Program and the Truman Scholars Program. From 2006-2008 he served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs with responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His research and teaching focus on China’s foreign relations, the international relations of East Asia, and international security. His most recent book, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power (W.W. Norton, 2015) was an editors’ choice at the New York Times Book Review and was selected as “Book of the Week” on CNN”s Fareed Zakaria GPS. Christensen received his B.A. with honors in History from Haverford College, M.A. in International Relations from the University of Pennsylvania, and Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University. He is currently the Chair of the Editorial Board of the Nancy B. Tucker and Warren I. Cohen Book Series on the United States in Asia at Columbia University Press. He is a member of the Academic Advisory Board for the Schwarzman Scholars Program. Professor Christensen is a life member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a Non-Resident Senior Scholar at the Brookings Institution. In 2002 he was presented with a Distinguished Public Service Award by the United States Department of State.

Transcript

Bruce Dickson:
I learned that 15, 20 minutes ago. With that we were expecting to have more people but given the fire in the Metro, people who tried to get here may not be able to get here. It’s been a great season for Metro hasn’t it. There was one fire and one delay after another. My name is Bruce Dixon. I’m director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. This evening’s event is our annual event remembering Gaston Sigur, both his contribution to GW as well as his involvement in US public service. Gaston Sigur received his PhD in history from the University of Michigan. After which he worked for the Asia Foundation in different locales around the world. He came to GW in 1972 both to teach and to direct, what at that time was the Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies. He was in that role for about 10 years when he was chosen by President Ronald Reagan to become the Senior Director of Asian Affairs on the National Security Council and later became Special Assistant to the President for Asian Affairs.

Bruce Dickson:
He was out of government briefly. Returned to the GW and then went back into government, both as a senior advisor but also Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs. While he had that position in the mid ’80s during the Reagan administration, was credited with major achievements in promoting the US Japan relationship as well as having a significant impact on democratization in South Korea. After the 1988 election, when the first Bush administration came into being, President George H. W. Bush appointed him to continue serving as Assistant Secretary of State.

Bruce Dickson:
He finally retired from public service in 1989 and returned to GW. Although 1989, remember at the time the world was changing. What used to be the Sino-Soviet Institute quickly was no longer appropriate, given the change of times. What had been the Sino-Soviet Institute was split into two. One half what is now the Institute for European Russian Eurasian studies, the Soviet half of the Institute. Then the Sigur Center evolved on what had been the Sino half of the Institute. It was originally from the beginning named in honor of Gaston Sigur. The original name was the Gaston Sigur Center for East Asian Studies and was later shortened to simply to the Sigur Center for Asian Studies to be more encompassing, not just an East Asia but South and Southeast Asia as well.

Bruce Dickson:
This event is meant to both memorialize his achievements and his contributions as well as a way of in doing so, having a speaker who had similar profile as Gaston Sigur did in terms of having a bigger role in public service as well as a strong academic background. Before introducing our speaker today, I want to introduce and highlight a few other people who have been a prominent part in the study of Asian studies here at GW. First of all, in the lobby of our center, we have a much larger version of this photograph. Which is with Gaston Sigur meeting in the oval office with President Reagan at that time, Vice President Bush and Secretary of State, George Shultz. We’ve got a much larger version in our lobby, but we want to provide this copy of it to his family. We’re fortunate tonight to have Gaston’s wife, Mrs. Estelle Sigur here, son Paul Sigur. I’d like to share this photo and give it to you for your taking. I also want to recognize Bill Johnson who was the original Associate Director of the Sigur Center. He had been himself a long time professor here at GW and was involved both in the founding of the center and its development in its early years. Bill, thank you for being here. Thank you for your contribution over the years.

Bruce Dickson:
We’re fortunate tonight to have as a speaker, Thomas Christensen. Tom is professor. A William P Boswell professor of Rural politics of Peace and War in Princeton University and also Director of Princeton’s China in the World Program. Also Director of the Masters of Public Policy program and the Truman Scholars program. One of the longest business cards probably you can have. From 2006 to 2008 he served as the Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs in the second Bush administration. With particular responsibility for relations with China, Taiwan, and Mongolia. His most recent book was entitled the China Challenge, Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power, which came out last year. It was an editor’s choice at the New York Times book review. Selected as book of the week on CNN’s GPS with Fareed Zakaria. Tom is a life member of Accounts on Foreign Relations and a nonresident fellow at the Brookings Institution. Presented in 2002 with a distinguished public service award by the US Department of State. It’s hard to imagine anyone who sort of exhibits the characteristics of Gaston Sigur that we are here to celebrate. So with that, Tom Christensen.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Thanks so much, Bruce for your overly kind introduction. I’m really honored to give this talk here because of the person that it honors. I’m very honored by the presence of the Sigur family. Somebody who made an enormous impact on US foreign policy towards Asia and was a true scholar academic leader. A role model for me in my career, and it’s great to be here in the Harriet Harding auditorium because Harriet Harding was a role model for me as an academic. To see David Shambaugh here, I think he shares that with me, that Harriet was someone who exhibited the way it should be done when you studying US China relations as a scholar. It’s a tremendous honor for me to be here. Before I start, I have to say I still work for the state department as a part time advisor. I have to give a disclaimer because this is being recorded, that all the views are my own and not those of the state department or the U S government. My wife always jokes that anybody who knows your views would know that they don’t represent anybody else’s.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I have to say that. Now it’s done. These are my views. Today what I’m going to talk about is the the regional security environment in Asia, particularly for the United States, its allies and its security partners. which is a large group of nations when you include all of those. How does the rise of China pose challenges for regional stability for all of those actors? I think the real regional security challenge is trying to discourage China, dissuade China from settling its many disputes with its neighbors through coercion and the use of force and thereby destabilizing the region.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That’s very important to the United States and obviously to its regional allies and partners. I think that this challenge is somewhat different than the challenge you’ll read about in the media. The challenge that you’ll read about in punditry circles and sometimes even in academia. What you’ll often read about, is a concerted effort by China to drive the United States out of East Asia entirely, on the one hand, or an effort or a reality where China will become a global challenge or superpower challenger to US leadership around the world and will become a problem for the United States and regions everywhere.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I don’t see either of those challenges as particularly pressing for the next couple of decades. I think that this other challenge is real and present and it’s going to get more intense over the next several years. The reason I say that is I see no persistent evidence that China has as a doctrine or a strategy to drive the United States out of East Asia entirely, in the near term. I don’t see any capabilities that China has, if you do a full net assessment of China’s capabilities that would allow China to become a global challenger to US security interests around the world in the next couple of decades, even if China were so inclined. When you do a net assessment, I can talk about in the Q and A if you like, of military power, economic power, and particularly diplomatic power, where the United States has 60 plus allies and China has North Korea. It doesn’t look like China’s poised to have that kind of global competitive power, even if it were so to choose.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That’s where the good news ends because China doesn’t need to be a peer competitor of the United States to pose a challenge to the U S interests and who in the military sense for deployed U S forces. It is already powerful enough to destabilize East Asia today. That power is only going to grow over the next several years. I think that what the United States and its allies need to do is to dissuade China from using that capacity to try to settle its many disputes with its neighbors in a way that would destabilize this region. That is important, not just to the United States and its regional allies, but the whole world.

Thomas J. Christensen:
The world is highly integrated in a way it’s never been before. When real scholars talk about pre-World Rwanda, Europe, and they said there was a lot of trade interdependence and it didn’t prevent conflict. They’re really exaggerating the analogies to today, because today the world is much more interdependent. So, if East Asia goes in a bad direction, the global economy and the global stakes will be very negatively effected.

Thomas J. Christensen:
What we have in East Asia today is a rising China that you know about from the economic sphere? In the military sphere, it’s rather dramatic as well. China has had a fast growth in its economy since 1978, but it’s had a very fast growth in its military capacity since particularly 1999. It’s a key year in China’s military modernization. What was traditionally a military that was based on two things, a land army that had its dual purpose. I want you to focus on the dual purpose. The protection of the Chinese communist party against domestic and international enemies, right? It’s a party army. It’s not a national army. It’s designed to protect the Chinese communist party against domestic and international enemies. That’s the traditional army and that is supplemented with a relatively rudimentary nuclear deterrent against nuclear powers in the day. By public reports, a couple of dozen liquid fuel, intercontinental ballistic missiles that could reach targets like the United States or the former Soviet Union.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Again, according to public reports, with warheads that were separated from those missiles. they would have a long response time as a kind of minimum deterrent against a nuclear attack against the PRC. That’s the traditional military. What’s happened particularly since the late 1990s is China is able to get off shore with military power into the East China sea, in the South China sea in a way that it couldn’t. It has developed these power protection capabilities with its Navy, it’s Air Force, it’s road mobile, accurately tipped ballistic missiles, conventionally tipped ballistic missiles. I’ll talk in a moment about the nuclear tipped missiles.

Thomas J. Christensen:
It continues to modernize its nuclear force and it’s using a solid road mobile missiles now, instead of those liquid fueled ones. Which would have a much shorter response time in a crisis. Therefore provide a much more robust nuclear deterrent against actors who might try to use conventional or nuclear forces to denude China’s nuclear deterrent. China is able to get off shore with these forces, with these Air Forces, with these Navy forces and with the now strategic rocket force, formerly the second artillery to raise costs to superior military forces of the United States in conjunction with its allies.

Thomas J. Christensen:
These are asymmetric capabilities according to China’s own doctrinal writings. Chinese doctrinal writers recognize that the most likely great power adversary that China will face. They don’t use word the United States usually, but it’s pretty clear who they’re talking about, has superior power to the Chinese military. What they’re trying to do is design asymmetric strategies to leverage a weaker military force to achieve political goals against that superior. I say that because a lot of American writings will talk about China closing the gap with the United States overall and maybe keeping the United States from operating at all in the East Asia region under terms like anti-access area denial, which is the Pentagon’s A2/AD phrase. I think some of those phrases exaggerate contemporary Chinese military power in a way that actually provides China more coercive power than it has earned.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Because China’s goal is to make the United States think twice about projecting power to the region by raising costs and by calling it anti access area denial. It kind of implies that China has the capability to physically prevent the United States from projecting power in the region. I don’t think that’s true. The Chinese doctrinal writings don’t portray it that way. They talk about deterring, delaying American intervention and reversing the American decision to intervene if it so chooses, which is consequential enough. I’m not downplaying the importance of those capabilities and doctrines. That’s consequential enough. We don’t need to come up with more dramatic terms to describe it.

Thomas J. Christensen:
The way that China has developed these capabilities is to develop relatively high tech systems in certain areas that pose challenges to the superior US forces. I talked before about accurate conventionally tipped ballistic missiles, road mobile systems, including according to public reports in recent years, the ability to attack moving targets at sea with a ballistic missile. Because the ballistic missile when it reenters the atmosphere is able to do terminal guidance toward a target.

Thomas J. Christensen:
This is important because one of the US advantages around the world is the ability to project Naval aviation power on aircraft carriers to distant places. And if those aircraft carriers are at greater risk, that might give a future U S president pause about putting those carriers in those places to project power. Another capability is submarines. Not quite as high tech, but quite effective. China has imported and reverse engineered various Russian diesel electric submarine technologies that pose challenges to forward deployed US Navy forces. Which again are superior. But now are challenged and the costs of deployment of projecting US power in that region is greater.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Obviously when you’re talking about an ally like Japan, it’s a direct problem for their Navy when China has these submarine capabilities. Those submarines can launch various weapon systems that are quite sophisticated. They can launch submarine launched cruise missiles, some relatively sophisticated ones, especially in recent years. That can pose challenges to forward deployed forces. They have a fairly sophisticated torpedoes and they can lay fairly sophisticated sea mines in a kind of blockade scenario for say a Taiwan conflict that could pose real challenges for what would again otherwise be superior US forces.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Then there are cruise missiles on boats, some fast boats that the Chinese have developed. They can travel in large numbers and those cruise missiles can pose challenges as well. Advanced aircraft, fourth generation aircraft that can again get off the coast into the waters around China and air defenses which I think are underappreciated. China has first imported and then reverse engineered some very sophisticated air defense systems that basically put a kind of umbrella off the Chinese coast and make it more difficult and more costly potentially for advanced air forces to operate in the area around China. Anti-satellite weapons which reduce potentially one of the great advantages of the United States has. Which is what’s called a C4ISR, a fancy term acronym, which basically means the ability to see the battle space and control forces within it from space based assets. If China can attack those lower orbit satellites in a way that denudes that capability, it can reduce US advantages. Cyber attacks, a lot of cyber attacks are talked about in the commercial realm. There are military, imported cyber capabilities that could potentially put at risk US response time.

Thomas J. Christensen:
My colleague James Mulvenna has written about this publicly and he has talked about the fact that while US combat systems are on secure networks that are harder for adversaries to penetrate some of the logistics capabilities of the U S military still rely on unclassified cyber spines that could be attacked in ways that could slow down the US response to a problem. Then there’s the nuclear piece. I want to focus on this for a moment. You’ll see why a little bit later in the talk. China is modernizing its nuclear force to include a larger number of road mobile nuclear tipped, solid fuel missiles that would have shorter response times. They’re supplementing that with submarine based nuclear forces for the first time according to public reports. They will be able to, or they are able to put out to sea nuclear weapons on submarines as a kind of second leg of a dyad, a nuclear dyad.

Thomas J. Christensen:
All of this is a setup for why this force, which is not a pure competitor of the United States poses huge strategic challenges for the United States and its allies. My basic bottom line on this is that in the post cold war era, the United States has become accustomed to dealing with regional conflicts against potential or real adversaries in the following fashion. Putting at risk those target’s ability to put at risk for deployed US forces early on in a conflict. Either as a deterrent or as an actual war fighting strategy to basically take out the capabilities of the other side to hurt US forward deployed forces and raise costs for the United States. That takes the form of taking out air defenses, taking out command and control of adversaries very early on in rather robust attacks. When people say, “Oh, we just need a no fly zone over country X.” If country X is a sophisticated country, that’s a relatively violent operation. Because what you’re doing is you’re taking out all the radar systems and all the air defenses of that country.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Because what you’re doing is you’re taking out all the radar systems and all the air defenses of that country. So there’s going to be a very violent initial set of actions by the United States to set up that no fly zone. So that’s how the United States has gotten used to operating. The problem is that many of the assets that I describe are based on the mainland of China, or are stealthy in the form of submarines, so the temptation would be for a U.S. President or commander to take the fight deep into China early on, to protect the four deployed forces operating out here from potential attack from assets on the mainland. That would make sense from a forced protection point of view, which is the job of a commander and a President is going to be concerned about that as well.

Thomas J. Christensen:
The problem is we’ve never done that type of operation. The United States never has, to a nuclear power. Never taken the fight deep into the homeland of a nuclear power, especially early in a conflict. The idea of doing that, it could be escalatory, and what makes matters worse is that the Chinese conventional course of capability, described in some detail and I did it for a reason, is overlapping in dangerous ways with China’s modernized nuclear force. So that a lot of the conventional course of capacity of China has been built on road mobile, solid fueled, conventionally tipped ballistic missiles, and the new nuclear force is on road mobile, solid fuel, nuclear tipped missiles. Under the same command leadership, the strategic rocket force now, formerly the second artillery. And China has based its naval coercive capability largely on submarines, and now it has introduced nuclear submarines into the mix. Why is this important? If the U.S. carries out its standard relatively offensive way of protecting four deployed forces, it may try to get at early on in the conflict, at the command and control systems in the rocket forces or in the submarine forces.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That might be tempting to do. I’m not saying anything about the U.S. is or isn’t planning to do. I’m just saying it’s logical that the commander might want to take out those forces. The problem with that is, given this overlap a future U.S. President might have to consider whether the Chinese leadership would see such an action as a way of denuding the Chinese nuclear deterrent with potential escalatory implications, because they wouldn’t be able to communicate with the other submarines or a nuclear submarine might be hit in an anti-submarine operation directly, or the command and control for a nuclear force may be compromised when a conventional missile force command and control is compromised. So that makes the problem even more complicated.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Some people take heart in the idea that China has a no first use doctrine for nuclear weapons, so no amount of American conventional strike on the Chinese mainland would ever lead to nuclear escalation because China has a no first use doctrine for nuclear weapons. I’ve done research on Chinese doctrinal writings on nuclear weapons that I found, not from my government work but from scholarly research, that on materials that are not supposed to be read by people outside the Chinese military that have gotten out of China. And it seems like no first use is a serious principle in Chinese doctrinal writings. It’s just something they take very seriously. You wouldn’t dismiss it as a term. If they were to abolish no first use, it would get our attention.

Thomas J. Christensen:
But even in that world, it seems more like a guideline than a rule. There are in the doctrinal writings exceptional circumstances under which Chinese rocketeers at least, they’re not the ones who are going to make the decision, are considering instances in which what they say the threshold of deterrence would be lowered. And that doesn’t give one much confidence that a very robust conventional conflict between the United States and China would necessarily stay at the conventional level. So that’s a concern as well.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Okay. So what does this all mean from a strategic point of view? It means that a China that’s not a peer competitor to the United States has coercive power that American leadership will have to consider, and it makes a strategic environment for the United States, its allies, and strategic partners more difficult than it might appear if you just do a net assessment of the relative military power of the two actors.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And China is a rising nation that’s rubbing up against its neighbors in new ways. And lest I seem like I’m criticizing China directly, and on a cultural level I am not, because when countries rise, they rub up against their neighbors in new ways and the big question will be, are they well equipped or is the situation well structured to encourage that rising power to act in moderate ways as opposed to immoderate ways in handling those new frictions.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So I’m not picking on China, because in 2000 I published an article with my colleague at Columbia University, Richard Betts, in which we said if China handles its rise in its region as badly as the United States handled its rise in its own region in the late 19th century, we’re in really big trouble. Because the United States ended up in totally avoidable war with Spain in the late 19th century, which was followed by a large counterinsurgency war in the Philippines, largely because of domestic politics and jingoism in the United States driving the United States in a bad direction. China has all of that in spades today for reasons related to domestic politics, and one could imagine those types of dynamics playing out in a way that makes China’s ability to respond moderately to the new frictions with its neighbors reduced in probability.

Thomas J. Christensen:
China has unfortunately many points of friction. So if we look around China’s periphery, China has maritime disputes with many of its neighbors. It has what it calls the nine-dash line, which looks something like this on the map. And that claim, which is abstract and vague, it’s not really clear exactly what is included in it. Is it all the waters, is it all the rocks and reefs or all the islands? It’s expansive under any definition, and it overlaps with the claims of other actors.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So if we go around the table, the Philippines now has a rectangular claim around the Philippines that’s consistent with the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. That’s a relatively new phenomenon. Then you have Malaysia, which has claims that overlap with the Chinese. They come up like this. Vietnam’s claims go way out into the Filipino claims and way into the Chinese claims out at sea. Brunei has a tight little rectangle that sticks out to sea that overlaps with the Chinese claims.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So you have multiple claimants and these claims overlap. And then if you go up to Taiwan, there’s a sovereignty dispute there, of a different sort. It has to do with the sovereign identity of Taiwan as an island and its relations with the mainland, and it takes different forms with different parties in Taiwan. But all Taiwan political parties have a dispute with the sovereign nature of Taiwan, vis-a-vis the mainland that doesn’t agree with the Beijing’s interpretation of that sovereign status with Taiwan. So you have that, and then you have the East China Sea where you have the dispute between Japan and China over what the Chinese call the Diaoyu Islands and what the Japanese call the Senkaku Islands.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So you have all these disputes, and these disputes are really important in the following sense. We’re not in a cold war with China. The United States is not in a cold war with China. The Cold War was terrible. So I want to just preface my comments on that. The Cold War was terrible. It was dangerous. I’m glad the United States fought it. I’m glad the United States won. But it was an extremely unpleasant, nasty, and dangerous experience and people like Gaston Sigur are heroes for helping our country survive that experience intact and prevail it.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So I’m not trying to say anything about the nostalgic days of the Cold War, but I am going to say something that might startle you after saying that, and that is that in many ways the course of diplomatic challenges of the United States and its allies in East Asia with a rising China, are more complicated and harder to manage than the Cold War was in many ways, in the following sense.

Thomas J. Christensen:
After the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, for the rest of the Cold War, for the most part the lines between the two camps, the communist camp and the anticommunist camp, were relatively clear. The geographic lines. People on both sides of those lines knew what aggression would look like, particularly in places like Central Europe. The Warsaw Pact going into West Germany, that was looking at aggression, plain and simple. NATO going into Eastern Europe with conventional forces, that was, there were exceptions like West Berlin and they were important exceptions. It’s not a coincidence that that’s where a lot of the crises where early on.

Thomas J. Christensen:
But in general there were fairly clear lines. Why is that important? We know from human psychology studies, the Nobel prize winning work of Tversky and Kahneman, that the vast majority of human beings, whatever culture they come from, whatever gender they are, whatever generation they were in, tend to pay higher costs and take bigger risks to defend what they believe is legitimate status quo or what is legitimately theirs than they do to get new stuff.

Thomas J. Christensen:
There’s a temptation to get new stuff, but the degree of risk taking and the degree of costs that countries are willing to pay is much, much higher in the same way that it is for individual to defend what you believe is rightfully yours, as opposed to getting new stuff. There’s still that danger of opportunism and trying to get new things. In the cold war this was a stabilizing fact, because we knew where the lines were. We knew what aggression would look like and both sides knew that the other side would be more likely to stand firm protecting what they already had, and that was a stabilizing factor. What we lack in East Asia because of these disputes that I described is exactly that. There is no accepted legitimate status quo in East Asia. I’ve talked to diplomats in the South China sea disputes from every country except Brunei, I’ve never talked to a diplomat from Bernai about this. And I get the very strong impression that all of those diplomats sincerely believe that their claims are legitimate.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That counts the Chinese. So some people say China’s revisionist in the South China sea, is China sees all this new stuff. And I think to myself, I wish that were the case. My fear is that they actually see themselves as securing something they’ve claimed since the 1930s back to the KMT regimes of Chiang Kai Shek in the 47 Republican China consultation. And then it’s actually theirs, and then others have moved in on their territory. And I have talked to the Vietnamese about it, and they say, this nine dash line is outrageous. It runs right down our coast. It was drawn at a time when we were a French colony and had no voice in international politics. So it’s totally unjust. And the Malaysians had their own post-colonial national story, for why they should have a special rights off their own coast, the Filipinos the same way.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And they all have domestic politics that are tied up in these issues that make them even harder for them to back down on. And in that sense, the diplomatic challenge is much greater than it was during the Cold War. And I would say the same thing for the Diaoyu Senkaku dispute. Japanese people really believe the Senkaku islands are theirs. And many, many Chinese people I’ve talked to really believed the Diaoyu islands are Chinese.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That’s not a happy situation. It’d be much better if some of them were lying because it’d be easier to deter them, but they all really believe it. So that worries me. Adding to the problem is domestic political challenges in various countries, but especially since I study China I’ll focus in China, and it’s my strong impression that since the financial crisis of late 2008, that China is in the worst place domestically for the challenges that I just described. And I put it in the following nutshell. I say China is more confident abroad since the financial crisis and more afraid at home at the same time. So the Chinese communist party feels like it has more leverage on the international stage because the United States had lost a lot of prestige and power in the financial crisis.

Thomas J. Christensen:
China weather that storm relatively well economically it was the sole engine of growth within the world for a few years, at least in the early part of the crisis, gained a lot of power and prestige. So the sense is that China doesn’t need to take the slights of its neighbors or the United States like it used to, because we’re stronger now in a hurry.

Thomas J. Christensen:
That has obviously negative implications for a country that has these historic claims that it’s trying to fulfill. And then of course Taiwan as well, which I’d be happy to talk more about. And then at the same time, the financial crisis made the Chinese communist party more concerned about maintaining stability at home, because it called into question some of the sustainability of the economic growth models that were in place and the need to restructure economy faster than they had already known. They needed to restructure the economy on a faster basis to restructure that economy, so as to continue to produce growth and growth being one of the two major pillars of the Chinese communist party regime in this post ’78 period.

Thomas J. Christensen:
One of them being economic performance, the other being nationalism and protection of China’s national honor on the international stage in a postcolonial nationalist narrative that said China’s been bullied since the opium war and China needs to have a greater place on the international stage than it’s had in the past. So that puts a premium on being relatively tough in these maritime disputes, either because China has an opportunity now because it’s stronger to secure territories that it couldn’t secure in the past, or because China has an incentive to react extremely neurologically or emotionally or tough to the provocations of others. And China is not the only actor in this drama. The other disputants take actions to which China reacts. So both things are true. It’s not either or. And that makes the situation even more complicated and more concerning.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I would say on the domestic political front and I think as I said before that I’ve mentioned why the PLA, we need to recognize that the PLA is a party army, not a national army. National security in China is not national security. In Chinese the terms are very ambiguous and the term guójiā which is often seen as nation is really state. It’s state security, it’s party security. And my impression, I’ve been going to China since 1987 almost every year. The only year I wasn’t there was ’89 because I had June 16th plane tickets. But I was there in ’90 to ’91 at Peking university.

Thomas J. Christensen:
The only period in the times that I’ve been going to China where the Chinese government seems more concerned about maintaining domestic stability than now, was the period just after tenement. We exclude that period. China’s government seems more concerned about maintaining domestic stability than any other period. And that’s not a force for stability in this situation. So I would say if you looked at that two by two table China is in the place where it’s more confident abroad and more nervous at home, the place where the United States and its allies and partners would like to see China, is China to more humble abroad and more confident at home for the purpose of this Concourse and Diplomatic Exchange.

Thomas J. Christensen:
This is not a new cold war. The cold war, as I said, was nasty, China’s not an adversary of the United States. It’s a potential adversary, not a real one. If it becomes that, there’ll be a lot of failure in our diplomacy, but it’s a very complicated challenge all the same. Fortunately there were some positive features. I don’t want to make it too grim and too depressing, and one of them is that that regional interdependence. People talk about trade deficits between the United States and China in hamfisted ways, particularly in a political season. They talk about trade in general in a hamfisted way, particularly in a political season, but trade and financial investment in Asia is a major force for peace because products aren’t made in individual country’s anymore. And that’s what’s really different between world war one and the present in terms of interdependence.

Thomas J. Christensen:
You have transnational investment, you have transnational production where parts of products are made all through this region brought to China, assembled, sent back out to the region, sent to Europe, sent to the United States, and things that aren’t so much made in China as they are assembled in China in many cases.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And that’s a major force for peace because if China were to go on a regional rampage in the way that not only Hitler’s Germany did, but that Wilhelm Germany went on before world war one, then China would be really not just shooting itself in the foot economically, it would be shooting itself in the head economically because it would disrupt this incredibly delicate transnational production chain that requires on time delivery of products from multiple places. So it is fragile by its very nature. So that’s a force for peace. There is more institutional infrastructure in Asia than there was in the early post cold war period, when my colleague Aaron Freedberg write his excellent article, right for rivalry. I think the way you put it, if I can quote it directly is, “the rich alphabet soup of institutions in Western Europe, in Asia are a thin gruel indeed”. I think that’s a direct quote. But actually there’s a much more rich alphabet soup now in East Asia that could serve a purpose of confidence building.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I think that a very strong U.S presence in East Asia, a very strong alliance system is a very strong force for stability and peace in the region, but it needs to be accompanied by assurances that the purpose of that presence and those relationships is not to contain China the way we contain the Soviet union. Basically prevent China from gaining any kind of diplomatic power and prestige or economic wherewithal. That would be counterproductive in spades in East Asia and could lead to massive instability if those assurances weren’t accompanying the credibility of American presence. And at the end of the day some kind of credible threat of response if China were to become extremely coercive and aggressive. And I think we’ve been successful in the past on a couple of occasions along these lines, it can be done. There are certain things I don’t like about recent policy. I don’t like a lot of the rhetoric that has been used to describe our policy, which I think is counterproductive.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I mean the Nike sneaker camp that we should just do it. We should have a strong presence. We should have strong alliance relationships and we shouldn’t put fancy labels on it. I don’t like the term the pivot, because the pivots suggests that we’re pulling forces out of other regions and aiming them at China. We should just say we need a strong presence in Asia to stabilize the region. But I do like the details that happened underneath the pivot, bolstering those diplomatic relations. A lot of the military details of the pivot were actually in training before the Obama administration came into office. So it’s an inaccurate description, but whatever you call it, it’s a good idea that we’re bolstering our military presence in East Asia. And I think it’s a good idea that we seize the opportunity of some of China’s more assertive behavior towards its neighbors to strengthen the American military relationships with countries like the Philippines, with Malaysia, and even most recently with Vietnam.

Thomas J. Christensen:
With Malaysia and even most recently with Vietnam. And there are successes in this story where a strong position has been accompanied by assurances in ways that created stability. And one of them was the administration I served, the Bush administration in 2007, 2008 where the United States signaled that use of force against Taiwan was unacceptable. Sold lots of weapons to Taiwan, but at the same time when the Taiwan leadership was pursuing provocative initiatives that seem like efforts to unilaterally change the status quo and cross street relations, the administration criticized first privately and then publicly those initiatives in a way that helped maintain stability. And I think the Obama administration has done a fairly good job of managing a very volatile situation in the East China city with the government reiterating it’s not the first time and it’s not part of the pivot. Reiterating the longstanding US position that unlike the other maritime disputes in which the United States takes no position on sovereignty at the Senkaku is are special in the following sense.

Thomas J. Christensen:
In the case of the Senkaku is the United States takes no position on sovereignty. But it does recognize Japanese administrative control over the islands and therefore the alliance applies to them. This was stated by the secretary of state and then it was very pointedly, and I think appropriately, stated by the president in Tokyo in 2014. And at the same time, according to all public reports, the administration has discouraged Japan from taking provocative actions in and around the islands that would poke Chinese nationals in the eye and lead to a reaction. And I think that’s the right mix. And the situation isn’t totally stable now, but it’s much more stable than it was in the 2012, 2014 period as a result.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So this can be done. It’s not science fiction, it’s hard work. It takes good diplomats like your fine husband ma’am, who can handle this type of portfolio. But it is possible to do this and I am confident that it can be done in the future. I can talk about the South China sea and the Q and A or now, and I’ll leave it up to Bruce whether I should just take questions or that the South China sea as a kind of detailed problem. I have a lot of views on it. I know it’s the pressing problem of the day, but I’m sure people will ask about it. If you prefer, I would just let-

Speaker 2:
Go ahead and open up the chair.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Okay, well it’s not trying to see the very complicated situation. The US has no position on the sovereignty of any of the reefs, islands or rocks in that area. It does have an alliance with one of the disputes, the Philippines, but it doesn’t recognize the Philippines claims. It does recognize however, a commitment as an ally to the Philippines of public ships, which includes coast guard and Navy ships for the Philippines at sea.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And it’s quite possible that Filipino ships could come under pressure or attack in the future in these disputes. So that’s a direct problem for the United States as part of the alliance system. And the Philippines had one ship, it’s beached off of Palawan. It’s the Sierra Madre. It was beached there intentionally by the Filipinos from all judgments of what happened in 1999. A couple of weeks after the US accidentally blew up the embassy in Belgrade and Yugoslavia. And in that, both had one of the worst military billets and peacetime around the world. Which is there are eight Marines who are stationed permanently on a Navy ship, which the Philippines claims is a active commission ship of the Filipino Navy. It’s one of their most mighty Navy ships.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Unfortunately from American perspective, because the Filipino Navy unfortunately, from the US perspective, is quite weak. And that poses a challenge. It’s a huge area because it’s inside the nine dash line. It’s also in the Philippines and that’s a real problem. US policy in the region has been, US demands peaceful resolution of the disputes, takes no position on the sovereignty. To me, it’s freedom of navigation, which is often misunderstood in the press. There’s a lot of talk about all the trade that goes through the South China sea and why it’s so important to keep navigation. I think this is kind of a smokescreen by my own country. So I’ll be critical of my own country on this score.

Thomas J. Christensen:
China has absolutely no incentive to block trade through the South China sea. The biggest victim of such a blockage would be China if there’s blocking trade from the South China sea. So I don’t expect China to go that route. Where the freedom of navigation is really important however, is for the US military to be able to operate in the South China sea. And if China were to use one of its more expansive interpretations of the UN convention of the law of the sea and try to prevent the US military from operating in the South China sea, that would have huge implications for US military power projection around the world. And it would have huge implications for US credibility with its regional allies.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So that’s really what that struggle with freedom of navigation operations is about. It’s about military freedom of navigation and making sure that not only the Chinese, but US allies know that regardless of artificial Island building by the Chinese and regardless of interpretation of UN convention law of the sea, the US military can and will operate in that region. The United States is also called the clear claims consistent with international law, and that’s being called into question by the Philippines at the international tribunal of the law of the sea, that this nine dash line cannot possibly be fully compliant with UN convention law of the sea, which China is a signatory of. So that’s one of the positions with the Philippines.

Thomas J. Christensen:
The other position is that China is taking illegal actions that are inconsistent with the UN convention law of the sea. In fact, in places like Scarborough Shoal where a lagoon has been sealed off by the Chinese coast guard to prevent Filipino fishermen from fishing in what is the Filipino [inaudible 00:06:20]. What is not being raised in that case is sovereignty. And the Philippines was very clever not to raise sovereignty because that court would never arbitrate sovereignty unless all the disputants were willing to be involved and China clearly wasn’t. So the Filipino case is actually very smart and it may have implications for future US policy.

Thomas J. Christensen:
There has been the sealing of that lagoon in 2012, which I’ve got a lot of a region upset. There was trying to block resupply of the Sierra Madre off of on second time to show off of a Palo. There has been oil rig activity around here that upset the Vietnamese and ended up leading to a Vietnamese reaction and riots in Vietnam that targeted ethnic Chinese and the kind of extremely nasty way and actually the victims were from Taiwan. So I guess rioters have a one China policy and they went after these poor souls. We invested from Taiwan, Vietnam. People were killed. It was serious business.

Thomas J. Christensen:
There’s been the Island building campaign in various places in the Spratlys which has been seen as very provocative by the neighbors. And harassment of fishermen from various countries including Indonesia, which is not in dispute, they’ve been harassed by Maritain law enforcement ships. And basically what this has done is provided a tense atmosphere in the South China sea that I think is largely unnecessary. And it has led various countries to cooperate more robustly with the United States. Which I think the Obama administration has appropriately taken the advantage of to improve relations with the Philippines in terms of [inaudible 00:52:10] access, improve relationships with Malaysia in terms of airstrip access for surveillance planes. Improved relations with Vietnam on the defense of it.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So I support a lot of the things the Obama administration has done in the South China sea, including the freedom of navigation operations. I wish those freedom of navigation operations however, were more quiet. They should have happened earlier. They should happen more frequently than they have and they shouldn’t be on the front page of the newspapers. Because the whole point of freedom of navigation operations is to say this is normal activity. You could build a sand pile, we’ll complain about it diplomatically, but it’s not going to prevent us from sailing right by the sand pile, which has no status. Right? So that’s what you do quietly. And China will notice, the US Navy is operating. They will notice. You can tell the allies if the allies don’t notice. It doesn’t have to be in the front page. Because when it’s in the front page, you’re calling out the Chinese government. And I tried to describe before why that isn’t an optimally good idea. Because that just adds tension where it’s not necessary. There’ll be enough tension over the existence of the U S Navy. So just do it.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And then we do these general operations in the South China sea, like the aircraft carrier Stennis was about here and secretary of defense flew out there and the Filipino defense minister flew out there and this and that. That’s all fine. I think it’s a little melodramatic. I think it’s great to have the carriers go through there on occasion. I think it’s a little melodramatic to have the Sec. Def. visit the carrier while it’s out there and make a big public relations. Because it unnecessarily again, calls out countries nationalists reactions.

Thomas J. Christensen:
But the bigger problem is this, I’ll conclude with this. The bigger problem is a lot of the struggles in the South China sea are not struggles where aircraft carriers are the most appropriate tools of diplomacy. Those aircraft carriers are designed to fight major States with major capabilities. Right? And what we’re dealing with in the South China sea increasingly is China increasing its presence through the use of what are called white hulls Coast Guard ships, not Navy ships. Dredgers that dig up sand and produce artificial islands. And increasingly what’s called the Maritime Militia.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Fishermen are tough people to begin with. But a bunch of tough fishermen in China have signed up for military service. And they carry rifles and small arms and they go out to these disputed areas and they coerce and intimidate fishermen from other countries and they establish a Chinese presence. Are you really going to use an aircraft carrier against them? Right? So it’s not so much that I want to abolish the aircraft carrier as a tool of U S diplomacy. It’s just that it’s not always the proper tool. And what I would rather see is the United States go on a very robust initiative to increase the Maritime awareness and the law enforcement and Naval capability of China’s neighbors. Because they’re the ones who actually have the claims. They’re the ones who have the dogs in the fight. And just make it more costly for China to try to bully its way to getting all of the claims, the disputed claims.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And in that process, the US isn’t taking sides. US isn’t saying we agree with the Filipino claims or the Malaysian claims. Just saying you can’t get all of the claimed islands through aggression and bullying without a high cost. And that seems like an inappropriate strategy. And at the end of the day it’s their fight, not the US fight. And sometimes I worry that some of the disputants wanted to fight to the last American. And that’s not a desirable outcome from the United States. So the United States can help. And one of the things the US can do is to provide situational awareness.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And in the process the United States should continue to take its position on the sovereignty the way it has, stick to international law, stick to international law, stick to international law. It will be mightily helpful if the US Congress would pass ratify the UN convention law of the sea. Very difficult to do. Going back to the Reagan administration, but it would it be mightily helpful for the US strategy if it was based on a law that the US had ratified? But we do follow it so we can still follow up without having been ratified. But then we have to be consistent. And there’s a Japanese claim way out here in Okinotorishima, which is a bunch of rocks with a bunch of sand. And it’s not an Island in the Japanese claim. Easy around it. They’re our allies. We don’t want to call the Japanese out on that and my understanding is that there’s places way out of the Pacific where the US does the same thing but we should stop doing it.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Let’s be consistent because peace and stability in East Asia is so important to the United States and the world. It’s worth giving up a couple of fisheries so that we can have a strategy built on principle that we can follow. And the goal again isn’t to deprive China or any given reefer rock or Island. It’s to prevent the Island disputes from being settled through coordinating force and keeping the region stent. Let it be negotiating, encourage negotiation. And it should be able to be worked out and then everyone will benefit. China will benefit. The United States will benefit.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And I’ll just close with this, it’s not a zero sum game. It’s not a cold war and it’s not a zero sum game. It’s just really complicated. It’s potentially really dangerous and it has to be managed well. And again, I’m tremendously honored to speak here and the Harry Harding auditorium at the Gaston Sigur memorial lecture because those two people for me, they’re my heroes. So thanks.

Speaker 2:
Tom’s is going to take Q and A for a bit.

Thomas J. Christensen:
For as long as you like.

Speaker 2:
So as he calls on you-

Thomas J. Christensen:
I like my job [crosstalk 00:14:27].

Speaker 2:
Please identify yourself before you start. But I get the first one. Whether intentional or not you’re now you made a point of not referring to specific leaders in specific countries, and this is really about the national interest, but about growing trends in the region. Leaving aside the specific headaches in the United States or whether Xi Jinping remains president. How much of this is influenced by administrations or your leaders or how much sort of basic differences between how the patients are perceiving their interest in the region?

Thomas J. Christensen:
Well, I think public diplomacy is really important. And public diplomacy is often the first victim of domestic politics in every country. So in this time complex environment, the signals that countries send are important. I agree with a lot of the policies that the Obama administration has raised in East Asia, but I really think the pivot language was incredibly unfortunate and consequential. Because it signals something that was unnecessarily confrontational, fed into domestic debates in China into about what the United States was and wasn’t about and it fueled the types of people in those debates that we don’t want to see win the debates. And it made it very hard for the people that we’d like to see win debates in China win.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So again, you know that’s it consequentially. I think that was driven largely by US domestic politics by a new administration that wanted to say we’re withdrawing from two Wars, but we’re still very muscular in international security affairs, so we’re pivoting to Asia. And the dependent has problems in many different ways. One of them being that it makes the United States seem like it has strategic ADHD and that they can only do one thing at once. Which means even, you’re trying to, I see my student here who’s heard me say this before. For instance… Good to see you. It is designed to reassure the Asian allies and partners that were there in a robust way, but it has to be in the back of their mind. If you pivot it in, you could pivot out so it doesn’t even check that box. And then every other ally and friend around the world thinks, why are you getting away from us?

Thomas J. Christensen:
So it’s just not a good structure. And to the Obama administration’s credit, they stopped saying it themselves. So it’s not just me who was critical apparently, it was an internal discussion. So I think that’s important. If you look at Xi Jinping as opposed to who didn’t Hu Jintao, I do think it makes a difference, but I think the result is largely the same. But the process is different. This is just my interpretation. It’s very hard to tell. The Chinese system is not particularly transparent. But my sense on the Hu Jintao era after the financial crisis, there was a kind of group leadership and people watching each other’s backs on nationalist issues in the transition process to try to make sure that you looked sufficiently robust, the defensive about China’s expensive sovereignty claims in the region and that had a negative influence.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I think since she’s Xi Jinping took over there’s a different dynamic which is Xi Jinping wants to restructure the economy. He wants to clean up the party in dramatic ways and to do those things. He believes he needs to portray himself as a great leader who gets things done and takes no flack. Which is a very different dynamic than Hu Jintao era, but it plays out the same on these sovereignty disputes. A leader who gets things done secures China’s long held plains. A leader that takes no flack pushes back hard when there’s a challenge from the Philippines or there’s a challenge from Japan or there’s a challenge from the Unites States. So you’re still in the same cell, the two by two, even though the process is different. So I do, I do think it matters. And domestic politics is a big part of all this. One of the problems is all these countries save Japan, had post-colonial nationals narratives as domestic legitimizing. Whether it’s a democracy or not democracy in East Asia.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So that complicates these disputes. In a hundred years, historians are writing that the United States and China fought a war over a beached ship at the second Scarborough Shoal. An intentionally beached ship, which was declared a Navy ship. That would be a disaster. But it doesn’t take a tremendous amount of imagination to get there. That’s the scary thing about these disputes. It doesn’t take a tremendous amount of imagination to get there. You don’t have to be true science fiction authors to write that chapter of the history book from 2,125. And that’s something that we got to be able to deal with. Or fishing rights in some lagoon. Marco?

Marco:
If you were-

Thomas J. Christensen:
Nice to see you, Marco.

Marco:
Good to see you. If you were going to super impose economic diplomacy and trade diplomacy in the South China sea, what picture would you get? Would it be possible that either trade or economic disputes would actually exacerbate problems of jurisdiction regarding the islands [crosstalk 00:01:04:01]?

Thomas J. Christensen:
Well, certainly economic disputes could because if some of these regions, the Blue Dragon Region in the Southern part of Vietnam, Reed bank, which is close to that beached ship, actually have natural resources that are exploitable. The question is how many. And you understand economics. So this is Marco, we worked in the government together. He was posted in Beijing. I think Spelman is here. I have a lot of my colleagues here. So you have areas that have economic benefit for the people controlling it. So that’s a problem. And then you have fisheries. And fisheries are important. I mean it doesn’t sound like a world peace issue, but fisheries in Asia are very important economic assets. So controlling that lagoon and keeping the Filipino fishermen out is important to a lot of people in the Philippines and they vote and it’s a democracy.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So that’s a potential source of that. But I think that broader thing I described where Malaysia is producing lots of microchips that are going into computers in the Shun Jun area that are funded from Taiwan using Japanese parts, that’s a force for peace. It would be insane to break those chains over rocks and reefs. Right? So you can’t prove that because as a counterfactual, it’s the dogs that don’t bark. But I believe that this region would already be in conflict if it weren’t for that economic independence. You know, because these things are very emotional issues. And if cost weren’t very high to assert your claims more robustly, they probably already would have been asserted. And the Japan’s… There’s problems with Japan going back to 2010 over Senkaku islands. The Japanese investment patterns has not recovered to this day towards China. And that produces a lot of jobs in China. So there are real costs to these disputes.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yes, ma’am. Oh, she’s goi-

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yes, ma’am. Oh, she didn’t tape me. Okay. I’m being taped all the time, I think.

Nadia:
Welcome back. Nadia Tsao, the Liberty Times.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah.

Nadia:
You mentioned Taiwan, when you were serving in the government, now with the inauguration of the President again-

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah.

Nadia:
Do you see a different dynamic? Some people predict that based on Xi Jinping actions in South China Sea, East China Sea he’s a more aggressive leader. Do you believe that he will exercise, put pressure on Taiwan to make the President Tsai.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Wow, thanks. You know, there’s nothing like a Taiwan question that turns me back into my official government load. Right. I will not answer a hypothetical incident. It’s just, it’s just the nature of the question. Like it’s an instinct that I developed over two years system, but now I’m going to say nothing. Right. It’s a good question. I don’t know the answer, because I don’t know president Xi Jinping personally, and I spent 45 minutes in a room with him when I was Deputy Assistant Secretary. He was Vice President. I was impressed with his intelligence. I watched what’s happened in the South China Sea.

Thomas J. Christensen:
It doesn’t give me a lot of optimism about how moderately he’ll respond to perceived challenges from Taiwan. I’ve known President Tsai, I have met her many times over the years. I have tremendous respect for her. I think she’s smart. I expect her to adopt modern policies. Whether they will be satisfactory to the mainland, and the mainland will not push against her, remains to be seen. But, I really believe in the current era, the most likely cause of tension in Cross-Strait relations will be mainland disappointment. And that’s unfortunate. This idea that somehow Taiwan should parrot various phrases that previous Taiwan leaders have stated publicly, like the 1992 consensus. In order to set, maintain or create or whatever verb you want to use, a foundation for stable Cross-Strait relations. I don’t think that that should be necessary for stable Cross-Strait relations. And I hope that the two sides can find a way to work around these types of differences.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I don’t expect President Tsai to parrot those phrases. That’s not what her party’s about. But I don’t see conflict across the Taiwan cities anything but avoidable. It should be avoided. It would be a disaster, and cooler heads should prevail. So, that’s what I hope for. Hope isn’t a strategy. There’s things that countries can do to maximize the chance that that happens. But I think the big thing is I’ve been concerned and a little bit worried about some of the media reporting in China. In the official media, about expectations for future Taiwan leaders to repeat things like the 1992 consensus, which I think are unrealistic expectations. So, the question is how when those unrealistic expectations are not met, how does the mainland respond? I don’t have an answer. One would hope that someone who’s as smart as Xi Jinping would not do something counterproductive, but I can’t guarantee that that’s the case. I know that’s an unsatisfactory answer, but I don’t think it was only Yogi Berra but Yogi Berra said the future, it’s hard to do predictions, particularly about the future.

Speaker 3:
That’s great.

Speaker 4:
Tom, thanks very much for this presentation of the problem that we’re facing in the South China Sea. A lot of the measures that you suggested, I think you’re aware, these are already underway, doing a lot of these things are in our time awareness and capacity building region and so forth.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah, I don’t know how much, it’s hard to tell and I haven’t gotten [crosstalk 01:10:15].

Speaker 4:
Get the Chinese to stop and so the debate is full of frustrated people here and-

Thomas J. Christensen:
Get the Chinese to stop what though?

Speaker 4:
Stop the expansion we’re seeing in the South China Sea-

Thomas J. Christensen:
You mean the building of islands.

Speaker 4:
[crosstalk 01:10:29] using intimidating, coercive mechanisms.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah.

Speaker 4:
[inaudible 01:10:35] But let me-

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah. Okay.

Speaker 4:
Because I think that the [inaudible 01:10:38] is now reaching Washington is reaching to looking at the United States’ style of dealing with this issue as part of the problem. And I wanted to get your reaction to this and let me explain what I’m saying.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah, sure.

Speaker 4:
One second.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah, I’m trying to figure it out.

Speaker 4:
Obama is very cautious, incremental, transparent, predictable. He doesn’t let the issues spill over from one to the other, and he doesn’t let them get in the way of progress in important issues like climate change and things like that. And that makes it a situation with the opponent, it’s easier to read the United States, and it’s easy to see that what if they do expand some more, the so called salami slicing is not going to lead to much of a reaction.

Speaker 4:
And so there’s more attention being devoted to this and the discussions right now saying well jeepers, maybe the United States is a bit of an enabler in this situation.

Speaker 4:
The style of policy and action is such that an opponent like China in this case. It can read it easily. Okay. Expand easily and the consequences of Obama.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Okay. I’m not so sure it’s an accurate description of the reality. I’m not here to praise the Obama administration or criticize it. I think the United States has done some things that have gotten the attention of China that were relatively surprising. Various activities with aircraft for example, in various areas. Some of them big, honking aircraft like B-52’s in the East China Sea, the South China Sea. So, I don’t think it’s the case that, actors in the region, whether it be China or the other actors are always predicting exactly what the United States would do.

Thomas J. Christensen:
I do think that complaining about the island building of China undisputed and disputed waters, reefs, islands, rocks, whatever it is, and complaining that it’s provocative and taking advantage of those provocations to strengthen the U.S. military position in the region is something that’s likely to get their attention. And it goes back to what I described before, which is China’s strategy of developing asymmetric capabilities that can raise the cost of foreign deployed U.S. forces. It’s incredibly important when the United States is able to set up multiple new basins in a place like the Philippines, not just for the South China Sea, but for broad contingencies, because that increases the number of targets for Chinese missile leaders and others in the potential conflict. Incredibly important for regional awareness, which is a big part of American military advantage to be able to operate these new P-8 aircraft out of Malaysia.

Thomas J. Christensen:
None of that would’ve been possible likely given the post-colonial nationalist countries will often run against the U.S. if China weren’t seen as being assertive, aggressive. I don’t want to even say, aggressive I think of the use of force, so I’ll say assertive instead of aggressive. I haven’t seen Chinese influence. So, here in these regions, China is building these islands, I think we should complain about them. They’re not the first to build islands and not being a defense lawyer for China here. The Vietnamese built islands, the Filipinos built islands. Chinese are the last to do it, but they do it in a big way because they’re China. So they built a lot of them, and it’s undeniably destabilizing and you complain about it. But, really the most important thing from a U.S. perspective, I believe, is how these things are used.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So, the fact that they put airstrips on them is concerning. And it’s not concerning for the reasons that many people often state. It’s not concerning because those airstrips can be used against the United States. That would be extremely stupid for an adversary to use airstrips on isolated sand piles against the U.S. military. It would be a very bad place to be, as a soldier or an airman from a foreign country, if that sand pile is being used against the U.S. military. But, where it is quite dangerous, is you have these other claims from other disputants. If China started to use those artificial islands as launching pads for offenses against the holdings of other states, that would be something that would be extremely destabilizing for the region, and would run against stated U.S. policy, which is that the disputes be handled peacefully, and that would provide an opportunity for a more direct to U.S. approach toward the artificial islands than has been provided by China or the other disputants to date, it seems to me.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And that, I think, can be determined and I think that’s really the destabilizing aspect of those islands to begin with. So, if you can deter that kind of use of the islands, then you’ve done a lot. And then there’s the issue of this ITLOS case, and that’s supposed to come to a head as you know Bob, I’m really talking to the rest of the room, because I know you’re an expert on this stuff, but the ITLOS case is likely to come to pass in the next several weeks and there’s a very good chance that one of the disputed areas, Scarborough Shoal, will be decided in a way that creates a challenge for U.S. policy in the region. If the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea says that China’s activities in the Filipino exclusive economic zone are inconsistent, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and that it is illegal for China to block that lagoon, and the Filipino send fishermen there with coastguards, then there’s going to be a real issue for the United States. Because the international court, the viewer strategy again, is based on international law.

Thomas J. Christensen:
International law would be challenged by the Chinese if they challenge the Filipino ships and Filipino ships, not the reef itself, are part of the U.S.-Philippine Alliance. And then there’s a real challenge, and I think that sort of dynamic can be presented to the Chinese in ways that could alter the behavior. Will it stop them from increasing the presence in the South China Sea altogether? I don’t think so. I think there are certain outcomes from U.S. Strategic policy that are really unattainable, but shouldn’t be seen as the standard of success or failure. China is getting bigger and has more capacity. It has these claims for a long time. There are going to be more Chinese boats in the South China Sea over time, there’s going to be more Chinese activity in the South China Sea too. The question is, how destabilizing will that activity be? How violent will it be, and how much will it harm the interests of the region, the world and the United States in the process?

Thomas J. Christensen:
So, I don’t say United States has failed to deter China from building artificial islands. I don’t think that’s a standard of success or failure in that the United States should be held to. I think it is destabilizing of China to build it. I think it’s been counterproductive for China’s own national security, in getting the neighbors upset about China. China’s diplomacy in Southeast Asia was fantastically successful, I outlined this in my book, from 1997 to 2008, reassuring its neighbors that China’s rise was going to be something that was good for everybody in the region, and China has largely scrapped that since 2009, so it’s not good for China either. This is not a zero sum game. We’ve all lost, in a sense, from these provocative activities, and China has lost the most I would say.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So, knowing the book from which some of these comments were derived, I try not to make scorecards that the Obama administration did well, that the Bush administration did well. My confession is I’m a lifelong independent, of sometimes say, I’m like Groucho Marx. I would never join a party that would have me as a member. So a Groucho Marxist maybe. But, the goal is really to prescribe, proudly served in a Republican administration, but the goal is to try to learn the lessons of what’s worked and not worked in the past, so that whoever’s elected in the future will have a better playbook. And that’s really the goal. So I don’t want to beat up the Obama administration and will point out things that I think we did wrong. Thanks. It’s a long answer to a very big question. Yes, sir.

Speaker 5:
[inaudible 01:19:46] with the [inaudible 01:19:47] problems. …………But, somewhere in the middle, you talked about Philippine strategy, even attacking China. I lived in this country from 1917, before Nixon’s visit to China there were a lot of right-wing nuts who used to ask me since I was from India, if the United States might nuke China, confused me, I said that would be barbaric if it did. So given, I mean, with American involvement in the Palestinian issue, Afghanistan, and Iraq, we’ve got so much terrorism that says America is strong, Europe is high-strength. If you ever gotten into conflict, a military conflict with China, the amount of terrorism would multiply 100-1,000 from what it is now, so shouldn’t the United States think of those kinds of things. [inaudible 01:20:45]

Thomas J. Christensen:
Could the United States think? [crosstalk 01:20:45] Okay. [crosstalk 01:20:47] I would say it was very dangerous if the United States didn’t think of these kind of things. If they came [crosstalk 01:20:52] to the conclusion that a nuclear exchange between China and the United States is a very bad thing that would be a good conclusion to draw. But, you would have to think about it first, before you came to that conclusion.

Speaker 5:
You’re right.

Thomas J. Christensen:
So I think the United States is obliged, with its Alliance system in Asia, and with its interest in East Asia, to think about what may or may not cause a conflict with China and how it would be prosecuted.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And what would concern me is if their thought process was relatively shallow, where some of those normal reactions of the U.S. military were to be employed. And I was, what I’m trying to suggest is that the United States needs to have more things like active defense of foreign deployed forces, rather than relying on robust attacks into the mainland, so that a President would have more realistic and more serious options if push were to come to shove. And I don’t think push needs to come to shove, so I don’t want to come across. But you can’t, this idea that you get peace by avoiding talking about war I think is just, it’s just fantastic and unrealistic. [crosstalk 01:21:57] You have to think through.

Speaker 5:
[crosstalk 01:21:58] You have to think seriously about what the other side is also doing.

Thomas J. Christensen:
Absolutely they are. And, so we have to as well. So, that doesn’t mean it’s necessarily going to lead to war, but you have to think about it. And it’s interesting, my title at Princeton, and maybe I’ll close with this because you want to wrap up right, is William P. Boswell, Professor of World Politics of Peace and War. It’s a very long title. Not as long as my title in the State Department, but it’s very long. The gentleman who donated the money to Princeton, William P. Boswell was an energy, I don’t want to say tycoon. He was a very successful energy business person in Ohio. He had a house that was a Frank Lloyd Wright designed home. He was a very successful Princeton grad. But, before he was a successful Princeton grad, he was a warrior in East Asia who fought in Burma against the Japanese. He got a Bronze Star, and when he came back to Princeton, he finished and he went into business, was very successful and he donated enough money for two chairs in his name.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And he said, “Put the peace before war.” I talked to his son about it all right, but don’t leave [inaudible 01:23:07] peace at. Just put the peace before war because peace is a lot better than war. He’s seen war. So I, this is a good way to close, right? But you have to think about the war piece and you know, the United States has in its history, a period in which it says war is bad. Stay away from it. And there’s a lot of bad things on the campaign trail. This is one of them, on this year’s campaign trail, this idea of war is bad, so stay away from, don’t think about it. Right? And what that does is it leaves regions to fester and to escalate to a point where the United States ends up having to fight its way back in. And that’s the much worse world than the U.S. being present, being strong and moderate at the same time, and keeping the peace, so that those conflicts never happen.

Thomas J. Christensen:
And, I think that’s a good place to close because again, who did a better job of that in Asia for U.S. ideals in places like Korea and keeping the peace during the cold war than Gaston Sigur and I’m tremendously honored to give the annual lecture. Thanks to Bruce and David and everyone else involved in having me here. And thanks to Mike who did a tremendous job with all the logistics. I really appreciate it. And thanks to the family, honoring me with your presence. Thanks so much. [inaudible 00:18:36].

Speaker 6:
[inaudible 01:24:36]

Thomas J. Christensen:
Yeah, I don’t think we should stop [inaudible 01:24:38]. I’ve been here before.

05/22/2017: The 22nd Annual Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture: Lessons from Korea: Korea’s Democracy After 30 Years with Ambassador Kathleen Stephens

Monday, May 22, 2017

6:00 PM – 8:30 PM

City View Room, 7th Floor

Elliott School of International Affairs

1957 E Street NW, Washington, DC 20052

Kathleen Stephens is a former U.S. ambassador to the Republic of Korea. Stephens’ diplomatic career included serving as acting under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2012;

Transcript

Gregg Brazinsky:
… all of you to the Gaston Sigur Memorial Lecture. The Sigur… I’m just briefly going to talk about the Sigur Center and tonight’s guest. The Sigur Center for Asian Studies’ mission is to increase the quality and broaden the scope of scholarly research and publication about Asia, and to promote US Asian scholarly interaction while educating a new generation of students, scholars, analysts, and policy makers. The Sigur Center promotes research and policy analysis on all different parts of Asia, East Asia, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, and South Asia. And it has an active program of publishing, teaching, public events, and policy engagement.

Gregg Brazinsky:
The Center offers students the largest Asian studies program in Washington DC metropolitan region with around 70 faculty members at GW who work on Asia. The Center was founded in 1991 out of the Sino-Soviet Institute and it was named for Gaston Sigur, a Japan specialist who had a long and distinguished career at the George Washington University, the National Security Council, and the US Department of State. And it’s also a particular pleasure that today we have four members of a Gaston Sigur’s family with us in the audience.

Gregg Brazinsky:
The Sigur Memorial Lecture is an annual event which was created with the intent of bringing an eminent policy maker or policy practitioner or scholar to the university every year to give an address related to the politics, culture, and international relations of East Asia. And today’s lecture in particular is partially to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies. This year as our speaker, we are particularly lucky to welcome Ambassador Kathleen Stephens. Ambassador Stevens has a distinguished career in the foreign service. This includes serving as acting under secretary of state for public diplomacy and public affairs in 2012, as US ambassador to the Republic of Korea between 2008 and 2011, as principal deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and public affairs from 2005 to 2007, and deputy assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasian affairs from 2003 to 2005.

Gregg Brazinsky:
She’s also won a large number of honors and awards, which I’m not going read the full list here. That she’s received the 2009 Presidential Meritorious Service Award. She’s also received recognition from the Korean government. She received the Sejong Cultural prize in 2013. And in 2011 the Pacific Century Institute’s Building Bridges Award, as well as the Outstanding Achievement Award from the American Chamber of Commerce in Korea. Please join me in welcoming Ambassador Kathleen Stephens.

Kathleen Stephens:
Thank you. Well Gregg, thank you very much and good evening everyone. I’m going to move this aside. I’m not going to risk my luck and your patience with trying to [inaudible 00:03:49]. Thanks again for that really kind introduction. I am delighted to be back here at a George Washington University at the Gaston Sigur Center for Asian Studies, and I am so honored to be delivering this 22nd Memorial Lecture on this 22nd day of May. It’s a particular delight to see four members of the Sigur family here who have continued the tradition of public service that Gaston Sigur epitomized. Thank you. Thank you for being here. I know that these lectures over the years have brought many distinguished speakers to this podium to address a wide range of topics. And the scope of the subject matter, I know from Gregg over the years, reflects, well, I think the Center’s growth and maturation, and it’s a fitting legacy to Dr. Sigur, whose own career was one of such exceptional variety and impact.

Kathleen Stephens:
I understand tonight’s lecture is the first time that we ate first and then are speaking afterwards. Gregg probably, maybe didn’t know that one of my favorite to a Korean expressions, I have many favorite Korean expressions, is [foreign language 00:05:00], even when you go to the Diamond Mountains, you should eat first. So thank you for that. I know it makes for a more content audience. And what I’m going to try to do, although I have a rather formidable list of notes here, when we start talking about lessons, I have a lot of lessons, I guess. Maybe I’m trying to really get into my second career. I no longer work for the US government, so don’t take anything I say too seriously or hold against the US government. But I do want to try to make some comments even though they’re somewhat lengthy, a little bit of a trip down history and memory lane, and then really open up to a discussion because we really have quite an extraordinary group of people here, many of whom I know, and many of whom I’ve known for years.

Kathleen Stephens:
So thank you all for coming. But I was reminded, actually this weekend and earlier today, of Gaston Sigur’s career. I was in New York, as I was saying the family, earlier today where I was attending a trustee meeting of the Asia Foundation. As many of you know, Gaston Sigur worked 16 years for the Asia Foundation in Afghanistan, Japan, and San Francisco. And I was thinking about how that experience really prepared him so well for his subsequent work in academia and in government. I think that has to do with what the Asia Foundation is, and what is too often missing in academic, if I may say, and government circles in terms of on the ground and in country experience and expertise. So I’ll stop talking about the Asia Foundation in a minute, but maybe another lecture could talk about that because I think that’s an example of the kind of engagement and soft power that’s more important now than ever.

Kathleen Stephens:
But tonight I am going to focus on Korea. When Professor Brazinsky invited me some months ago to be this year speaker, he said I could talk about anything I liked, he didn’t say for as long as I like, but as long as it was about Korea. And so I suggested to him a topic that’s been kind of rattling around in my head for a long time. It’s something I just loosely call lessons from Korea. Now I personally have learned a lot from… I’ve been deeply influenced by Korea and by the Korean people. I know I’m not alone in this room tonight in that experience. But even more importantly, I think there’s a lot we can and need to learn about what works and doesn’t work and US foreign policy formation, implementation, and how we approach difficult issues, and working with allies, when it comes to our involvement Korea over the past 70 plus years. And some of these lessons, especially maybe the more painful ones, are especially important as we continue to address the challenges that North Korea presents.

Kathleen Stephens:
But I’m not going to talk, at least in my prepared remarks tonight, about North Korea. Gregg and I agreed that tonight is a good time, and I think this is a perfect venue and the perfect audience, to recall and reflect upon the events of 1987. Was it really 30 years ago [Steve 00:07:55]? The year that was the tipping point and Korea’s democratization, a year that saw ever-growing numbers of Koreans protesting in the streets, demanding the right to elect their president with their own hands. And getting it.

Kathleen Stephens:
Now just two weeks ago, and it was it really only two weeks ago, South Koreans for the seventh time since 1987 elected a new president in a democratic and free election. That election also came after weeks of protest, months, actually, of protest. Massive, peaceful, in the streets of Seoul and other South Korean cities. And this time the demand was the removal from office of a president, a democratically elected president, but one who had lost their confidence and trust, their [foreign language 00:08:48]. And they got it. Park Geun-hye was impeached by the national assembly and then removed from office by a constitutional court, roughly 11 months before her one term presidency would have ended in the normal constitutional cycle.

Kathleen Stephens:
So there’s a lot of lessons I want to reflect on. One lesson I wasn’t really thinking about, but I was telling someone before I came here that this was what I was planning on doing, and someone said, “well, did you see the Washington Post last Friday?” There was a headline, let me say, and online, the headline was, “South Koreans to Americans, we’ll teach you how to impeach a president.” It wasn’t really the lesson I was going to talk about tonight, and maybe we’ll leave that along with North Korea for questions and answers, or our side conversations. But I do hope that a kind of historical look back to 1987 and the ensuing years will help us think about issues that have fresh salience today throughout the world. And they do include things such as should, and if so, how, can the US promote democracies in other countries?

Kathleen Stephens:
What can we learn from Korea’s own democratic journey? And what can other countries learn? It may be more than we thought. Now you’re probably thinking if I’m going to describe 30 plus years of Korea’s politics and its political development before even getting to what’s happening now, we’re going to be here all night. So I want to assure you I won’t even try to do that, but I’m going to suggest a little bit of reading, if I could be slightly academic. And one great book to read is of course Gregg’s own book, Nation Building in South Korea. I may make mention of that a little later. But I’m also drawing from some memoirs by people I knew or worked with over the years, because I was talking about this mostly for an American perspective. I guess kind of obviously. This includes a time, as I’ll talk about, when I was an active duty foreign service officer. Don Oberdorfer for his The Two Koreas.

Kathleen Stephens:
He has a good chapter there on the events of 1987 and prior. And books of two other former American ambassadors in Seoul, William Gleysteen’s, Massive Entanglement, Marginal Influence. The title kind of says it all, but written about an earlier period of course. Also very important, ’79 and ’80. And my own former bosses book, the late James Lilley China Hand, and his chapter on Korean democratization. And actually there’s also an exhibition at the Wilson Center starting this Friday on Korean democratization after 30 years. Thursday, Thursday. And so I decided rather than to have slides, we’ll just go and see the exhibition. But what I’m going to try to do tonight, with your indulgence, is to give you a fairly personal account of what I witnessed and experience from my little vantage point and learned as a young foreign server, at least younger, foreign service officer assigned to Korea from 1983 to 1989, trying to make sense of Korea’s churning political scene, trying to understand, explain, and sometimes, in small ways, influence Korean and American attitudes and approaches.

Kathleen Stephens:
Now I guess another proviso, there’s a Mark Twain saying, that as I get older I have increasingly vivid memories of things that never occurred. So if something seems a little jumbled later on, you can certainly remind me. But one thing I certainly do remember very, very well is the far, far larger and really key role that Dr. Gaston Sigur played during those years. First at the Reagan White House, and then as assistant secretary for East Asia at the state department. I admired him then, and now 30 years later I admire him even more. But so I was pretty new to the foreign service. I served a couple of years in China. Just as we, US and China, normalized relations in the early ’80s. And then I was thrilled to be assigned to Seoul’s political section in 1983. I’d been a Peace Corps volunteer in the ’70s I knew a little bit of Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
I was ready to go. And I wanted to be a political officer. Others in the embassy were not so enthused with the prospect of a woman in the political section. I was told repeatedly, and always I was told, with the best intentions, mostly by Americans, that I was the first woman to even want that job. Because Korean politics was such a man’s world that required drinking and carousing and all kinds of things, I couldn’t possibly be expected to comprehend or participate in. Nevertheless, I persevered. And after nine months of Korean language training to make me conversant in the language of politics, labor unions, and human rights, or at least to have some sense of what was being said to me, all these things were important to my new job covering Korea’s domestic political scene, I started that job. Trying to get to know, trying to understand and report on Korea’s internal politics, especially at student labor and opposition scene.

Kathleen Stephens:
So Korea in those days, in the ’80s, I know a lot of you weren’t even born then, so stick with me. It was a long way from the rural Park Chung-hee era Korea I’d experienced in the 1970s. So one lesson is, even if it’s a few years don’t rely too much on your previous experience. It helps, but you got to be open to what’s changed. And I certainly reminded myself of that year after year as I came back to see not only a much changed Korea, but this country as well. But in any event, when I was in Korea in the ’70s, talk of politics was essentially forbidden. There was a midnight to 4:00 AM curfew throughout the country. And my treasured copy of Time magazine in the ’70s arrived each week by Korean mail, blacked out and torn up beyond use by Korean censors. And I was back a few years later, 1984. Obviously a lot had changed. And when I started my job in the political section, Chun Doo-hwan had ruled the country since 1980.

Kathleen Stephens:
The economy was booming. Double digit growth in many years. Seoul had won the right to host the summer Olympics in 1988. Chun had promised he was going to step down in 1987 after a single seven year term, and that this was going to be his contribution to Korea’s political development, that he would not stay in office until literally the end as Park Chung-hee had done. And he would preside over Korea’s first peaceful transfer of power. But all those promises, all that economic growth, didn’t erase the deep antipathy and suspicion, in many quarters hatred, to a Korean leader who had seized power through a military coup, brutally suppressed citizen calls for democracy, most bloodily of course in Gwangju and May, 1980. And in fact, as the economy grew, as people prospered, as South Koreans watched people power gain ground in places like the Philippines, in those years, Korean university students, historically the conscience of the nation, increasingly found support for their democratization calls from a growing, urban, middle-class.

Kathleen Stephens:
A slowly liberalizing political environment, some of this liberalization done under some American pressure. If I seem to overemphasize the American role, I’m not ignoring what else happened, but that’s just where I’m putting a bit of emphasis. But this liberalized and political climate included the return of opposition dissident Kim Dae Jung from his exile in the United States. And together with previously jailed or banned oppositionists, they shocked the Chun regime with an unexpectedly strong showing in the parliamentary elections in 1985. The heavy handed, to say the least, police response to growing student and labor protests, massive lashings of pepper gas, the use of torture against suspected student radicals, all this further alienated the Korean public and strained US South Korean relations.

Kathleen Stephens:
President Chun continued to emphasize he was determined to step down in 1987, after finishing his seven year term. But as that term drew near, and as I think about this year, 30 years ago now, many Koreans doubted whether he really intended to relinquish power, or if he intended to, while should I say more of a Putin, and to retain some kind of behind the scenes power.

Kathleen Stephens:
There was an indirect electoral college method in place that was clearly designed to ensure that Chun’s long time friend and fellow former army general, Roh Tae-woo, would be his successor. And as these demonstrations gained force, gained steam, over a period of years and months, they focused increasingly, and with increasing support on one major easy to understand demand. It’s kind of like a branding I suppose. I mean there were many, many things that, especially the students, wanted to see addressed, but the slogan became, we want to elect our president by our own hand. We’re ready for that. And they gained a lot of support with that in mind. Some Koreans, most especially Korean students, blamed the United States for not doing more to support democracy, or to oppose Chun in 1979 and 1980. And I spent countless hours, really kind of futile hours I suppose, hearing these grievances and trying to respond to them as best I could.

Kathleen Stephens:
They were an apology for what they regarded as the American failure to stop the bloodbath in Gwangju in 1980, after supporting Chun. There were a series of attacks and occupations of American diplomatic facilities, including the firebombing of the US Cultural Center in 1982, and subsequent attempted attacks or occupations of US facilities elsewhere, including the occupation of the US Cultural Center in Seoul in 1985. So it was certainly clear to US officials, and not just political officers running around on the ground, but right up the chain, that a large proportion of Koreans wanted to see a more democratic system.

Kathleen Stephens:
But there was also concern, in the administration, about undermining Chun and his plan to step down with unpredictable consequences in a country is still under threat from North Korea. And it was also conventional wisdom, I’d just say not in every quarter, but in some, and I don’t think… I know this is not something that Dr. Sigur subscribed to, but I would hear senior policy people sometimes say, and scholars, I must say American scholars, that cultures that are heavily influenced by Confucianism were not naturally inclined towards the values of democracy, that this was going to be a slow process and it could not be rushed.

Kathleen Stephens:
During this period there were two horrific North Korean attacks, one on the Korean presidential motorcade in Rangoon in 1983, that almost killed the president, killed many others. And the other blowing up by North Korean agents of the Korean Air civilian flight coming back from the Middle East. But I was hearing from students and oppositions every day, why doesn’t the US do more? And they complained bitterly about US interference and support for dictators. I actually learned years later, when I went back as ambassador, from a South Korean diplomat, by that time in very senior positions, the foreign minister and others, that the Chun Blue House, back then in the ’80s, was always asking the foreign ministry, who is Kathy Stephens? And why was she on so many college campuses and so many demonstrations, seeing so many dissidents? Why wasn’t she acting like a proper diplomat?

Kathleen Stephens:
And I was reminded that the foreign ministry too, they were watching all this, and hoping, and in their own difficult position of trying to… So it was a story, not just the people on the streets but throughout the society looking for change. But that was my job and I loved it. But I want to stress two things that were done publicly. We talked about public diplomacy. There were a lot of private things, two things that were done publicly by very senior American officials that I think had a real impact, and I saw it for myself while I was there. And one was our Secretary of State, George Schultz, who made several visits to Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
I remember one in particular just right around this time, 1986 I believe, when he was there primarily to show support for the summer Olympics. These were going to be supported and held in safety. And I enjoyed accompanying him to a photo op at Seoul’s spectacular new Olympic Stadium. But we at the embassy had been reporting on the use of torture, and it’d become public that in fact a student had died from torture in police captivity, and Secretary Schultz decided it was time to speak out about this. And I’ll always remember him saying, I don’t if it will have the same impact today, at a press conference simply, in that kind of deep gravelly voice he has, “you don’t torture.” You don’t… that’s all he said. But that diplomacy on torture, backed up by quiet diplomacy, but a clear public message, won us respect. And I felt this myself in my context, that we had not had before.

Kathleen Stephens:
1987 was the tipping point year. The year when President Chun started to actually tighten up again to prepare for an election later that year to elect his designated successor. And it was that year, the beginning of that year, February, 1987, with all this as kind of a backdrop anyways, that our assistant secretary of state for East Asian affairs, Dr. Gaston Sigur, gave a speech in New York. I don’t think the speech got a lot of attention in the United States. A lot of stuff going on back then too. But in the speech, he announced US support for the creation of quote, “a new political framework,” unquote, through constitutional and legal reform. And he called for the civilianizing of South Korea’s politics. Now that word, he gave the speech in English obviously, to civilianize, that captured the attention and the imagination of-

Kathleen Stephens:
The attention and the imagination of everybody in Korea. Wow. That was a mess. I remember we talked about how we translate, how we talked about that. A clear message that the United States was looking for something quite different, and hoping for something quite different, as Korea went through its political transition and a civilianized process.

Kathleen Stephens:
It was also during this time in ’87, in this increasingly tense atmosphere, that I made my one and only trip to The Blue House during that era. At that time I was accompanying my DCM, our number two at the embassy, to see a senior member of [Chun’s 00:23:41] staff. And that was when we’d seen in the newspapers and heard elsewhere through our sources, that there was this idea of having re-education camps for student activists, and we went and said, “re-education camps doesn’t sound so good. Are you sure you want to do that?” They didn’t do it, but I think there was still a kind of a tone deafness to what was going on in the country, and also how the US was reacting.

Kathleen Stephens:
Our new ambassador, Jim Lilley, arrived and broke with earlier tradition by meeting both opposition Kim’s, including Kim Dae-jung who was still anathema to South Korea’s elite in a way that’s very hard, I think, to imagine today, and had them to his residence for Independence Day and other events.

Kathleen Stephens:
But after this tumultuous spring of protests in 1987, on June 10th the ruling camp held their party convention. They nominated, to no one’s surprise, Roh Tae-woo as their candidate. And demonstrations seemed like maybe they were just going to tough it out, but then they started to grow again. The international press kind of came in more and more saying, “Is this going to be the next Philippines? More and more attention. There were rumors that martial law might be declared. Students were joined on the street by the so-called necktie brigade of men in suits and women coming out of the small stores. And you could walk down the streets in central Seoul and buy all kinds of makeshift gas masks so that you could try to endure the pepper gas, as more and more people came out. And amidst all this, we got word at the embassy of Seoul that there was a letter coming from president Reagan that needed to be delivered to m.

Kathleen Stephens:
And I remember my boss had a terrible time getting an appointment for our ambassador to go in and deliver this letter. He didn’t want to see it. But finally on June 19th he delivered the letter, it was a very gentle call for political rather than military solutions.

Kathleen Stephens:
And then six days later, Dr. Sigur came to Seoul and saw president Chun went to see Kim Dae-jung and others in the opposition. And that night at a dinner that was hosted by the foreign minister. And I think this is from Dr. Sigur’s own recollections heard from again, some of our friends in the foreign ministry, there’s a fever going on and that fever is democracy and we cannot turn it back and still every day we wondered what would happen. At least at my low level sometimes people think the United States knows everything. If they did, they didn’t tell me and I don’t think we really knew exactly how this was going to play out, but we could see the direction things were going.

Kathleen Stephens:
We had our hopes that this was going to go in the right direction and I arrived at work in the morning, every evening we’d go out and kind of watched the demonstrations, come in the morning, see what was happening, what the word was from Washington on what was being reported in the western press and sit down with journalists some times and talk about what was going on. But I got a phone call from a contact of mine in the Korean government and he said, do you have a television anywhere you can turn on, so I found one and turn it on and Roh Tae-woo. The presidential nominee came before the cameras visibly nervous and announced that he was agreeing to all the opposition’s demands. I still get to chill when I think about it and I went out and I remember another colleague of mine, Steve, I don’t know if you were there that day.

Kathleen Stephens:
But [Ed Dawn 00:00:27:09] was talking to all the journalists and I kind of burst into the room. This is a conference room in the embassy and said, kind of almost like hold the presses. You may want to hear this, I said Roh Tae-woo has just agreed to direct elections and all the journalists jumped up and ran out of the room. What you may do in a while too, but it was thrilling. I’m just trying to think, it was really thrilling. It was just a moment of great electricity and it was a climax, a day we remember. But what followed, and I won’t go into such detail, was equally important, and I would say somewhat unpredictable. Some would say maybe you could predict the two Kims split, even though they said they wouldn’t, the presidential contest became a raucous three-way race, but suddenly in those weeks following, and those months following, instead of going onto demonstrations that were heavily teargassed, we were going out to political rallies with a million people gathered.

Kathleen Stephens:
The hunger for political participation was moving, and inspiring, and a little scary too. What was going to happen? And in the event, of course, Roh Tae-woo benefited from the split between the two Kims and rode democratization and the Olympic wave to victory, and indeed was president when the Olympics came and was very successfully held in Korea in 1988, that’s my kind of summary of kind of how thrilling it was to be in Korea in those years, in the 80s. I left Korea in 1989 and my life and career took a different turn. 89 later that year, the wall fell. I actually ended up going to Yugoslavia just as it was breaking apart. And I spent the next 15 years working on jobs in post cold war Europe. But I took the lessons and I took the inspiration of Korea with me.

Kathleen Stephens:
And one was simply an optimism about the possibilities of positive change and I needed that as I worked in imploding Yugoslavia and I worked later to find a way out of the seemingly endless troubles and frozen troubles of Northern Ireland. But of course another lesson I carried with me was that the United States had a role to play and that individuals at various levels in different roles can make a difference, and then policy can make a difference in actions both small and large. But also a lesson, and again here I’m going to refer to Greg’s book again, the even more than the high policy state votes for the decision to do something in one place and not to do it in another is longer term engagement.

Kathleen Stephens:
What Joe Nye called soft power in some ways, the supporting education exchanges and values that can make a real difference. And this is, I think what you talk about in your book, Nation Building in South Korea, there was underpinning whatever we did right or wrong as the United States, relevant or not, in the 70s and the 80s we were there for decades. In supporting certain values, certain institution building and I think it had an impact. You can imagine in 2005 you’re getting a story of my life here. I’m sorry I returned to Korea for the first time since 1989 this is sort of like being, Rip Van Winkle, right? I mean Roh Tae-woo was president when I left in 1989 Roh Moo-hyun was president when I came back in 2005 as an official from the state department. They had the same last name but they spelled it differently in English, so to remember that.

Kathleen Stephens:
But they had some other differences as well. And in between the two, these two men that I had known as opposition leaders often seen them under house arrest. Kim Young-sam and Kim Dae-jung had both been president, so I have to say it was personally very moving and rewarding to go and see Kim Dae-jung to see Kim Young-sam, to see all these people I’d known and to see what had happened and hadn’t happened. How Korea’s democracy had grown like our own. I think in fits and starts, but overall in an incredibly impressive and positive way. And as part of the Bush administration in 2005, 2006, 2007 I had a role in working with the administration of president Roh Moo-hyun. Sometimes people called them the odd couple or sometimes people used to say about us career relations in those years that it was like [inaudible 00:31:22] music, it wasn’t as bad as it sounds.

Kathleen Stephens:
That was another Mark Twain quote I think, but in fact we worked with Roh Moo-hyun’s administration on the Korea-US Free Trade Agreement, right? Agreed under those administrations ratified under the next one. Korean troops in Iraq. Not a very popular war in Korea either, but South Korea sent the third largest contingent of forces to Iraq in those years. And of course the six-party talks where we made progress before we stopped making progress. But that’s another story. And this work of course continued into Lee Myung-bak administration and he was president while I was there as ambassador, when we worked together in the aftermath of the Cheonan ship sinking, the Yeonpyeong shelling and maybe not so much thought about now, but in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008 when Korea joined the… If you like the top table of economies as the chair of the G20 through a very difficult period.

Kathleen Stephens:
To me kind of again, but just kind of my impressions living in Korea again, being in Korea again after 15, 16 years, having left just as this great democratic tipping point had been reached and Korea was on this democratic path. I mean at first I realized I was asking people questions they found were very odd. I tried to get most of those questions out of the way before I actually became ambassador. But I remember going back in 2005 and 2006 and meeting with students and I said, well, what about the military and politics? They looked at me like I was crazy. They hadn’t thought about the notion that military was completely out of politics. Civilian authority had been completely established. Dr. Sigur would have been very pleased. It was civilianisation. The issue of legitimacy had been resolved. Remember in divided Korea, this question of legitimacy has always been something, it really ate at I think South Koreans self confidence and sense of their countries, place in the world.

Kathleen Stephens:
I found Koreans far more confident and this didn’t just come from economic growth. Even more it came from a sense that Korea had joined the world of democratic nations. This strength and security, it didn’t undermine it. That was always I think a false argument. Power had transferred peacefully across the political spectrum and successive administrations, as I’ve already mentioned it dealt with crises, economic security and each case there were some setbacks. I mean, Kim Dae-jung came to power thinking in the first instance, I think he really wanted to focus on inter-korean relations. What was the first thing he had to do a president, he had to deal with the Asian financial crisis and the meltdown and worked very, very closely, not just with the United States but with other partners to do so.

Kathleen Stephens:
The US had worked with all these governments and so I always found it a bit of a myth or at least an over simplification, this kind of conventional wisdom that still exists, I have to say in parts of the US thinking, on Korea that we work better with conservative governments. Maybe there’s some scholars out there who’ve looked at this and you can tell me if you found differently, but I think we’ve both been effected by our election cycles. That could certainly have a big impact on our policy continuity and goals. But I don’t think that there’s a real pattern that you can say that somehow if it’s a conservative government in Seoul it’s going to work better for the Americans.

Kathleen Stephens:
I’m talking about all the positive things I see, I’ll get to. Women’s rights, much improved. South Korea is still very low on a lot of the OEC scoreboards of opportunities and conditions for women, but it really was only with democratization, that pioneers like Lee Tai-young Korea’s first woman lawyer who fought for years, I remember seeing her in Yeouido with her kind of stand there helping women who were trying to get divorces, or get child custody, or get support and had no rights really under the old household registration system. It wasn’t until after democratization and quite a long time after that, some of those structural changes really began to happen.

Kathleen Stephens:
Human rights, I’m going to talk about this again in a very kind of way that I experienced it. The fact that in terms of being a Rip Van Winkle, there was no more corporal punishment in Korea. I worked as a Peace Corps volunteer in Korea in the 70s when students, including middle school students were brutally beaten and this was a pattern. I don’t want to embarrass Koreans here. I think it was kind of people didn’t like to talk about it or think about it, but this kind of brutality was pretty common, especially for the young boys through high school, through their military service. And I think really influenced the kind of treatment that university students got when they got picked up for demonstrating. That’s all gone. It’s all gone. It’s unacceptable, it’s not just a matter of protection for political rights, but it’s a new respect I think for broadly speaking, human rights and human dignity.

Kathleen Stephens:
And my favorite one is I saw such a blossoming of creativity in Korea compared to what I’d known in the 70s and the 80s I’m going to have to say I’m very nostalgic about the past. I’m getting old. I have to be nostalgic. And I have wonderful memories of Korea in the 70s but it was a pretty dull place in a lot of ways in terms of people’s ability to express themselves. I’m not talking about politics now, but I am absolutely convinced that without political reform, without openness, without democracy, you might see this is a good thing. There would be no Korean wave, there wouldn’t be K-pop, there wouldn’t be all these kind of amazing cutting edge artists that you see on the Korean scene now. It’s just part and parcel of what comes with it. And I think Korea has been just an extraordinary example of that connection.

Kathleen Stephens:
What are some of the continuing challenges I see? Clearly institutional development has been uneven in Korea. Local autonomy was introduced some years ago. I think about 10 or so years. It’s still relatively new and there actually will be local elections next year. I think this is important, but it still has, I think by Korean zone analysis on all sides of the political spectrum, a long way to go, that vortex of Seoul, the sucking sound of centralization in Korea and in Seoul is still very, very strong. The national assembly is still relatively weak and of course the presidency is still quite strong. However, the one term five-year presidency, which was enshrined in the 1987 constitution as the best block to someone staying on in power, has as any democratic compromise does, as any structural compromise does, its own weaknesses.

Kathleen Stephens:
And in the case of Korea, of course it means that one becomes a lame duck very, very quickly. Some people say even the day after you’re elected, you’re a lame duck, but certainly by your third or fourth year, and we’ve seen this with each Korean president, power really seeps away. And with it and with the stepping down from office, I think there continues to be a really unfortunate tendency towards retribution. Someone said to me recently that being a South Korean president is the worst thing you can possibly do for your legacy and your reputation. I mean most South Korean presidents, and I’m not just talking about the most recent one, it doesn’t end very well. Again, you could point to individual ones, [inaudible 00:00:39:05]. And say, well they deserved it. But I think there’s a broader question there, which is how does Korea’s democratic system mature to the point where former presidents can live in dignity and safety after they step down.

Kathleen Stephens:
The press environment? Much change, but it’s changing still. And young people, and this brings me up finally to the present day, I think I’d say all the young people born well after 1987, well after Korea joined the ranks of the middle income countries, have both great expectations and also great dissatisfaction and discontent with what they see as growing inequality and hyper competitiveness always there, but even hyped up more now, ironically by it’s success in Korea today. But certainly my feeling as an American coming back all these years was that when president Obama said, I liked it every time he said this, that US-South Korean relations were stronger than ever. I always really agreed. I didn’t think that was just sort of feel good talk. And I really felt that the most fundamental reason that they were stronger than ever and more resilient than ever was precisely because of Korea’s democracy.

Kathleen Stephens:
And yet, despite all that beginning last year, of course, South Korea experienced what most Koreans now regard as its most significant political crisis and upheaval since 1987 and it had nothing to do with the US, it had nothing to do with North Korea. I think most of you kind of know what happened. If I summarize very briefly, maybe we can talk a little bit about [inaudible 00:40:50] of why it happened, what it means and some prospects for the new Moon Jae-in presidency and Korea’s democracy. Just to remind you kind of what happened. Park Geun-hye who was elected president in 2012, in 2016 last year she was entering this kind of lame duck portion of her presidency. I think it’s fair to say she had already been weakened by deep disappointment about her handling of the Sewol tragedy, and the aftermath, and the opposition, shades of 1986 here made a strong showing, a surprising strong showing in 2016 national assembly elections last year.

Kathleen Stephens:
And then of course these reports began to emerge that the daughter of her friend had received preferential admission and treatment at an elite Korean university. Ewha a woman’s university. Student protest began. This touches a real nerve in Korea, right? This notion of missed inequality that the one chance that ordinary Koreans feel they have to move up in life is through education and elite education. That it is a vortex and still a very narrow one. And the notion that someone had been able through connections, sure it never happens here, to get into a university really outraged people, and these protests began. And then of course this snowballed when the story that was investigated by now a much more competitive and diverse press, but competitive is very part of it too. And social media, I think there’s all kinds of social media research should be done, but we can learn from on this about this friends, associates influence on her administration, present [inaudible 00:42:33] administration and then of course about influence peddling with Korea’s large corporations, the chaebol. The candlelight vigils began and grew. I saw one in November last year when I was visiting in Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
In fact, I’d come back from south of the river and I was staying up towards the embassy, towards [Anguk-nong 00:42:54] and I had to walk from… For those who know [inaudible 00:42:56] from Nam Dae Mun, completely filled with people and I’m sure some of you saw it, quite impressive, quite impressive and yet much unlike [course-19 00:43:04] there’s certainly no tear gas but almost, I mean serious and yet happy. A really interesting phenomenon. And although the emphasis has been on the young people, the younger generation, fat people out with their families, sometimes their in-laws, their children, but all out with these signs and they basically said Park Geun-hye must go.

Kathleen Stephens:
And I actually, again back to my old political officer roots I guess. And I’m just as a civilian now myself. I sort of asked people and I still speak enough Korean to go up and sort of ask them, why are you out here demanding she step down now? You’re going to have an election next December. She’s one term, you know she’s stepping down, why aren’t you… I started in America, we would, well it’s really worked well for us, but we’d be finding a candidate to support and getting ready for the election next December. And you want to get her out now and you’re just pouring all this passion into it. And honestly, presidents including in the nine states, and [crosstalk 00:44:11] they have friends they talk to, the relationship between business and government in Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
This is not exactly a new story. What is it that inspires this passion in you? And they said a lot of things and they said, we’re so embarrassed by her. I don’t see why you say, [inaudible 00:44:31] so I said, well, you’re embarrassed, but she’s lost our trust. And a lot of the university students that I talked to, that said our seniors struggled for democracy in 1987 now is our moment. Our moment is to pick up the torch, almost literally and carry it on. And I do think that for all this real dissatisfaction and anger at her performance as president and what she had done, underlying this is what I mentioned earlier, this deep sense that that Korean society had changed so much that the deck was stacked against a lot of young people, prospects for education and betterment had declined.

Kathleen Stephens:
Again, perception there’s a longer discussion there to have, how much things have changed. But in any event, they were out there and they want to change. And the younger generation, a big generational divide I would say in this issue. President Park was impeached by the national assembly by professional politicians who were really following the voice of the people in this. They weren’t really ready for an election like right now, but she was impeached and then removed by the constitutional court through institutional and procedures. I think one can debate, and I hear Koreans debate to what extent this is kind of the mobs on the street. I don’t see it as that versus the use of institutions. But I think the process to me was impressive. Forced peacefulness and force adherence to the processes laid out in the con…

Kathleen Stephens:
Adherence to the processes laid out in the Korean constitution. So, of course, the election was held May 9th. Again, it’s hard for me to think that was just a couple of weeks ago with the highest turnout, voter turnout, in decades, particularly among the young. Moon Jae-in from the opposition party, the democratic party who’d run against Park in 2012, and lost a fairly narrow election, was elected. And, again, kind of a three way split, although there was 15 candidates in all.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, much again kind of shades a little bit of 1987. One with a clear victory and a larger margin than Roh Tae-woo did, but clearly one with a split among the other candidates. So, there still is a large segment of the conservative population, I think, in Korea that remained concerned about what this all means.

Kathleen Stephens:
One other point I wanted to make about the election, because I think it was, and, again, I know this room is filled with people who follow this even more closely than I do. But, I think if you… For those of you who maybe only saw western reporting, I’m not trying to beat up on western reporting, but on the election, and the other things that were going on in April in terms of tensions in North Korea and the response of the Trump administration to it, it would be kind of easy to think that the election was about security in North Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
I mean, certainly for the younger generation. And, my sense is, it really wasn’t. And, I was back there for a week or so and April. It was domestic concerns, the kind that I mentioned that outweighed by a long shot the security of North Korea issues. Or, for that matter, Alliance issues in the election. And, now, in the aftermath, Moon was sworn in about as quickly, I guess, as you can imagine, within a few hours.

Kathleen Stephens:
There are very, very high expectations of him. Especially on the economic and welfare side and I think it is going to be very challenging, of course, to address these. Some of these are very deep rooted issues of demographics, of the challenges we see elsewhere that have resulted in some surprising election results throughout the world of a sense again of Korea is not a country that’s going to walk away from trade.

Kathleen Stephens:
It’s heavily trade dependent. But, the globalization that the sort of established order as it’s kind of worked for the last 20 years has had some winners and losers. And, that and that things need to be reordered a bit. So, he has some proposals for addressing that. But, I think he will find the challenge great, as leaders elsewhere do. Moon has, since becoming president, reiterated that he would like to work for constitutional revision. Something that’s been talked about for 30 years, since 1987, but not done to lessen the power of the presidency. Perhaps to change the term of office to two terms. And, to make us some kind of constitutional revision happen at the same time as the local election do next year. So, I think there is, I mentioned all these things not to get too much into the weeds. I guess you’d say, “Wow, she’s really into them already. Nevermind.”

Kathleen Stephens:
But, I think there’s this notion that this is a moment of kind of redefining Korean democracy. But, redefining and on the framework that was kind of proudly established in 87. But, is now really found to be insignificant. So, I think it’s really interesting. I don’t envy president Moon, but he, right now, is enjoying tremendous good will and tremendous hope as well as, as I said, some very high expectations.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, of course, he’s also facing, and this’ll be my final point and I think a very, very challenging international environment. An environment talking about how things have changed. Nevermind 30 years, but over the last 10 years. And, North Korea under Kim Jong-un determined to be established as a nuclear power. Moon Jae-in has responded. There’s been two missile tests just since he became president.

Kathleen Stephens:
Although, certainly you would find many Korean conservatives worried that he might be too soft on North Korea. His immediate response to the missiles tests has been, let’s say, indistinguishable from other South Korean governments in asserting the importance of cessation of that and a move towards denuclearization. But, also, looking for a way to open up some kind of diplomatic process. I take it as a very positive thing that there is a plan to have a summit with president Trump as early as next month. Sometime towards the end of June. And, to try to really develop a relationship there.

Kathleen Stephens:
But, of course, that challenging international environment also includes an assertive and confident China and a bilateral relationship, which is probably worse at the moment. Again, maybe there’s a chance for a bit of a reset with Moon Jae-in in power. But, having gone through, maybe, it’s worse periods since normalization 25 years ago. And, maybe by the time they celebrate 25 years of normalization later this summer, they’ll have found a way to get back on a better track. At least in terms of South Korea, China.

Kathleen Stephens:
So, I guess I just want to conclude with a final thought. As you could tell, I could probably go on all night about what I saw and what I think I learned and what I think we could think about in terms of us foreign policy. But, also, just in terms of Korea’s journey as a whole. It’s a lifelong interest of mine. That sounds too mild, I guess. And, I know of many here in the room.

Kathleen Stephens:
But, I guess, the thought I just wanted to leave you with was something that former president Obama quoted after our election in which he reminded us that George Washington exhorted Americans in his farewell address, a couple hundred years ago, that all Americans, that we’re almost all the anxious, jealous guardians of our democracy. And, I thought, you know, that’s a little bit like what I think Koreans out on the streets here over the last year felt they were. Anxious, jealous guardians of their democracy.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, I think that’s a lesson in kind of an inspiration. That whether it’s in Korea or, dare I say in the United States or elsewhere, is we see democracies under some stress. All of our democracies are unfinished business. And, I think we can all draw not just lessons from the distant past and the urgent present, but, also, from each other. And, that we’re going to have to find a way to work together more closely as democracies if we’re going to find some reasonable response to the challenges of North Korea to the continuing challenge, I think, of the next generation to find a path to reconciliation and peace on the Korean peninsula.

Kathleen Stephens:
So, I do enjoy reflecting on the past, but I hope we can also, maybe, in our remaining time, think a little bit about how we go forward from here. So, again, thank you very much and thank you, especially the Sigur family for your many contributions. And, it’s great to be here with you tonight to remember Dr. Sigur.

Kathleen Stephens:
So, I’m told we have a little bit of time. If we want it. To have comments or questions or cookies or… Yes? And, if you don’t mind just telling me your name just because they’re, you know.

Speaker 2:
My name is… oh. My name is [inaudible 00:53:39] from [inaudible 00:53:40] and now I’m a [inaudible 00:53:40] at the Sigur Center. And, thank you for your great presentation and storytelling about the South Korean [inaudible 00:53:43] of 1987. And, I agree with most of your points. Personally, I like the combination of your personal career path and [inaudible 00:54:00] South Korean [inaudible 00:54:00] of 1987. So, I wonder what you think has made [inaudible 00:54:15] to keep things [inaudible 00:54:17]. At the end of your presentation, you mentioned this briefly about the challenge of South Korean democracy.

Speaker 2:
But, let me tell you one thing. The South Korean [inaudible 00:54:27] like me, let’s say since 2015, a couple of years ago from now, focused on [inaudible 00:54:35]. 2017 is [inaudible 00:00:54:40]. But, now South Korea democracy seems to have been backsliding quite a lot.

Kathleen Stephens:
Backsliding. Okay.

Speaker 2:
Yeah. So, what have been made [inaudible 00:54:53] to make South Korean democracy. For example, some people consider [inaudible 00:54:58] political system is [inaudible 00:09:04]. And, some people might say Confucian culture is a problem. Especially in making progress on women’s rights or human rights, something like that. And, also, some people consider elected politicians and bureaucrats don’t behave like the politicians in bureaucracy and democracy. They behave like noble men [inaudible 00:55:28]. So, many people argue that there are some social problems in [inaudible 00:55:34] democracy in South Korea. So, as a very close observer to South Korean democracy, I wonder, what do you think of [inaudible 00:55:38] further South Korean democracy?

Kathleen Stephens:
Yeah. Well, I mean, all those things you mentioned I think are challenges or obstacles. I tried to list a few areas where, yeah, I feel like, still, more needs to be done. How do we get there? You know, there’s the Churchill quote about democracy is the worst form of government in the world except for all the others. I mean, it certainly is a process. It’s not a kind of a perfect… a condition that can be perfected.

Kathleen Stephens:
But, yeah, I do think that in terms of institutions, the progress in the press and in the courts has been very important. I see a lot of change there over the last decade or so. And, I do, again, I’m still hesitating because I used to work for the U-S government.

Kathleen Stephens:
I wouldn’t say this, but now I guess I can say whatever I want. But, I do think that there needs to be some ways of making the… of allowing the national assembly to be more effective and more engaged. Frankly, it’s a problem we have in our country right now in my opinion, too. And, not for constitutional reasons.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, how does that happen? I think a lot of it just turns out to be people who go in. The reason I’m so encouraged now is not so much because one candidate or another was elected. But, because so many young Koreans, or, not so young, are activated. They want to be involved. So, I think that sort of activation is the most important thing to try to work across a range of these issues that you’ve laid out.

Kathleen Stephens:
So, I really can’t just pick out one and I think they’re getting there. I do think that the local autonomy issue, which I mentioned, is one that bears, I don’t know what you think about that. But, that it’s sort of, again, it was local autonomy, but kind of imposed from the top. And, needs to become a little bit more organic, I think. And, I think gradually that’ll happen.

Kathleen Stephens:
Hope that helps. Yeah. Over here.

Ella:
Hello, thank you, so much for a great speech. My name is Ella and I’m from Kazakhstan. And, there are around, I believe, around 200,000 Koreans, ethnic Koreans living in central Asia. And, for those people who both know, they came from Russia in 1936. And, they came to Russia before that. Was from the northern part of Korea. I was curious, do you know anything or while you were working in South Korea, interest from South Korean leadership, whether they had interest to help those Koreans in central Asia? Because, I might be wrong, because from my perspective, it seems that there is lack of interest in helping or just communicating with Koreans in central Asia. It also seems that not so many people in South Korea are aware there are Koreans in central Asia. Thank you.

Kathleen Stephens:
Yeah, thank you. There’s actually, there’s a, I’m almost recommending things. There’s a documentary film that was made a couple of years ago called Cordio Sodom, the unreliable people. Right? And, it actually, if you have to, it has this great footage that, I mean, very moving. It shows the this movement of ethnic Koreans from Russia and the border areas into central Asia where they were just like dumped in the plains in the winter and kind of told to survive.

Kathleen Stephens:
During my time as ambassador in Korea, I haven’t followed it really since then, the Eemian Bach government was very interested in developing stronger relations with central Asian countries. In particular, Uzbekistan. But, I think also Kazakhstan and some others. Part of this was kind of resource diplomacy. And the fact that there were Korean communities in some of these areas, albeit ones that had really no ties to Korea.

Kathleen Stephens:
These are communities where, generally speaking, as I understand, they don’t speak Korean. The link is, cultural link is pretty well lost. But, they were certainly interested in looking for ways to strengthen their relationship. So, I actually visited Uzbekistan from Korea and my colleague there, the American ambassador in Tashkent said Seoul has the best bilateral relationship with Tashkent of any government in the world. And, in fact, Korean Air was building a huge logistics hub. The same kind of logistics hub that exists… cargo hub that exists in Incheon airport there in Tashkent.

Kathleen Stephens:
So, there was a real effort country by country to think about strategic trade partners, linkages. And, in part to kind of, if you like, I think, market the Republic of Korea as sort of not being China. For those who are worried about Chinese domination. But, bringing certain capabilities and certain links.

Kathleen Stephens:
With respect to the Korean communities, my impression is that most of the Korean communities of central Asia, if they had any ties to Korea, they tended to kind of be to North Korea. But, that’s changed now over the years. And, I think E is slowly, interesting, you haven’t really seen much. But, slowly in Uzbekistan, for example, I did see some effort to establish some linkage. But, we actually, actually, I remember, see, I always tell too many stories. But, I visited a General Motors plant in Korea down near Pusan. I’ve forgotten, Shaman, I think. But, General Motors also had a plant in Uzbekistan and they used to bring the Uzbek employees back and forth. For kind of internships and so forth. So, there are things going on. But, I don’t know what recently, so much. Thanks. Yeah, rust.

Speaker 3:
[inaudible 01:02:26] interesting presentation. I was cast a special assistant during that period of time. I remember a key role that might help. My question is about the Korean military. You mentioned that when you got reengaged to Korean affairs, 2005, on. You raised the question. There was no residence at all. [inaudible 01:02:51] didn’t take the [inaudible 01:02:52] role. But, during this recent impeachment, were there any clinches in the military that you picked up? Any thought at all that maybe democracy wasn’t going to work out or was that [inaudible 01:03:01] really over?

Kathleen Stephens:
I think that’s really over. I mean, if someone heard this thing, I think that’s really over. And, actually, since we’re talking about our former mentors and colleagues, Jim Kelly was in New York. And, I was talking to him yesterday. Actually, about this point. And, he told me something that I hadn’t heard before, which he said, “When Roh Tae-woo became president in 1987, he actually,” I’m not betraying confidence here. I think it’s so long ago, nobody cares. But, except we aficionados. But, there was a conscious effort to kind of promote up and out serving officers in the Korean military who might’ve had some political inclination. So, there was kind of a conscious effort. But, no, since then, absolutely not. I never heard anything. Yes.

Mike:
Mike [inaudible 01:03:59] how would you advise the new president to thread the needle in terms of dealing with the U-S administration? I mean, he has his own ideas about what he wants to do about North Korea. And, I’m not at all sure that our administration would say, “Well, fine, you want to deal with him, okay. Take the problem off of our hands.”

Mike:
How far can he push this thing? Particularly since at some point there’s going to be an impetus for direct U-S North Korea diplomacy or dialogue or whatever you want to call it. And, can you do that and cut out the South Koreans? Or do you end up going back to the six party process, which didn’t seem to be terribly successful?

Kathleen Stephens:
Thanks. One of the things that was a great worry, I think, in Korea and South Korea over the last few months, during this period of, I hate to call it a political vacuum. Because, the very capable civil service went on. They had a very capable acting president. But, nonetheless, there wasn’t political authority there in terms of elected president. And, in the meantime, our new president came into office. And, in particular, in March and April had a lot to say about policy towards North Korea. Some of it sort of contradictory.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, there was a real worry in South Korea about what sometimes called Seoul passing or Korea passing, right? That while South Korea was going through its political process that prime minister Abbaye had established a good relationship with president Trump, Xi Jinping and president Trump seem to be, at least from the American side, kind of new best buddies.

Kathleen Stephens:
You have Xi Jinping, according to president Trump, telling Trump that to Korea used to be a part of China. Which, of course, Koreans would not really agree with. So, there was a worry. And, I think when Moon Jae-in came in getting to advice, I mean one, I think he has a political imperative. But, also, just from a policy point, if you will, imperative to kind of get back in the game, get Seoul back in the game. And, be at the table when North Korea policy is discussed. And, when decisions are made.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, I think he’s done a good job of, of getting started on that by sending over his special envoy who was welcomed at the white house who had a meeting with president Trump. And, now, they’ve began to plan for this summit. So, my advice would be to build that relationship. I’m just as Mr. Abea has. Just as Mr. She has. But, to try to come to it with ideas from a Seoul perspective that are going to be attractive and workable from a U-S point of view. I don’t think that’s impossible. I mean, obviously, I guess, I just worry more about what I see so far as the kind of the incoherence of the American approach. But, I hope we’ll get a little more coherent. And, I think that we’re going to see Moon Jae-in really emphasize that there’s also an inter Korean dimension to this.

Kathleen Stephens:
And, he’s also already said some things about this that. That, for example, again, this is not my advice to him, these are some things that have been suggested, but I think they sound like they’re worth exploring. That in an effort to improve the atmosphere for talks without undermining sanctions or pressure or the insistence on denuclearization, the new government in Seoul might look good at restarting certain humanitarian assistance programs or family reunions.

Kathleen Stephens:
Now, easier said than done. And, where Pyongyang is on these things remains to be seen. They’ve already come down pretty hard on Moon Jae-in. But, I think those are the kinds of things that he’s going to want to explore and he’s going to want to do it, clearly, in close coordination with Washington.

Kathleen Stephens:
Yeah. How can we get back into a diplomatic process, whether it’s six party or some other configuration, I do think it’s very important that that Seoul is a full participant. It doesn’t have to be in every meeting. There could be an inter Korean channel, there could be a U-S, Pyongyang channel for certain things. But, there has to be. The one thing we have learned, I mean, one lesson, again, I didn’t talk so much about North Korea over the years. But, North Korea is a challenging enough problem. But, to even have a chance to work, a precondition is Seoul and Washington has to be working together. And, that was certainly a lesson we learned in the Kim Dae-jung and the Wuhan years through bitter experience. Even if we are working together still-

Kathleen Stephens:
Experience. Even if we are working together, it still may not result in what we want, but at least we have a chance.

Speaker 4:
Yeah, sorry Celeste.

Celeste Arrington :
Thanks, Celeste Arrington, I teach Korean politics here at George Washington. Thank you for your talk. I wanted to ask, since you brought up women’s rights in South Korea, a couple of things. One is, what do you think has worked to improve human rights? You mentioned the abolition of the household registry system as one major victory in that process, but over the years what has worked? And then, what effects do you think the demise of Park Geun-hye will have or is it having on women’s participation in politics, especially because the number of members of the National Assembly who are women continues to be quite low? Not quite as low as Japan, but still relatively low.

Kathleen Stephens:
Right. Well, I mean in terms of women’s, opportunities for women, full participation of women in the kind of longer historical perspective, I mean I certainly think that the opening up of educational opportunities for women has been very important, and that’s kind of done now. But, some of us would remember a time in Korea where if there was a choice, the daughter didn’t go to school, right? Or didn’t go abroad for education, so on and so forth. That’s pretty much over, and I think, and also the preference for sons, I mean that’s kind of remarkable to me that there doesn’t really seem to be much of a preference for sons anymore. But, in terms of what’s worked to get women into more participating in more parts of the society, well they’ve had their greatest success in areas like the civil service, right? Areas where there is a process and the process involves taking an exam and if you pass it, then you have rules that allow you to get in. It’s been much harder I think when it comes to corporations and business opportunities.

Kathleen Stephens:
And the other challenge, I mean, you know this very well, but I hear again and again from Korean women and men is, is it goes back to… [inaudible 01:11:31] I guess what I see when [inaudible 01:11:33] the thing that’s so difficult about Korean society, it’s so stressed out. Actually, I’m going to digress and say somebody was saying, “Oh, when you’re in Korea, aren’t people just really stressed out about North Korea?” I said, “No, they’re not stressed out about North Korea. They’re just stressed about being South Korea.”

Kathleen Stephens:
It’s just, it’s the most stressed out place I know, but it’s just because… And women feel this, so even if they have the education, they’re middle-class or they’re… They can have a lot of advantages if they have that even one child, they feel they have to devote everything they have to making sure that child gets into the right pre-school and learns English at the age of 18 months. It’s pretty incredible, right? And I don’t know how you get to that, and again I think it affects men too, so I just… to me the great, kind of weakness of… the great strength of Korea is also its great weakness, and that is this very high aspiration, highly competitive society. And I think it is impacting on the choices that women feel they have in particular in their lives.

Kathleen Stephens:
With respect to yeah, Park Geun-hye, yeah I mean maybe especially for a woman of my generation, I always kind of think, yeah if a woman doesn’t do well, sort of, then everyone says, “Well a woman can’t do that job anymore.” I think that’s gone away a little bit. And certainly Park Geun-hye was… she wasn’t elected as a woman or [inaudible 01:12:53], she was elected as the inheritor, I think, of the Park Chung-hee legacy and with her own profile. I have thought about this obviously.

Kathleen Stephens:
I mean, it was interesting to me that during the recent campaign, one of the top five candidates was a woman. Sim Sang-jung? Right? Yeah. And a minor party, or a small party, I don’t want to say it’s minor, it’s small. Every time they had a debate, her rating went up. She was certainly the best debater on the stage and in the view of people who watched. So, she didn’t get elected president but she didn’t expect to be. Korea is going to have a woman foreign minister for the first time. I hope she does well. If she does, I think that’s good. If she doesn’t then maybe…

Kathleen Stephens:
But, I think women in prominent positions will continue to kind of, grow in Korea, but I do get back to kind of just worrying about something that has really nothing to do with my diplomatic duties or my former ones and that is just kind of the nature of Korean society and how you have, and this is what Moon is expected to do, to kind of create a system that addresses some of the stress Koreans feel and holds onto these virtues of wanting the best for themselves and everybody else, while opening up a few more options and paths for people’s lives. It’s kind of related.

Kathleen Stephens:
I’m sorry for all these long answers. This is one thing I was reminded… I left Korea as ambassador in 2011 so it was quite a long time ago, but people still remember that when President Obama came to Korea I think in… he came several times. In fact, people say he visited Seoul more than any other foreign capital in the world during his presidency.

Kathleen Stephens:
Anyway, he came several times while I was there and on one occasion he asked Lee Myung-bak over a lunch, he said, “I’m really thinking about educational policy in the United States. What’s the biggest challenge you face in your educational policy in Korea?” And President Lee said immediately, he said, “[foreign language 01:15:30]. Korean parents, they’re my biggest problem.” And he said, “Why?” “Because they’re never satisfied. They never [inaudible 01:15:44] …” And when President Obama came back from that trip, he had kind of the standard speech that he was giving, because he had an education agenda in this country and he kept talking about Korean education and the high expectations and the involvement of parents and how great this was and so on and so forth.

Kathleen Stephens:
And I had more… Nevermind the 80s when people were concerned, when [inaudible 01:16:06] really wanted to tell me about America’s faults and its policy and many other areas, all Koreans, would come up to me and say, “Why is President Obama saying such nice things about our educational system? Because it’s horrible! Haven’t you told them how bad it is and how it’s just killing us all?” And I actually told him that one time, and he laughed and he said, “Well we need more of that.” Yeah.

Speaker 5:
Hi, it’s good to see you again.

Kathleen Stephens:
Yeah, thank you.

Speaker 5:
Thank you very much for wonderful the talk. I am [inaudible 00:07:39], I happen to be in Korea just before the election and at that time the mood was the kind of Korean spirit. There was police surrounded by all these big [inaudible 01:17:00] . Cornered by the Chinese and [inaudible 01:17:02] Japanese and kind of betrayed by the US, especially the very secretive southern installation of [inaudible 01:17:14] the people were very shocked. But then there was another opinion, maybe it gave [inaudible 01:17:22] a way out so that he didn’t have to feel responsible for its installation. But, when you think if you don’t have USA as a big ally as Korean’s have always relied on, if they lose it they have really nothing. So, there is a very genuine scale about that possible discontinuation of that wonderful relationship. So the impression is, well I say, maybe President Trump does anything against whatever President Obama did, but eventually there will be forces of both names [inaudible 01:18:06] I’ve been held to them.

Kathleen Stephens:
Yeah, I mean it’s even more typical for me to kind of try to predict the direction of American, of the Trump administration, but if history is any guide, the Trump administration will conclude as previous administrations have. Remember, I mean, Jimmy Carter wanted to withdraw all the troops from Korea there in the late seventies we’ll conclude that the broad bipartisan shape of our Alliance relationship with South Korea remains an enormous asset and extremely important to both countries.

Kathleen Stephens:
And I would remind everyone that, we have just in the short several months of the Trump administration, so far, the secretary of defense, the secretary of state, the director of the CIA normally not announced, but it was announced and he was there, the vice president have all been to Korea, and they have all affirmed the close nature of the Alliance and the Trump administration’s commitment to it. But, of course what we have in Washington now, well he’s not in Washington now, but we have an American president now who has his own means of communication, so we say, and it’s, especially in a situation like Korea, it’s potentially, I think, quite dangerous, and certainly unpredictable. So I think we saw that in April when people were very, [inaudible 01:19:50] what was happening, and I do worry about that. I recall, actually, I hadn’t said that the election on, on May 9th had sort of nothing to do with the US it was maybe about a week before the election.

Kathleen Stephens:
President Trump in, I think it was a press interview, I can’t remember, maybe you all do, he said two things about South Korea, and one he said, “Well, South Korea really should pay $1 billion for this missile defense program.” It was that and, “Oh that Korea, US free trade group actuals, we haven’t touched on, but is a terrible agreement, we’re going to get rid of it or renegotiate it.” And you know, by this time, frankly, a lot of people just sort of said, okay, he said it, We’ll see what happens.

Kathleen Stephens:
But, on that day in Korea, at this point, I mean literally the taxi drivers, everyone’s talking about politics and that’s sort of the word on the street was, well, Trump just gave Moon Jae-in the election, that that was the impact. Now I don’t think that that’s probably the case, I mean Moon won by a clear margin, but there was a sense that I don’t think that was in president Trump’s mind at all. I mean, I don’t know to what extent he was aware of when the election was, but there still is that obvious sensitivity in Korea to what is said and certainly what is said by an American president… Steve.

Steve :
You spoke a little bit about the novelty of you being a young political officer [inaudible 01:21:30] and I would think the novelty of being a woman ambassador without a rock star sign and all of that. Also, I wonder if you’ve re-reflected on what impact that had on the [inaudible 01:21:48] my department, you’ve talked about that, I’m sure you thought back…

Kathleen Stephens:
Hey Steve. Yeah, it’s a little hard to really step back and evaluate that. I mean I will say that when I arrived in Korea in 2008 as the new ambassador, I certainly was a different profile from previous American ambassadors. But the thing that had the biggest impact that people responded to was that I spoke Korean badly, but I spoke it, and a lot of people said to me, this shows, they’re always over-interpreting, but maybe just that the United States now really respects Korea cause they sent an ambassador who speaks our language and who knows Korea, so that was the Trump card, if you like, I think. In terms of being a woman, I think just because of the generation I am and everything I was a little sensitive. I didn’t want to sort of be the woman ambassador. I wanted to be the American ambassador who is a woman.

Kathleen Stephens:
I was going to be the best American ambassador I could be. I had these experiences in Korea which really moved me a lot, and they were things like being at a concert during intermission and having a parent, often a father with a little girl who would come up to me and say, and they would recognize me and say, cause my picture was out a lot. So people would recognize me and the father would say to me, this happened a lot, “My daughter really likes you.” Or oftentimes young men, it comes, “My mother really likes you. She’s a big fan.” And then it was a little bit, “Can we take a picture?” and, “My daughter wants to be a diplomat, she wants to go into politics.” Right?

Kathleen Stephens:
So then you think, wow, I guess that this, maybe I am having an impact. And so I sort of admit it meant a lot to me, especially when it was frankly, men, Korean men who are coming up and saying this, and “I want my daughter to be this, I want her to do this.” And the other thing, and again, I’m not trying to make too light of this, but I had Korean politicians again, mostly male, who would come up and say to me sometimes, “Well, my wife really, really likes you and so I have to be nice to you.”

Kathleen Stephens:
I mean in a sense of I got to listen to what you have to say. I don’t know, anyway it was… but no, I think overall, and I see in the world today, I think the fact that there’s a foreign minister who’s a woman is a very good find. And also, actually again it gets back to Yung Kee’s question in a different way because the new foreign minister is gone I think. Right? Kind of the press on her is, well, she doesn’t really have the experience and the traditional bilateral relationship. She’s not an America hand or Japan hand. She’s been in kind of the UN and mostly working on multilateral relations. How is she going to handle kind of the hard policy questions? But, I think it’s also a signal that Moon Jae-in sees, as his predecessors did, part of 21st century Korea as a more, punching above its weight on a global stage and as a real middle power, and that you can do that as well as have a strong Alliance relationship and management of important great power relations. But I don’t know, that’s all I can say about that.

Jer Lin :
[inaudible 01:25:39] Thank you very much. My name’s Jer Lin [inaudible 01:25:51] and I’m glad to work in [inaudible 01:25:52] am I passionate about the Korea [inaudible 01:26:00] as you all already thought, that Korea has a reaction [inaudible] that due to the previous, the president Parks, the Korean conservative party was divided in two ways. [foreign language 00:17:21] I’m just curious of your opinion about your perspective about Korean conservative party as you’ve had a long living experience in Korea. And also, is there any distinguished point in contrast to the US conservative [inaudible] party to [inaudible 01:26:48] Korea with President Park.

Kathleen Stephens:
Boy, I don’t know. I’m not a political scientist. but I do feel like our politics and all in our country and South Korea are going through some changes. I don’t know what the Republican party is going to look like in a few years, I don’t think any of us do, but I mean it’s going through some interesting times with respect to the kind of traditional conservative forces in Korea, in South Korea, if you like. I think there, they need some new leadership now. Right? And maybe there’ll be a bit of a generational change, but [inaudible]

Kathleen Stephens:
I guess the more general point I would make is, relatively speaking, and you alluded to it when you say about all the parties and how they changed their names and Korean political parties, even though we say conservative, progressive, they are a little bit more, so then that comes traditional analysis. We’ve always had a Korean politics, a little bit more personality dependent, little more factionalized, kind of coming and going depending on who the leader is. So, I think in the next election, whether you know next year or whenever it is, there’ll be probably some parties with some other different names, and maybe some new leaders.

Kathleen Stephens:
I guess the only one thing I think it’d be interesting to watch is, I mentioned again, local autonomy. Well, at least some new leadership coming up from the governors or the mayors. Now even Bob came to the presidency by being mayor of Seoul, but Seoul is Seoul. It’s sweet, generous. But will there be a party system that begins to develop and will it be less regionalized with more focus on other bread and butter or economic issues? I don’t know, but I think that’s just one area you might look at going forward now. Exhausted you all. Well, thank you all very much. [inaudible].

Gregg Brazinsky:
Thank you again, ambassador Stevens for such a fantastic lecture and for giving such a very interesting and fantastic answers to all the questions. There is some leftover food outside, especially if you’re a student or a graduate student, feel free to take as much as you can carry. It’s going to go bad if you don’t take it. So please help us clean up and take some of the food

Kathleen Stephens:
[inaudible].

poster for the 12th Annual Conference on China’s Economic Development

11/8/2019: 12th Annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations

Friday, November 8, 2019

8:00 AM – 5:00 PM

Lindner Commons – Suite 602</strong style>

Elliott School of International Affairs

1957 E Street, NW, Washington, DC 20052

poster for the 12th Annual Conference on China’s Economic Development

The Institute for International Economic Policy is pleased to invite you to the 12th annual Conference on China’s Economic Development and U.S.-China Economic Relations on November 8th, 2019 at the Elliott School for International Affairs, located at 1957 E Street, NW.

The conference will feature panels on the Political Economy of Protests; Capital Market Liberalization and Industrial Policy; Industrial Policy, Technology Transfer, and Financial Access; and the Belt and Road Initiative.

This conference is co-sponsored by the Sigur Center for Asian Studies and the GW Center for International Business Education and Research.
Conference Agenda

08:15-08:50:  Coffee and Registration

08:50-09:00: Welcoming Remarks: James Foster (IIEP Director, GWU)

09:00-09:45: Keynote: Daniel Xu (Duke University) – “Fiscal Policies and Firm Investment in China”

09:45-10:45: The Political Economy of Protests
David Yang (Harvard University) – “Persistent Political Engagement: Social Interactions and the Dynamics of Protest Movements”

Davin Chor (Dartmouth College) – “The Political Economy Consequences of China’s Export Slowdown”

10:45-11:15: Coffee Break

11:15-12:15: Capital Market Liberalization and Industrial Policy
John Rogers (Federal Reserve Board) – “The Effect of the China Connect”

Wenli Li (Philadelphia Federal Reserve Bank) – “Demographic Aging, Industrial Policy, and Chinese Economic Growth”

12:15-13:15: Lunch

13:15–14:30: Policy Keynotes:
Chad Bown (Peterson Institute for International Economics) – “The U.S.-China Trade Relationship under the Trump Administration”
David Shambaugh (GWU) – “Stresses and Strains in U.S.-China Relations”

14:30-15:00: Coffee Break

15:00-16:00: Industrial Policy, Technology Transfer, and Financial Access
Moderator: Maggie Chen (GWU)
Jie Bai (Harvard University) – “Quid Pro Quo, Knowledge Spillovers, and Industrial Quality Upgrading”
Jing Cai (University of Maryland) – “Direct and Indirect Effects of Financial Access on SMEs”

16:00-17:00: The Belt and Road Initiative
Moderator: Stephen Kaplan (GWU)
Scott Morris (Center for Global Development) – “Belt and Road’s Debt and Project Risks”
Jamie Horsley (Yale University) – Title TBA