Category: Insights & Opinions

As a research institute, the Sigur Center for Asian Studies encourages engagement and discussion on various academic and policy issues related to the study of Asia. In the spirit of open dialogue and exchange, the Sigur Center provides students, professors, scholars, and professionals with a platform to hold civil and mature discourse by publishing occasional entries on its Asia on E Street Blog. The following are intellectual contributions from our current and former visiting scholars in the form of case studies, excerpts, or a summary of their research.

Featured entries could be on an array of topics such as – but not limited to – contemporary politics, history, economics, security, language, and art.

If you have an insight or opinion related to Asian studies, or if you conducted research for a course, publication, or profession that you would like to share with the Sigur Center community, contact us at gsigur@gwu.edu to see if the Sigur Center could feature your work.

View from Southeast Asia: Vaxxed But No Recovery to the Max

April 26, 2022April 27, 2022Insights & OpinionsLeave a Comment

Julia M. Lau

In the earliest phases of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020, before vaccines were viable and available, Southeast Asia’s performance was a bright spot in the world’s fight against this scourge. The challenges surfacing from the global pandemic have ravaged economies, health and social welfare systems, and other sectors in ways that few could predict more than two years ago. While the time has come to treat COVID-19 as endemic, Southeast Asian governments are prepared for a complex adjustment to a new reality. Even as regional Covid-19 case rates are dropping from their peak, calibrating public policy to suit the present moment will be a tough balancing act between openness and caution.

Compared to the overwrought drama of China’s draconian and ultimately unfeasible “zero Covid” strategy, which has brought about more pain and suffering than necessary to ordinary citizens and cast a shadow on the global economy, there is now confidence within Southeast Asia that it is time to go back to business as usual. Vaccination rates in most of Southeast Asia are relatively high, which has given governments the chance to reopen borders to tourism and travel. With the significant holidays of Easter, Ramadhan and the celebrations after the fasting month, Labour Day (May 1) and Vesak Day taking place in April and May, several ASEAN countries have lifted travel and quarantine restrictions that were previously choking the regional and global movement of people and goods.

Singapore, with 92% of its population completing the full regimen of vaccinations, was perhaps the most fine-tuned in the region in its health and social policy approach to the crisis overall. After over two years of “Dorscon Orange” (“Dorscon” is the government’s shorthand for “Disease Outbreak Response System Condition”), Singapore dropped its caution level to “Yellow” and lifted restrictions on group sizes for socializing and household visits on 26 April 2022. The government allowed previously closed nightclubs, karaoke joints and bars to resume business, and theatres and live music venues have increased capacity limits. Vaccinated visitors traveling by air to Singapore will no longer need to take any Covid tests prior to their flights. Malaysia, Vietnam, and Thailand, which also have high rates of vaccination, are also easing restrictions and encouraging domestic travellers and visitors to return to pre-Covid travel habits.

The most pressing challenge facing the region now is that of an uneven regional recovery buffeted by external shocks, including the war in Ukraine, which have exacerbated supply chain delays and rising commodity prices. Even if the most successful nation-states in Southeast Asia – if success is defined as the reopening of borders to trade, tourism, and investment, and the revival of local businesses – manage to recover from most of the problems that the pandemic created, the weaker and less developed economies might be crippled by a continued lack or weakness in their health and social services infrastructure. China’s refusal to lift travel restrictions on its citizens will continue to act as a drag on the region’s tourism and other sectors, given Southeast Asian economies’ close dependence on Chinese business and the Chinese people’s growing affluence. It will require strong cooperation and focus, aided by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) network, to overcome intra-region inequalities and to re-establish the vibrance of the region.

When the final accounting for Covid-19 is done, it can be expected that the death tolls, case numbers, and less tangible losses like collective trauma, mental health challenges, and the economic and educational setbacks for tens of thousands of low-income families and children throughout the region will exceed even the most pessimistic estimates. For instance, in places like Indonesia, case and death toll numbers are likely to have been significantly under-declared: a recent report noted how more than 99% of Indonesians in Central Java had antibodies for Covid-19, which belies Jakarta’s official count.

Governments in Southeast Asia will have their work cut out for them. Restoring the strength and stamina of healthcare workers to gird for future battles with the next pandemic will have to be a priority for the entire region. A fruitful outcome from the pandemic would be for regional governments to facilitate increased exchanges of information and programmes for medical and other personnel to learn and reinforce the tough lessons that each Southeast Asian nation-state took from their respective fights with Covid-19. Measures like the ASEAN Response Fund, which supports the procurement of medical supplies to any ASEAN state that requires it, are positive developments that will strengthen the region going forward.

Julia M. Lau posing for a picture on a sunny day by a waterfront

Julia Lau is Editor, fulcrum.sg in Singapore and a non-resident scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies until December 2022. @JuliaMLau

7/5/18: Viewpoint on Security and North Korea’s Nuclear Program

July 5, 2018May 21, 2021Insights & OpinionsLeave a Comment

Visiting Scholar’s Viewpoint on Security and North Korea’s Nuclear Program

By Tanvi Banerjee, Research Assistant, Rising Powers Initiative and Major Joon-hyouck Choi, ROK Army

On June 12, 2018, North Korea and the United States held a historic summit in Singapore. The Trump – Kim summit provoked mixed reactions from observers all around the world, including South Korea. Major Joon-hyouck Choi from the Republic of Korea Army – and a recent visiting scholar at the George Washington University’s Sigur Center for Asian Studies – remains skeptical of the summit’s outcomes. Furthermore, he cautions the United States and South Korea against eschewing preparations for the worst-case scenario given the highly volatile situation on the Korean Peninsula, and the international community’s inability to deter North Korea’s nuclear program in the past.

Major Choi argues that even though North Korea has found a way to the the dialogue table to negotiate about its nuclear program, the program is still very important to the North Korean regime. The North Korean leadership believes that with a sophisticated nuclear and missile program, North Korea will be able to: first, deter an American military intervention on the peninsula; second, attack the American mainland and U.S. allies during times of war; and third, ensure the survival of not only the state but also the current regime. According to Major Choi, the North Korean leadership’s strong commitment to its nuclear program is one of the biggest factors that has made the resolution of the nuclear issue very difficult.

International efforts at denuclearizing North Korea have also been relatively ineffective. Pointing to the example of international sanctions against North Korea, Major Choi explained that although sanctions did cause substantial economic damage to North Korea, the efficacy of the sanctions was reduced by several factors. These factors include mistaken perceptions about North Korea’s threat and its durability, and domestic and foreign policy options. According to Major Choi, North Korea’s neighboring countries also had a role in undermining the efficiency of international sanctions. China, in particular, has often bypassed U.S.-led sanctions efforts on Pyongyang.

However, Major Choi believes that sanctions alone cannot bring stability to the Korean Peninsula. Thus, South Korea cannot solely rely on relaxed perceptions about the threat posed by North Korea. Major Choi observed that South Korea’s previous policies towards North Korea underestimated the North’s motives, and its willingness to develop nuclear weapons. As such, Major Choi recommends that in order to address the North Korean nuclear threat, South Korea needs to move away from conventional countermeasures and create a more realistic response strategy.

Major Choi proposed that South Korea and the United States should instead reinforce their response strategy by adopting an offset strategy. An offset strategy refers to retaining a competitive advantage over adversaries to deter them while maintaining peace when possible. By adopting and enhancing their offset strategies against North Korea, the United States and South Korea, who have superior technical and military capabilities, will be able to leverage their asymmetric power against the North and create unacceptable costs for the North Korean state and its leadership in times of war.

According to Major Choi, lessons learned from the United States’ first and second offset strategy can be valuable in developing adequate response strategies against the North. The first American offset strategy included President Eisenhower’s New Look strategy, which intended to deter the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact by developing a formidable American nuclear arsenal in the 1950s. The second American offset strategy aimed to offset Soviet Union’s conventional military superiority in the 1970s. This strategy led to the enhancement of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) platforms, and the development of precision-guided munitions and technology such as the Global Positioning System (GPS). The United States was thus able to deter the Soviet Union without having to rely extensively on its nuclear arsenal.

Major Choi believes that conflict and cooperation are mutually coupled like two sides of a coin and that the situation on the Korean Peninsula can flip at any time. Additionally, North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have become more sophisticated despite international efforts to stop the North’s nuclear program. According to Major Choi, to counter the North Korean challenge, the United States and South Korea need to strengthen the capabilities of the US-ROK Alliance. They need to enhance their respective conventional military capabilities and maintain an asymmetric advantage over North Korea.

Tanvi Banerjee is a senior in the Elliott School of International Affairs, majoring in International Affairs, with a double concentration in Asia and International Development. She is currently working as the International Affairs Research Assistant for the Rising Powers Initiative.

MAJ(P) Joon-hyouck Choi was a Visiting Scholar at the Sigur Center for Asian Studies from January 2018 through June 2018. During his term at the Sigur Center, his research topic focused on history and applications of military strategy, and evaluating U.S.-ROK military posture vis-a-vis North Korea.

5/8/2018: Deepa Ollapally – How Does India’s Look East Policy Look after 25 Years?

May 24, 2018February 12, 2021Insights & OpinionsLeave a Comment

How Does India’s Look East Policy Look after 25 Years?

By Deepa M. Ollapally

Originally published as part of a roundtable discussion titled “Frédéric Grare’s India Turns East: International Engagement and U.S.-China Rivalry” by the National Bureau for Asian Research (NBR) in its Asia Policy (13.2, April 2018 edition) publication.