Category: In the News

On July 8th, 2022, Professor Mike Mochizuki interviewed for PBS Newshour for video titled “Remembering the life and legacy of Japan’s former Prime Minister Shinzo Abe“.

On July 13th, 2022, Associate Director of the Sigur Center and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, Professor Deepa Ollapally, interviewed for Voice of America for an article titled “美中在东南亚较劲，专家：美渐占上风但拉锯战将持续 [US-China Competition in Southeast Asia, Expert: US gradually taking the lead but close contest to continue]“.

美中在东南亚较劲，专家：美渐占上风但拉锯战将持续

13 JULY 2022

by 锺辰芳

华盛顿 —
在与美国国务卿布林肯举行过双边会谈后，中国外长王毅接着对东盟发出警告说，要远离地缘政治算计，“不要当大国博弈的棋子”。专家说，如果要把美中两国竞争看成地缘政治棋局，那么美国在这盘棋局中正在迎头赶上，因为美国开始为这个地区提供中国之外的替代选项，不过东南亚国家并不愿在美中之间被迫做出选择，也不愿见到美中竞争白热化导致“后院发生热战”，因此美中拉锯战在可预见将来将持续下去。

王毅星期一(7月11日)在雅加达东盟秘书处发表演讲时说，包括东盟在内，不少地区国家受到“选边站队”的压力，地区战略环境面临被政治需要重塑的风险，东盟各国有必要“远离地缘政治的算计，远离丛林法则的陷阱，不当大国博弈的棋子，不受霸凌霸道的胁迫”。

王毅上周六才在印尼的20国外长会后与美国国务卿布林肯举行了5个多小时的双边会谈，两人都希望在美中关系紧张之际增加沟通机会，为两国关系加装“护栏”，同时也为接下来美中元首的谈话进行铺垫。

美中外长各持立场

王毅在会中对布林肯提出“要求美纠正错误对华政策和言行”、“中方关切的重点个案”、“中方重点关切的涉华法案”，以及“中美8个领域合作”等四份清单，希望美方“切实认真对待”。

布林肯在当天一场记者会上表示，他和王毅除了谈到美中可以在气候危机、粮食安全、全球卫生等领域合作外，也坦率地讨论了两国有重大分歧的议题，包括美国对北京在台海日益挑衅的言行、对香港、西藏和新疆打压自由人权措施的关切。

对于美中都在寻求扩大对东南亚地区的影响力、双方的外交较劲不断升温，分析人士说，当地国家都不希望见到这种竞争日益白热化，因为那将使他们处于非常困难的地位。

乔治华盛顿大学西格尔亚洲研究中心副主任迪帕·奥拉帕利(Deepa Ollapally)在接受美国之音采访时说，由于中国的“一带一路”倡议为地区注入庞大资金，再加上美国退出“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”(TPP)以及以中国为首的“区域全面伙伴经济关系”(RCEP)包含了许多地区国家，但美国并不在其中，过去多年来美国在与中国的经济竞争上一直都是处于落后的局面。

美中较劲针锋相对

不过她说，在拜登政府启动超越“四方安全对话”(QUAD)机制的“印太经济框架”(IPEF)并宣布将投入庞大资金后，美国也开始在地区与中国展开经济上针锋相对的较劲。

“无论那些金钱是否会全部投入，或他们是否会募集到所有资金并将它落实，那是另一个问题。不过我认为信息是非常清楚的。所以我认为布林肯在这个局面中处于上风。比他以前更为有力。另外一点是我认为中国现在正处于守势。因为大多数在地区的伙伴和盟友，包括东南亚和更广泛的亚洲，对于中国的利益不断在增加都感到紧张。所以我认为中国现在正感到一些压力。”

奥拉帕利说，王毅在20国外长会后接着出访东南亚5个国家，其中还包括缅甸，这是自去年缅甸因军事政变遭到西方制裁后到访级别最高的中国官员，所以王毅的访问或许意味着中国想要将缅甸和其他任何可能的国家拉到其阵营中而不要失去任何一个朋友，因此在当前缅甸受到孤立时中国要对其提供援助，几年前美国和其他西方国家也对缅甸非常支持，但现在情势已经有了变化。

拉锯战美渐占上风

她说，类似缅甸这种美中之间的拉锯战今后人们还会不断见到，不过她认为美国的地位应该会越来越强，而中国则是越来越弱。

针对王毅告诉东盟国家不要当“大国博弈的棋子”，奥拉帕利说，东盟国家已经在与美中两国的关系中保持的非常平衡，它们在经济上与中国有许多联系。

“不过我不确定他们会尤其喜欢听一个像中国一样的大国来告诉他们，不要做这个，不要做那个，小心这里，小心这个国家。因为我认为，你知道，他们是非常自豪的民族主义国家。我认为公开的这么说显示中国认为东南亚国家在往美国阵营靠近的路上走得太远。这几乎像是一个警告。我不认为这种说法会得到好的反应，因为‘不要做一个棋子’听起来好像是认为东南亚国家不知道应该如何追求自己的外交政策利益。”

中国忧美组建联盟

德国马歇尔基金会亚洲项目主任葛来仪(Bonnie Glaser)在接受美国之音采访时说，美中竞争日益激烈是因为双方都试图争取区域国家的民心，中国外长王毅在出访南太平洋国家后接着又到东南亚国家访问，显示中国对美国在印太组建包括“奥英美三边安全协议”(AUKUS) 和“四方安全对话”(QUAD)的联盟机制越来越担心。

“这些都是中国会担忧的机制。我认为他们也担心印太经济框架有潜在可能提供在中国以外的替代选项。中国的目标，当然是成为区域最有支配力量的国家。他们希望见到美国的影响力减弱。很显然，现在的趋势不一定是他们想要见到的方向。所以我认为他们正在谋求加强他们与这些国家的关系，防止它们滑向美国。”

北京不仅担忧美国提供区域经济选项，中国国家主席习近平在今年博鳌论坛上提出的“全球安全倡议”还进一步宣示，中国不仅可以为全球提供发展援助，今后还将提供安全领域的合作，最近中国与所罗门群岛签署的安全协议，正是美中在全球安全竞争上正在升级的例子。

北京欲顶回美国安全领域角色

葛来仪说，“全球安全倡议”还在初始阶段，不过中国对美国传统上被视为是一个主要安全提供者越来越担忧，现在决定要对此做出反制。

她说：“过去中国被许多国家视为是它们的经济伙伴，但它们把美国视为安全伙伴。我认为中国担忧这个趋势将继续增长，担心它们将在安全上依赖美国。所以我认为中国已经决定，是时候顶回美国作为印太地区主要安全参与者及提供者的地位。我认为那是促成‘全球安全倡议’背后的因素。”

区域国家不要选边

至于未来美中竞争态势会如何发展，葛来仪说，这是一个复杂的动态过程，但大体而言，区域国家都不愿意被迫选边。

“它们也不愿见到它们后院发生热战。它们担心美中可能脱钩，或是美国施压要它们不要与中国做什么特定的事，或是中国施压要它们不要与美国做什么。这会使许多国家处于非常尴尬的处境。那些国家想要利用美中竞争极大化它们可操作的空间，而不是减小它们可操作的空间。”

乔治华盛顿大学的奥拉帕利也说，没有国家想要在美中大国竞争中当一个棋子，也没有国家想要当别人的典当品，美中竞争的白热化不会受到这些国家的欢迎，因为这会让它们处于非常困难的地位。

她说，过去20年来东南亚国家在经济上与中国接近，在战略上与美国接近，现在美中竞争日益激烈是一个新发展，这些国家也担忧它们可能会被迫在美中之间选边。

“我希望美国能够理解它们所处的地位，不要迫使它们必须做出选择。那会是美国做出的错误外交举措。”

区域国家保持平衡对美中有利

奥拉帕利说，她希望中国也一样不要迫使东南亚国家选边站，尽管美中都对区域做出表态，不过她认为这些国家在可预见的未来还是可能和过去一样，在经济上与中国要比与美国更为接近，但是在政治上和战略上他们会站在美国这一边。事实上，她认为从美中两国的角度来说，或许这些国家采取中立或平衡立场还是对他们比较有利，至少到目前为止美国并没有要求东南亚国家在美中之间做出选择。

布林肯上周六在巴厘岛的一场记者会上表示，在印太地区，美国并不是要各国做出选择，美国是在例如投资、基础设施和发展援助等领域提供它们一个选择。“在一个程度上，其实有很大空间让所有人去做这件事，因为需求非常巨大，尤其是在基础设施方面。

不过他说，美国要做到是确保所有参与者都能朝最高目标准标竞赛，而不是比赛往下到最低标准，例如美国提出的“印太经济框架”就是要确保美国对地区国家所做的投资能够以最高标准来进行，例如在投资基础设施时美国不会让那些国家承担过多债务，而是在推动对劳工、对环境的保障，以及不会助长腐败等等。

“我的希望是，如果中国在持续参与这些努力时能够争取做得最好，提升它的格局，那实际上对各方都好。”

On May 30th, 2022, Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies and Director of the China Policy Program, Professor David Shambaugh, authored for the China-US Focus an article titled “About Time: The Biden Administration Rolls Out Its China Policy“.

About Time: The Biden Administration Rolls Out Its China Policy

30 MAY 2022

by David Shambaugh

Sixteen months after entering office, a senior Biden administration official finally gave a major public speech outlining the administration’s overall approach to China. The speech by Secretary of State Antony Blinken was sponsored by the Asia Society and took place on my campus at George Washington University (I was in the audience).

In listening to his smoothly-delivered speech in person and reading it carefully afterwards, what strikes me the most is that nothing new was said by Secretary Blinken. It was primarily an assemblage of previous administration statements and “talking points,” although the first time in one speech or official document. In that regard it was a letdown.

Also striking was that Blinken spent at least half of the speech reiterating general U.S. foreign policy and the Biden administration’s agenda for domestic technological renewal—not about China per se. Granted, domestic technological element is about competing with China, but one wonders why it was featured so prominently in this speech?

Notably missing was any discussion of what kind of China the United States would like to see and welcome—domestically, regionally, and globally? What kind of China would be easier (than the Xi regime) for the United States to work with? Blinken did discuss areas of potential cooperation on specific issues with China—but that is different from enunciating a positive vision for China’s evolution at home and abroad. To be sure, much about China’s behavior in recent years is very negative and destabilizing, and Beijing deserves to be called out on its malign behavior. Thus it may be difficult to offer a positive vision for China’s evolution and the relationship when the Xi regime and its policies seem so deeply entrenched.

Also striking by its absence was any discussion of strategy—as distinct from policy issues. Secretary Blinken ticked through a long and familiar list of policy issues and American complaints about Chinese behavior—but where is the integrated strategy for dealing with them? Perhaps in the classified version of the speech (the speech was billed as a shorter public version). But Blinken’s stated trilogy of “invest, align, compete” hardly equates with an integrated and sophisticated strategy.

If there was a conceptual centerpiece in the speech it was that Blinken and the Biden administration clearly view China as a revisionist power attempting to undermine and reshape the post-World War II liberal international order, and that the United States—together with its democratic allies—are going to resist it. Blinken stated:

“China is a global power with extraordinary reach, influence, and ambition… China is the only country with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do so. Beijing’s vision would move us away from the universal values that have sustained so much of the world’s progress over the past 75 years.”

Surprisingly, Blinken refrained from painting China as a regional revisionist in Asia. Yet, he said: “We can’t rely on Beijing to change its trajectory. So, we will shape the strategic environment around Beijing to advance our vision for an open, inclusive international system.” But, other than brief mention of AUKUS, the Quad, the recent U.S.-ASEAN Summit, and President Biden’s recent visit to the region, there were no specifics concerning how the U.S. will go about countering China in Asia. Similarly missing and notable by its absence was any discussion of how the United States plans to push back against China across the Global South, or U.S.-European transatlantic solidarity viz China.

When he came to discuss China’s behavior in a variety of areas, Blinken was appropriately candid—but not nearly as caustic, ideological, or insulting as previous Trump administration officials. Some examples:

• “Under President Xi, the ruling Chinese Communist Party has become more repressive at home and more aggressive abroad.”
• “We have profound differences with the Chinese Communist Party and Chinese Government. But those differences are between governments and systems—not between our people.”
• “The United States stands with countries and people around the world against the genocide and crimes against humanity happening in the Xinjiang region, where more than a million people have been placed in detention camps because of their ethnic and religious identity.”
• “Tibet, where the authorities continue to wage a brutal campaign against Tibetans and their culture, language, and religious traditions.”
• “Hong Kong, where the Chinese Communist Party has imposed harsh and anti-democratic measures under the guise of national security…. Beijing’s quashing of freedom in Hong Kong violates its handover commitments, enshrined in a treaty deposited at the United Nations.”
• “We’ll continue to oppose Beijing’s aggressive and unlawful activities in the South and East China Seas.”

Blinken also spoke at length about American dissatisfaction with China in the areas of technology theft, forced technology transfer, corporate espionage, supply chain disruptions, mercantilist practices, unequal market access, prohibitions against American media in China, inequalities in film distribution, and other concerns in the commercial domain. Blinken was blunt about these inequalities: “The lack of reciprocity is unacceptable and unsustainable.”

He paired these criticisms of China with a clear warning to the American business community: “We believe—and we expect the business community to understand—that the price of admission to China’s market must not be the sacrifice of our core values or long-term competitive and technological advantages… We will work to ensure that U.S. companies don’t engage in commerce that facilitates or benefits from human rights abuses, including forced labor.” This was a much-needed message to deliver to the U.S. business community, but the longstanding behavior of corporate America suggests that Blinken’s warnings will not be heeded. In the U.S. corporate boardroom, profits trump values every time. This has to change. But it will require much more than one speech by the Secretary of State to do so.

Counterbalancing this tougher rhetoric, Secretary Blinken went out of his way to hold out the olive branch to Beijing: “As we invest, align, and compete—we’ll work together with Beijing where our interests come together.” He then reiterated the familiar litany of such areas of potential cooperation: climate change, COVID-19 and public health, nonproliferation and arms control, illegal narcotics, food security, and global macroeconomic coordination.

Blinken also pointedly made four other key statements intended to reassure Beijing:

• “We are not looking for conflict or a new Cold War. To the contrary, we’re determined to avoid both.”
• “Competition need not lead to conflict. We do not seek it. We will work to avoid it.”
• We don’t seek to block China from its role as a major power, nor to stop China… from growing their economy or advancing the interests of their people.”
• “We do not seek to transform China’s political system.”

These are significant statements—whether Beijing will believe them is highly doubtful. Indeed they are not widely shared in Washington.

Secretary Blinken also went out of his way to speak positively about continuing to welcome Chinese students to study in America, while observing that: “We can stay vigilant about our national security without closing our doors.” Blinken also praised the contributions of Chinese-Americans while denouncing Asian-American racism and hate.

The section of Secretary Blinken’s speech concerning Taiwan was standard boilerplate verbiage. Unlike President Biden’s off-script unequivocal statement in Tokyo last week that the United States had a “commitment” to “militarily intervene” to defend Taiwan in the event of an attack from mainland China, Blinken made no such provocative statements. Rather he reiterated the liturgy of the One China Policy, Taiwan Relations Act, three joint communiques, and Six Assurances. He also explicitly warned: “We do not support Taiwan independence”—which was an important restatement of policy to make. Blinken did, however, accuse Beijing of “growing coercion” against Taiwan, and voiced concern over the potential dangers of an “unintended conflict.” To this end, he said that “We’ve prioritized crisis communications and risk reduction measures with Beijing.” This has been a priority for the Biden administration—but thus far Beijing has shown little to no interest in such mechanisms.

In sum, Secretary Blinken’s speech was long overdue, and is to be welcomed. As Blinken himself said in closing: “The scale and scope of the challenge posed by the People’s Republic of China will test American diplomacy like nothing we’ve seen before.”

Having laid out the lengthy list of policy challenges which China presents to the United States (and many other nations)—next comes the hard part: fashioning an integrated strategy to deal with them.

On June 4th, 2022, Associate Director of the Sigur Center and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, Professor Deepa Ollapally, interviewed for the South China Morning Post for an article titled “No 2 US diplomat’s trip to show US ‘continued commitment to Indo-Pacific’“.

No 2 US diplomat’s trip to show US ‘continued commitment to Indo-Pacific’

04 JUNE 2022

by Jacob Fromer

Washington’s No 2 diplomat will criss-cross East and Southeast Asia on a nine-day trip beginning on Sunday, the latest in a recent burst of top-level US diplomacy in the region.

Deputy US Secretary of State Wendy Sherman will meet with officials in South Korea, the Philippines, Vietnam and Laos, the State Department said on Friday.

Her trip comes amid worsening tensions with Beijing – but also questions about the US engagement in Asia while Washington has been consumed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

“The deputy secretary’s travel to the region reflects the United States’ continued commitment to the Indo-Pacific,” the department said.

US President Joe Biden and officials in his administration have said repeatedly that the US views its alliances and partnerships throughout the region as vital to its strategy to compete with an increasingly assertive China.

Even as the war in Ukraine rages past its 100th day with no apparent end in sight, administration officials have emphasised that they still regard China as their top priority.

Sherman’s trip comes just days after Biden himself travelled to South Korea and Japan to meet with the two countries’ leaders.

While in Tokyo, Biden announced a new US-led economic initiative for the region called the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), and he met with the leaders of Japan, India and Australia – an informal security grouping known as the Quad.

Both associations are widely viewed as counters to Beijing’s influence in the region.

Before that trip, Biden hosted a rare special meeting in Washington of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (Asean).

“This is really a big flurry of activity for the United States to show that it’s still very much focused on the Asian region,” said Deepa Ollapally, a professor at George Washington University’s Elliott School of International Affairs who is writing a book on big power competition in the Indian Ocean.

“It goes without saying that China is the main issue in this flurry of activities,” she said. “No one misses the point – at least not in Asia.”

Sherman has already made multiple visits to the region, including to China. During this trip, she will meet in Seoul with her South Korean and Japanese counterparts – part of the Biden administration’s efforts to improve “trilateral” diplomacy among the three nations, after years of tension between Seoul and Tokyo.

South Korea’s new president, Yoon Suk-yeol, has signalled he wants to align more closely with the United States and Japan on geopolitical issues, including competition with China.

In the Philippines, Sherman will meet with President-elect Ferdinand Marcos Jnr, the son of the former dictator who ruled the nation from 1965 to 1986.

China claims almost the entire South China Sea – which a 2016 UN arbitral tribunal declared has no basis in international law – and those claims include large swathes of the exclusive economic zone off the Philippine coast.

The two countries are entangled in a dispute over the area, and the Chinese coastguard has been accused of harassing Philippine fishing boats.

During the Donald Trump administration, Washington formally declared that it rejected China’s sweeping claims to the South China Sea; Marcos said recently that he would use the 2016 tribunal ruling to assert “our territorial right”.

In Vietnam, Sherman will meet with Vietnamese officials about trade and economic issues.

As Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s zero-Covid policy continues, numerous large US companies, including Apple, have reportedly sought to move production from Chinese factories to Vietnam. Sherman is expected to discuss “supply chain resiliency” with officials in Hanoi.

“China is already the dominant economic actor in East Asia,” said Joshua Kurlantzick, senior fellow for Southeast Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.

But that could potentially change, at least to some extent, “if China continues to follow a zero-Covid strategy in which – against all advice from medical experts – they’re deferring to the will of one man who seems determined to follow a strategy that is undermining their economy”, Kurlantzick added, referring to Xi.

Laos, experts said, is not a major geopolitical player – but just the fact that officials there had agreed to host Sherman could be a signal to its next-door neighbour China, which holds a large influence over the country’s economy.

“Laos has been very careful,” said Ollapally. “It has generally been closer to China than other Southeast Asian countries. And maybe Wendy Sherman is trying to pick one away.”

In the Laotian capital of Vientiane, Sherman is expected to discuss the country’s sustainable development goals, new American support for clearing unexploded mines left from the Vietnam war era, and civil society initiatives to promote “mutual understanding between our countries”.

“It will impress the Laotians that she’s actually choosing Vietnam, Korea, the Philippines and then Laos,” Ollapally added. “That is also somewhat of a signal to the Chinese, especially when this is part of a group that is not necessarily overly friendly to China.”

On March 18th, 2022, Associate Director of the Sigur Center and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, Professor Deepa Ollapally, was quoted in Vox for an article titled “Why India isn’t denouncing Russia’s Ukraine war“.

On March 7th, 2022, Associate Director of the Sigur Center and Director of the Rising Powers Initiative, Professor Deepa Ollapally, interviewed for the Jane’s Defence Weekly for an article titled “Ukraine conflict – Analysis: India faces mounting predicament“. 

Ukraine conflict – Analysis: India faces mounting predicament

07 MARCH 2022 | From Jane’s Defence Weekly

by Oishee Majumdar

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed the Indian government into a delicate situation, with mounting diplomatic pressure from the United States and its allies and Russia to take a clear stance in favour of one side.

Given its dependence on both the US and Russia for defence and security, New Delhi has been trying to strike a balance between them.

Although India has internationally condemned the ongoing violence in Ukraine – Prime Minister Narendra Modi has reached out to both Volodymyr Zelenskyy and Vladimir Putin to urge an end to the violence – the country has abstained from voting in the United Nations (UN) polls that intended to pass resolutions against the Russian attack.

Critics have described India’s position to be ambiguous or dubious, calling for a stronger Indian stance against the Russian aggression in Ukraine. On the other hand, many have also supported India’s decision to prioritise national interests and take a middle ground to not explicitly antagonise either the US or Russia. Since the beginning of the conflict, India has abstained from UN voting four times in polls held by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC), and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA).

Deepa Ollapally, research professor of international affairs and associate director of the Sigur Center for Asian Studies at George Washington University, told Janes that New Delhi “did not have much choice” in these votes given India’s dependence on Russia for military hardware.

“Russia has always been more willing to sell military equipment at relatively cheaper rates to India”, leading to a historically strong defence partnership between the two countries that India is obliged to safeguard, she said.

“The country also cannot afford to alienate the Russians who are much closer to them geographically than the Americans,” Ollapally added.

India’s relation with the US, on the other hand, is “more strategic” in nature given the two countries’ common concerns about China’s efforts to expand its presence in the Asia-Pacific, she noted.

Ollapally said that abstention from voting is similar to a “non-decision” on India’s part and is a “smart move” because it will enable New Delhi to “continue its goodwill” with both the US and Russia.

However, with “emotions running high in the US Congress against Russia, it complicates matters”, she said.

Although there may be “some amount of backlash against India in the US with certain members of the Congress strongly pushing for sanctions against the country”, Washington may choose not to do so as “India is a critical part of US’ Indo-Pacific strategy”, Ollapally said.

Nonetheless, India-US relations, which had been “going on an upward trajectory” in the past few years, will witness a rupture because of India’s stance on the Ukraine conflict, she said.

“India has stood firm in maintaining its strategic autonomy and is willing to incur some costs for that,” she said. This is a critical moment for the US, which will “pause to think how much they can really count upon India in the Asia-Pacific”, she added.

“Though there might be a temporary tiff, regular dialogues and a deepening partnership over the last 15 years have brought about a certain level of maturity in India-US relations, enabling the two countries to understand each other more. Many in the US realise that India did what it had to do in order to secure its national interests,” she said.

Despite India’s attempts to diversify its defence suppliers by engaging with countries such as France, Israel, and the United Kingdom, Janes data shows that Russia continues to be India’s biggest supplier of weapons.

In December 2021 India and Russia deepened their long-standing defence alliance by renewing the India-Russia Inter-Governmental Commission on Military and Military-Technical Cooperation (IRIGC-M&MTC) until 2031.

Besides the procurement of weapons, India relies on Russia for spare parts and maintenance of these systems. Given this dependence, a major concern for New Delhi has been facing US sanctions through the US Countering America’s Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA), which was enacted in August 2017 in response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014.

As a close strategic and military ally, India has been lobbying hard for more than two years for a CAATSA waiver, which can be granted by a US president under the act’s “modified waiver authority” for “certain sanctionable transactions”.

However, as Russia extends its military offensives in Ukraine, India could find it more difficult to remain immune from such sanctions. In comments to Janes, the US Department of State concurred.

“The sweeping sanctions imposed on Russia as a result of its invasion of Ukraine are likely to make it difficult for any international customer to procure new systems and parts from Russian suppliers,” a spokesperson for the US Department of State told Janes.

“As for CAATSA, we have not yet made sanctions or waiver determination regarding potential sanctions in response to any Indian transaction with Russia. We continue to urge all countries, including India, to avoid major new transactions for Russian weapons systems,” the spokesperson added.

Official spokesperson for India’s Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), Arindam Bagchi, did not respond to a Janes request for comment on how the Indian government plans to respond to potential US sanctions if it continues to maintain defence collaboration with Russia.

Since Russia is the primary contributor to India’s military imports, New Delhi may not be able to immediately cease its defence collaborations with Moscow. However, delay in defence procurements because of the diversion of Russian resources to the war in Ukraine will give opportunities to other countries to expand their defence trade with India.

The present circumstances may also give an impetus to India’s efforts to boost indigenous defence manufacturing. The government of India has been investing in the local defence industrial complex with the vision of not only making the country self-reliant but also enhancing its exports.

India expects its defence and aerospace manufacturing market to be worth USD65 billion by 2047. India has also outlined a vision of achieving a turnover of USD25 billion, including exports of USD5 billion in aerospace and defence goods and services by 2025.

On February 26, 2022, Professor David Shambaugh, Director of the China Policy Program, authored an article titled “Was It Really the ‘Week That Changed the World’?” for the National Bureau of Asian Research. 

Was It Really the “Week That Changed the World”?

On February 28, 1972, the United States and China officially announced the normalization of U.S.-China relations by issuing the Shanghai Communiqué. To mark the 50th anniversary of this consequential agreement, NBR asked David Shambaugh, a member of the NBR Board of Advisors, to reflect on this historic milestone and the current state of U.S.-China relations.

President Richard M. Nixon’s historic visit to China in February 1972 was hailed (perhaps hyperbolically) as the “week that changed the world.”[1] Looking back half a century later, to what extent was this true? If so, how so? The Nixon visit to China can be said to have catalyzed four main consequences, each of which have had a true global impact.

First, as is well known, there was a geostrategic rationale for the opening. Both the United States and China viewed the Soviet Union as an immediate and pressing military threat, but also as an expansionist power. Beijing, in particular, realistically feared a nuclear or conventional attack following the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and pronouncement of the Brezhnev Doctrine.[2] Moscow was also supporting insurgent movements and proxy regimes across Asia and Africa at the time, competing with both U.S. and Chinese proxies. By opening ties and aligning with each other, increased geostrategic pressure was brought to bear on the “polar bear” from several directions.

This rationale provided the “strategic glue” for the relationship—but it really only lasted for a decade. In 1982, China announced its “independent foreign policy” at the 12th Party Congress—which was codeword for a more equidistant rebalancing in Chinese foreign policy between the United States and Soviet Union. Deng Xiaoping still had his demands of Moscow to renormalize bilateral relations,[3] which had been ruptured since 1960, but beginning in 1983, Deng began the step-by-step process of rapprochement with Moscow, which accelerated once Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985. By May 1989, all of Deng’s conditions had been met and Sino-Soviet relations ended their hiatus—and along with it the central geostrategic rationale of Nixon’s visit. This was two years before the collapse of the Soviet Union and official end of the Cold War. Subsequently, the Sino-American relationship lost its “strategic glue” and has never found a new substitute since.

The second animating rationale for Nixon’s trip was less expedient and much longer-term: to bring China out of its isolation and into the family of nations. Little noticed at the time was the way Nixon described China in a 1967 article in Foreign Affairs. After some tough talk, he opined:

Taking the long view, we simply cannot afford to leave China forever outside the family of nations, there to nurture its fantasies, cherish its hates and threaten its neighbors. There is no place on this small planet for a billion of its potentially most able people to live in angry isolation. [4]

This was the vision for integrating China into the post–World War II global order—truly a strategic goal with global consequences, one that seven subsequent presidents (until Donald Trump) subscribed to. It took the better part of five decades to institutionally embed the People’s Republic of China into the international order, but generally speaking it can be concluded that Nixon’s call has largely been met.

The third of Nixon’s goals can also be found in the 1967 article, where he said:

The world cannot be safe until China changes. Thus our aim, to the extent that we can influence events, should be to induce change. The way to do this is to persuade China that it must change: that it cannot satisfy its imperial ambitions, and that its own national interest requires a turning away from foreign adventuring and a turning inward toward the solution of its own domestic problems. [5]

Nixon may not exactly have had economic modernization specifically in mind, but the year after his visit, Premier Zhou Enlai launched the Four Modernizations program.[6] It took the end of the Maoist era and coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in 1978 to reboot the Four Modernizations policy and fully launch China on the path of economic development—which has resulted in it becoming the second-leading economic power in the world today. In five decades, China has gone from being a very poor developing country to a middle-income one that is now setting global standards in technologies and many other fields. World history has never witnessed a nation modernizing with this scale, scope, or speed. Chinese citizens now also enjoy numerous personal freedoms that they never had when Nixon visited. Politically, China remains a very repressive Leninist/Orwellian party-state under Xi Jinping, but the political system is far more institutionalized and responsive than under Maoist totalitarianism.

The fourth accomplishment that the Nixon visit set in train was the normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations with the United States. Because of Nixon’s resignation following the Watergate scandal in 1974, official normalization was not achieved until 1979 during Jimmy Carter’s presidency. Over the subsequent four decades, U.S. and Chinese societies built deep roots of interdependence across many sectors—to their mutual benefit. These ties were buttressed by a broad range of governmental linkages at the national, state, and local levels.

In recent years, however, we have been witnessing a significant unraveling of these links and channels of communication. While many bonds remain—notably in the commercial and educational spheres, and millions of Chinese have emigrated to the United States—a distinct decoupling is underway. Today, a new comprehensively competitive dynamic grips the relationship, with acrimony and mutual suspicions now being pervasive.

How long this new acrimonious phase will last remains to be seen. If there is one consistent pattern in the 50 years since the Nixon-Mao opening, it is that occasional periods of tension are not permanent. Despite their differences—which are many and real—there nonetheless remains a strong intrinsic attraction between the two societies. Time will tell if the two sides can rediscover mutual commonalities, or whether—as Henry Kissinger has described it—we are in the “foothills of a [new] Cold War.”[7]

David Shambaugh is the Gaston Sigur Professor of Asian Studies, Political Science, and International Affairs and Director of the China Policy Program in the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He is also a member of the NBR Board of Advisors. His latest book is China’s Leaders: From Mao to Now (2021).

ENDNOTES
[1] Like many other Americans, I (at the age of 19) watched the visit on television with fascination.

[2] The Brezhnev Doctrine asserted that the Soviet Union reserved the right to intervene in any socialist country where the party-state was under threat from domestic or foreign (anti-socialist) elements.

[3] The three conditions were (1) severing the Soviet Union’s alliance with Vietnam, removing its military forces from Vietnam, and stopping support of Hanoi’s occupation of Cambodia; (2) drawing down Soviet forces along the Sino-Soviet border to the level of 1964 and withdrawing them from Mongolia; and (3) withdrawing occupying Soviet troops from Afghanistan.

[4] Richard M. Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam,” Foreign Affairs, October 1967, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/1967-10-01/asia-after-viet-nam.

[5] Nixon, “Asia After Vietnam.”

[6] The Four Modernizations focused on agriculture, industry, science and technology, and national defense.

[7] “Kissinger Says U.S. and China in Foothills of a Cold War,” Bloomberg, November 21, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-11-21/kissinger-says-u-s-and-china-in-foothills-of-a-cold-war?srnd=premium.

Policy Alert #245 | February 11, 2022

For more policy alerts, check out the Rising Powers Initiative. 

In the run-up to the Winter Olympics in Beijing, China had insisted on keeping politics and sports separate. But as the 2022 Olympics are now officially underway, the excitement of the sports is being largely drowned out by political tensions. Much of the criticism surrounding the Beijing Olympics has focused on China’s treatment of its minority Uyghurs. The opening ceremony appeared to meet this criticism head-on. It featured representatives of all 56 officially recognized Chinese ethnic groups, including Uyghurs, standing together and passing the Chinese flag across Beijing’s National Stadium.

Adding to the controversy, only one day before the opening ceremonies began, India joined the U.S.-led diplomatic boycott of the Olympics. This decision was made after China included a PLA soldier who was involved in a deadly border skirmish in 2020 with Indian troops in the torch relay ahead of the opening ceremonies.

In addition, just hours before the opening ceremonies, Chinese President Xi Jinping met with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who flew to China for the Games. It was the first face-to-face meeting Xi has had with another world leader in nearly two years. In a joint statement after the meeting, China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership. Beijing supported Russia’s demand that Ukraine should not be admitted into NATO, while Moscow opposed any form of independence for Taiwan. The agreement marked the most detailed and assertive statement of Russian and Chinese resolve to work together. 

China

In a press conference shortly after the Winter Games kicked off, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Zhao Lijian condemned “the political hype with malicious smear” against China surrounding the Games. When asked directly about China’s decision at the opening ceremony to have the cauldron lit by a Uyghur torchbearer, Lijian boasted China’s “ethnic unity,” asserting, “We are glad to see athletes from all ethnic groups, including Dinigeer Yilamujiang, join the Chinese delegation.” 

When asked about the decision to select the PLA commander in the wake of criticism from India, Lijian defended the move: “I want to stress that the torchbearers…are broadly representative. We hope that the relevant sides can view this in a rational and objective light and do not read too much into it from a political perspective.” 

In terms of the meeting with Russia, according to Xinhua News Agency, Chinese President Xi “stands ready to work with Putin to chart the future and provide guidance for bilateral relations under new historical circumstances.” 

• The nationalist Global Times compares China’s progress between its two Olympics: “Back in 2008… the opening ceremony made a statement: China has arrived. In 2022, China no longer needs to prove its standing on the world stage… China is already ahead on the leader board.”
• In an op-ed for the independent South China Morning Post, journalist Josh Ball observes Xi’s determination despite geopolitical challenges from the West: “Xi was expected to ride on the momentum of the Winter Olympics to push forward his development agenda for northern China.” 

India

On February 3, 2022 after Beijing’s surprising move to pick a Chinese soldier involved in the Galwan incident as an Olympic torchbearer, India made the decision to boycott the Olympics at the diplomatic level. Until then, India had made it clear that it would not join the call for boycott though it was not going to send high level representation. The Indian Ministry of External Affairs official spokesperson Arindam Bagchi stated, “It is indeed regrettable that the Chinese side has chosen to politicize an event like the Olympics… India will not be attending the opening or the closing ceremony of the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics.” In addition, the chief of public broadcaster Prasar Bharti, CEO Shashi Shekhar Vempati, said that it “will not telecast live the Opening and Closing ceremonies of the Winter Olympics being held in Beijing.”  India’s decision to boycott the games comes months after it adopted the BRICS joint statement in September last year, where it said, “We express our support to China to host the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympic and Paralympic Games.”

• In an op-ed for the pro-government Daily Pioneer, Bhopinder Singh, former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry, accuses China of “sports washing” or using a sporting event to distract from serious issues: “Despite its poor human rights record, China is trying hard to project that its world standing is unaffected and that the Games will be a success.” 

Russia

Back in December 2021, Russia criticized the US for its diplomatic boycott of Beijing Winter Olympics. “Our position is that the Olympics Game should be free of politics,” Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov told reporters according to AFP News Agency.  Russia is still formally banned from competing in the 2022 Olympics, amid the fallout from Moscow’s massive state-sponsored doping scandal at the Sochi 2014 Winter Olympics — but its competitors can take part under a neutral Olympic flag as Russian Olympic Committee athletes.

In his opening remarks to Xi carried by Russian television, Putin praised “unprecedented” close relations with China. Putin also highlighted close economic ties, including a new contract to supply China with 10 billion cubic meters of gas per year from eastern Russian.

• In an op-ed for The Moscow Times, an independent newspaper based in Moscow, reporter Felix Light notes the pivotal role Russia has assumed in the Winter Olympics: “Putin’s presence at the opening ceremony is seen as a symbol of deepening Sino-Russian relations across a range of areas, including relations with the United States, cybersecurity and even Ukraine.” 

Japan

Japan did not send any senior officials or cabinet ministers to the Winter Olympics – but stopped short of calling the decision a diplomatic boycott. Japan “believes that respect for human rights is important,” Chief Cabinet Secretary Hirokazu Matsuno said at a news conference. “We made a decision comprehensively. “In an attempt to strike a diplomatic balance in its relationships with both the US and China, Japan instead is sending Yasuhiro Yamashita, the president of the Japanese Olympic Committee, to attend the Games. 

As the winter Olympics commenced, the Japanese parliament has added its voice to the global chorus of concern about human rights in China. The Resolution Regarding the Serious Human Rights Situation in Xinjiang Uighur and Other Areas passed almost unanimously on February 1, 2022. The Diet resolution made no direct reference to the People’s Republic of China, and yet there was no mistaking whose behavior this resolution was referring to. The Chinese Foreign Ministry reaction was swift, claiming Japan “has no authority whatsoever to make wanton remarks” about other countries’ human rights conditions. 

• According to the conservative Asia Nikkei, the policy chief of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party criticized the government’s announcement that it would not send any government officials to the Beijing Olympics, saying it took too much time: “Tokyo should have swiftly decided on diplomatic boycott.” 

On 5 February 2022, Sigur Center Associate Director Deepa Ollapally authored an article titled “India’s rise reversed in 2021” for the East Asia Forum.

India’s Rise Reversed in 2021

Last year political and economic low points plagued Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government at home and abroad. The catastrophic second wave of COVID-19 that swept across India and the shocking and very public breakdown of the healthcare system was undoubtedly the country’s lowest point of the year.

At home, the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) repealed three new farm laws in November after it failed to win over thousands of farmers who waged a successful high-profile protest for more than a year. Passed hurriedly without sufficient parliamentary scrutiny, these laws that were directed toward privatising the agricultural sector threatened the existing rights of farmers and they lost trust in the government. The retraction by the government represented a visible victory for democracy even as India’s democratic credentials came into serious questioning.

Earlier in the year, Freedom House changed India’s status from ‘free’ to ‘partly-free’, for the first time since 1997, pointing to ‘rising violence and discriminatory policies affecting the Muslim population’ as well as a ‘crackdown on expressions of dissent’. As the year ended, the government stepped up its squeeze of non-governmental organisations and revoked licenses to receive foreign funds for two widely admired organisations, Oxfam and Mother Teresa’s Missionaries of Charity. Whatever one thinks of Freedom House and western hypocrisy, it was not a good look for the world’s biggest democracy.

Meanwhile, as the largest global vaccine manufacturer, the country was all set to reap soft power benefits from its initial vaccine diplomacy which would have contributed to rescuing a pandemic-stricken world. By April, India had already delivered over 66 million doses of mostly free vaccines to developing countries. But India’s image was dealt a deadly blow after the government’s ignominious response to the second wave of COVID-19, the crisis in vaccine production by the Serum Institute of India and the resultant emergency ban on vaccine exports. It has taken six months for the exports to slowly restart.

India got no relief outside its borders in 2021 either. The country was handed a diplomatic nightmare with the unceremonious withdrawal by the United States from Afghanistan in August. The return of the Taliban to power with little accountability represented a strategic windfall for Pakistan and a huge liability for India which had been closely aligned to the previous dispensation in Kabul under Ashraf Ghani. Initially, New Delhi did not show much imagination in dealing with this new unenviable scenario which could well embolden its adversary Pakistan.

The Modi government finally took a bold and innovative move in November by hosting a regional security dialogue on Afghanistan at the national security advisor level. While China and Pakistan declined India’s invitation to the meeting, seven other countries including Russia and Iran, along with five Central Asian countries attended. The eight attendees signed the Delhi Declaration which stated that: ‘Afghanistan’s territory should not be used for sheltering, training and planning or financing any terrorist acts’. Surprisingly, Taliban spokesperson Suhail Shaheen struck a rather conciliatory tone and said that they viewed the India-led meeting as a positive step.

Strategically, the fall of the Ghani government could not have come at a worse time for New Delhi. The country’s security situation had already worsened after the border clash with China in Galwan in 2020. China and India have been unable to break the impasse in their relations even after 13 rounds of talks between senior border commanders. There was no marked improvement in 2021, with the latest round in October ending in an acrimonious exchange between the two sides.

Tense relations with Pakistan on the western front and with China on the eastern front have brought New Delhi closer to realising its growing fear of a potential two-front conflict which poses a formidable challenge for India with no easy answers. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue did pick up momentum in 2021 with the first ever in-person leaders’ summit in September held at the White House. If nothing else, its continuing buoyancy buys India some insurance in terms of security, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

India, like most other countries, has been struggling toward a post-pandemic recovery. The Omicron outbreak found India better prepared than the second Delta wave with almost 60 per cent of adults fully vaccinated. The urban job crisis has persisted, with the government’s highly touted target of expanding manufacturing again not met, an outcome made worse by the huge loss of lives and livelihoods caused by the pandemic.

India is also missing out the opportunity of redirecting manufacturing from China as many expected. Instead, those investments and jobs out of China have gone to Vietnam and other Southeast Asian states. Still, the International Monetary Fund projects that India will prove to be the fastest growing major economy in 2021 at 9.5 per cent despite reducing its projections after the set back of the second COVID-19 wave.

If this holds into 2022, India might just find itself in a position to reverse the reversal of 2021.

On January 18, 2022, Director Ben Hopkins authored an article for the Middle East Research and Information Project (MERIP) titled “Afghanistan’s Present Failure Lies in its Past Design“.

Afghanistan’s Present Failure Lies in its Past Design

British and Afghan officials at the signing of the Treaty of Gandamak (Major Cavagnari second from left, Amir Yakub Khan in the center), May 1879. Photo by John Burke, public domain, British Library.

The spectacular collapse of the Afghan government to Taliban forces in mid-August 2021, followed by the shambolic withdrawal of the last American troops at the end of the month, took many by surprise. President Joe Biden’s administration was quick to blame its Afghan partners as rumors swirled that President Ashraf Ghani fled the country with suitcases full of cash. In the ruins of 20 years of American involvement in Afghanistan, there is a widespread belief in Washington that the corruption of multiple Afghan governments ultimately undermined them, leading to their downfall. Some, including Biden, have gone further, indicting not only the Afghan state but also more problematically the Afghan “nation,” or rather the supposed lack of one. In his remarks justifying the administration’s withdrawal, Biden stated, “I have never been of the view that we should be sacrificing American lives to try to establish a democratic government in Afghanistan—a country that has never once in its entire history been a united country, and is made up—and I don’t mean this in a derogatory—made up of different tribes who have never, ever, ever gotten along with one another.”[1]Such victim-blaming sentiments, while partially true, serve to deflect responsibility for the multitude of sins committed by the United States’ military and political intervention. On the one hand, faulting the now-deposed and never-very-popular Afghan president as the embodiment of a corrupt political class allows American policymakers to degrade a figure and institution that garners little sympathy either inside or outside Afghanistan. On the other hand, by insisting that American efforts crashed on the shoals of Afghan tribalism and lack of national unity Biden attempted to wash his hands of American responsibility, implying its imperial ambitions were no match for the forces of history. But the failure of the American project had little to do with Afghan corruption as understood in Washington, and even less to do with problems of the Afghan nation. Instead, it resulted from the historically constructed pathologies of the Afghan state.

Afghanistan’s fate—past, present and future—is fundamentally beholden to the conditions of its creation. While today those conditions—its dependence on foreign aid, lack of legitimacy among the population and inability to deliver the public good—are viewed as elements of state failure, they are in fact consciously constructed features of its original blueprint. These perversions of political design—or pathologies—embedded by outside imperial powers at the modern state’s inception have long determined Afghanistan’s political fortunes, both domestically and internationally. The re-incarnated Taliban, risen from the ashes like the phoenix, will be subject to similar vicissitudes, as will all future Afghan governments.

Problems of the Afghan Nation

In the policy world and among the US public there is a common belief that Afghanistan is a land trapped in the past, ruled by ancient ties of kinship, primordial bonds of blood, and timeless traditions and cultural customs. Any coherent semblance of an Afghan nation is lacking in this stereotype. Its place is usurped by ethnic solidarities such as Pashtun and Tajik communities vying for dominance within the geographical space occupied by the Afghan state. The Taliban are understood not only as Islamic fundamentalists—a problematic caricature for other reasons—but also as Pashtun chauvinist-cum-nationalists. Their agenda is not only the establishment of Afghanistan as an Islamic emirate, but also as a Pashtun-dominated polity. These simplified views enable analysts to speak of the Afghan civil war as one of ethnic cleavages and foreign politicians to talk of the country as a tribal society where any idea of a shared national identity lacks traction.[2]

Whereas the Afghan nation has increasingly been conceptualized in ethnically exclusive terms, the Afghan state has historically been actualized in ethnically inclusive terms. American policymakers, however, believed Afghanistan to be a Pashtun-dominated state and predicated their political calculations on this belief.[3] Consequently, following the US-led restructuring of Afghanistan in the Bonn Process, the United States supported the construction of a highly centralized, ethnically delineated constitutional structure that institutionalized Pashtun power in a dominant executive. Such institutional architecture was both based on and facilitated an understanding of the Afghan nation not as a multiethnic mosaic but rather as one where the dominant ethnic group, the Pashtun, subordinated the other people of Afghanistan to their will. Historically though, this has not been the case. While a Pashtun has served as the political executive of the country since the establishment of the Durrani Empire in 1747, he has overseen a multiethnic, cosmopolitical state complex manned by Dari-speaking functionaries drawn from other ethnic groups, most notably the Shi‘a Qizilbash and Tajiks. Even the Pashtun king, and later president, has not been a “real” Pashtun. Instead, he has been an urban Dari-speaker, more at home and at ease in the ethnically mixed realm of Kabul than the tribal tracks of Khost.

Afghan nationalism is predicated on a horizontal solidarity between peoples. Absent, however, is a vertical solidarity linking people and the institutions of the state. As a consequence, Afghan nationalism is not identified with the state, creating a disconnect that partly explains the state’s relative fragility.

 

Afghan nationalism is predicated on a horizontal solidarity between peoples. Absent, however, is a vertical solidarity linking people and the institutions of the state.[4] As a consequence, Afghan nationalism is not identified with the state, creating a disconnect that partly explains the state’s relative fragility. That fragility is both a cause and consequence of its lack of penetration into society. The Afghan state, historically, has been both a conceptually and physically limited enterprise. In the former sense, its responsibilities have been narrowly construed, mainly restricted to taxation and security. For the most part, the state claimed authority without exercising it, knowing that any attempt would expose its weakness. In the latter sense, until the communist takeover with the Saur Revolution in April 1978, the ambition and ambit of state authority was circumscribed to the cities. The pretense of its sovereignty over the countryside was only respected so long as it was not exercised. When the communist government attempted to assert its authority in rural areas beginning in the summer of 1978, the disconnect between the cities and the countryside, or rather between the Afghan nation and the Afghan state, became painfully obvious. The assertion of state power in the name of the people was met with widespread resistance by those people, leading to the Soviet intervention in December 1979.

Pathologies of the Afghan State

One of the most salient features of the relationship between the Afghan state and nation is the lack of linkage between the two, an issue the recent Taliban “victory” has failed to address. Before the Saur Revolution, the two sat juxtaposed to one another in a precariously balanced stasis, which was the basis of the Afghan political compact. Since then, they have drifted farther apart as both the state and the nation have radically changed. Today’s violence will not cease until a new political compact, with broad-based buy-in, has been constructed and enforced. The Taliban are unlikely to have either the political skill or the will to do so. Even if they overcome the disconnect between the Afghan nation and state, they still face the structural pathologies of that state. And herein lays the real challenge.

Following the collapse of the Ghani government and the American withdrawal in 2021, a chorus of punditry has decried these events as the outcome of the failure of the Afghan state. Indeed, this trope follows a well-trodden path of analysis when it comes to Afghanistan. For years the country ranked highly on Foreign Policy’s “Failed State Index.” When it was re-imagined as the “Fragile State Index,” Afghanistan’s ranking near the top slipped little, despite years of American investment in capacity building. This index reflects the international community’s expectations: that states be self-sufficient, ensure stability and security for their populaces and neighbors and deliver a discrete set of social goods for their citizenry. Yet this vision of the state poorly reflects the lived experience of many in the Global South. Further, it does not accord with the historical origins or trajectory of the state either as a generalized abstract concept or specific concrete reality. And it certainly has limited traction in Afghanistan itself.

The Afghan state was not designed to do any of the things now expected of a modern state.

 

The Afghan state was not designed to do any of the things now expected of a modern state. Instead, it was built to address a wholly different set of concerns, a reality which conditioned its original architecture. When Afghanistan was constructed in the latter half of the nineteenth century, its central purpose was to serve as a buffer state between the expanding Russian Tsarist Empire and the British Indian Raj. The state was never intended to serve the needs of its people, including establishing security within its borders. Of paramount importance to the competing imperial powers was the idea that it constrained insecurity within its borders. Most importantly, the Afghan state was never meant to be self-sufficient. Instead, it was designed to be reliant on surrounding imperial powers, especially financially. Thus, the first pathology of the Afghan state—bequeathed it by its imperial architects—was that it would be a fiscal sink.

 

Most importantly, the Afghan state was never meant to be self-sufficient. Instead, it was designed to be reliant on surrounding imperial powers, especially financially.

From its origins, modern Afghanistan was in effect envisaged as a fiscal colony of British India, enabling the Raj to exert influence without incurring the costs of outright control. The British attempted this latter course in the two Anglo-Afghan wars of the nineteenth century and found annexation and control—even in the relatively arms-length structure of the Indian princely states—provided an insufficient return on investment.[5] Moreover, it was unnecessary. The Government of India could accomplish its objectives through the more economical policy of paying Afghan rulers to govern for them. The idea of the annual subsidy was thus born. While delivered on an ad-hoc basis since 1849, the subsidy was formalized with the Treaty of Gandamak in 1879. From then onward, an annual treasure train of 600,000 silver rupees made its way from Peshawar to Jalalabad through the Khyber Pass. Even after Afghanistan secured its formal independence with the Treaty of Rawalpindi (1921), the subsidy continued—though for a time from the Bolsheviks rather than the British.[6] Cognizant of their part of the bargain, Afghan rulers from Abdur Rahman Khan, the so-called Iron Amir, to Muhammed Zahir Shah, the last king of Afghanistan, used that money to build the Afghan state—particularly its security infrastructure.

The British retreat from the Indian subcontinent in 1947 both facilitated and required other international benefactors to pick up the bill for governing Afghanistan. During the Cold War, this responsibility was shared by the United States and the Soviet Union, who saw Afghanistan as a key field of competition in their ideological struggle. The superpowers effectively split the country in two, with the United States responsible for the south while the Soviets looked after the north.[7] Many of their aid projects were dual use, serving both the needs of Afghan civilians and superpower militaries if required. The Soviet-built Salang tunnel through the Hindu Kush, connecting the north and south of the country, was designed to allow passage of T-62 tanks, a function it fulfilled in December of 1979. Likewise, the American conglomerate Morrison-Knudsen constructed the Kandahar airport with a runway of sufficient length and weight-bearing capacity to service any plane in the arsenal of the US (and allied) air force, something which came in handy after 2001.

The civilian form of the subsidy was radically altered during the respective Soviet and American occupations, where those governments paid for the Afghan state directly. The last public budget of the Ghani government, from 2019, totaled approximately $11.5 billion, with nearly 75 percent of that funding provided directly by foreign governments. As with previous Afghan rulers, the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), supported by the Soviets, and the Hamid Karzai and Ghani administrations, supported by the Americans, dedicated most of this foreign largesse to building and buttressing the Afghan security state. The 300,000 strong Afghan National Army ate up half of Ghani’s 2019 budget. The size of the country’s security establishment is out of all proportion to its domestic fiscal resources—and always has been. It requires a foreign subsidy, the condition of which is a security apparatus meant to contain chaos within the country. Afghanistan is a money pit by intentional design. Its reliance on foreign aid is not a sign of state failure but rather a testament to how well it continues to function according to the precepts of its initial blueprint.

A second pathology conditioning the fortunes of the Afghan state since its construction in the latter part of the nineteenth century is political legitimacy. The key issue has been how the state has interfaced with and legitimated itself to a population that, for the most part, does not identify with it. For most of its modern history, the problem was limited because such interface was constrained both in time and space.

Historically, the Afghan state has been periodically, rather than permanently, manifest in peoples’ lives. Prior to 1978, it was notable for its absence rather than presence, especially in the countryside.

 

Historically, the Afghan state has been periodically, rather than permanently, manifest in peoples’ lives. Prior to 1978, it was notable for its absence rather than presence, especially in the countryside. Consequently, the level of legitimacy required to keep the state in place was as diminished as its visibility. In such a scenario, the state needed to be seen less as legitimate in the eyes of most of the population and more simply less seen. Mass indifference, coupled with the consent of those closest to its centers of power—namely urban dwellers—was the winning formula. Given that the urbanization of Afghanistan before the Soviet invasion stood barely in the double digits, this was not a tall order.[8]Everything changed, however, with the advent of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan under communist rule. As the state increasingly inserted itself into peoples’ lives, the old legitimating formula of mass indifference with limited consent no longer sufficed. It required greater sanction, which the PDPA attempted to secure through violence. That strategy led to a backlash against their rule, eventually resulting in the Soviet invasion, which itself led to further violence. Subsequent Afghan governments have been faced with this challenge of legitimacy and have likewise struggled to meet it. The first incarnation of the Taliban in the 1990s largely enforced its rule through violence before being deposed. The regime following the American intervention in 2001 ostensibly legitimated itself through elections, but no one fully believed it. Indeed, part of the reason for the seeming rapidity of the fall of the Ghani government was that many Afghans viewed it with contempt, and thus it lacked broad-based legitimacy within Afghan society.

While former Afghan governments could survive with indifference, present ones need legitimacy.

 

While former Afghan governments could survive with indifference, present ones need legitimacy. The final, related pathology of the Afghan state is the expectations—both individual and collective—of the Afghan populace. More than half of the current population of Afghanistan was born after the American intervention in 2001. Fully three-quarters were born after the Soviet intervention in 1979. These people have very different experiences and expectations of the state than their predecessors. While imperial powers and Afghan rulers alike could design, construct and maintain a state largely indifferent and unresponsive to the people it nominally controlled, that changed with the dissolution of the old order as PDPA troops stormed the presidential palace in April 1978. As the state became more invasive through the modernization projects of the Soviets and then the democratic one of the Americans, people’s expectations of the state’s obligations to them changed. No longer is it sufficient for the Afghan state to deliver a basic modicum of daily security (something it has largely failed at for the past 43 years) and, in return, tax the population. It is now incumbent on the state to provide for the public good, not just the public order.

The Past Is Prologue, and Epilogue

Despite the protestations of Biden, the American failure in Afghanistan was not due to the past problems of the Afghan nation, but rather to the present pathologies of the Afghan state. Those pathologies—reliance on a foreign subsidy, the need for political legitimacy and the expectations of the populace—are both historically conditioned and currently manifest. They are the hard realities of rule for any candidate who wishes to govern Afghanistan. When the United States intervened in late 2001, it did so with little understanding of that state, or its fraught relationship with a well-established, though now strained, sense of national identity. Over time, US leaders have proved themselves indifferent students of Afghan history, culture and politics, enabling them to disingenuously blame Afghanistan’s failures both on the Afghans as well as the supposedly immutable forces of history.

But the pathologies of the state are as important for Afghans themselves as for Americans. The repeated failures of previous governments to come to grips with them led to their ultimate demise. And although history is a poor predictor of the future, it offers a prescient warning to current holders of power in Kabul. The Taliban seem as ill-equipped and uninterested today in the requirements of rule as they did in the 1990s. No doubt this disinterest in rule partly accounts for the Taliban’s keenness to win international recognition, for with it the spigots of international aid will once again be opened. Their welcoming attitude toward international NGOs, the aid community and the United Nations is simply an attempt to deflect the responsibilities of governance onto these bodies. It also reflects the reality that Afghanistan, despite their victory, remains a fiscal sink into which the UN is looking to dump $5 billion.[9] The Taliban’s survival as a government is fundamentally dependent on their ability to woo a foreign backer—be it Pakistan, the Gulf states, Russia or potentially China. Regardless of their ultimate success in doing so, one thing is for sure: the pathologies of the Afghan state will outlast them, or likely any other government, in Afghanistan.

[Benjamin D. Hopkins is a professor of history and international affairs at the George Washington University. He specializes in South Asian history, particularly that of Afghanistan.]

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Endnotes

[1] The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Terror Attack at Hamid Karzai International Airport,” August 26, 2021.

[2] See for instance, Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System, Second edition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002).

[3] For an academic example of this belief, see “Afghanistan: The Problem of Pashtun Alienation,” International Crisis Group, August 5, 2003.

[4] David Edwards, Heroes of the Age: Moral Fault Lines on the Afghan Frontier (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1996).

[5] For an argument that the Raj intended to construct Afghanistan as a princely state, see Francesca Fuoli, “Colonialism and State-Building in Afghanistan: Anglo-Afghan Co-Operation in the Institutionalisation of Ethnic Difference, 1869-1900,” ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2017.

[6] Ibid., p. 248.

[7] Nick Cullather, “Damming Afghanistan: Modernization in a Buffer State,” The Journal of American history 89/2 (2002). Timothy Nunan, Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2016).

[8] Erwin Grötzbach, “Modern Urbanization and Modernization in Afghanistan,” Encyclopædia Iranica, V/6.

[9] Karen DeYoung, “UN launches $5 billion appeal for Afghanistan, in largest ever for country in humanitarian distress,” The Washington Post, 11 January 2022.