Month: October 2018

Here’s America’s New Plan to Stop China’s Island-Building

By Zachary Haver, a research assistant at George Washington University focused on China. Zachary is a recipient of the GW Undergraduate Research Award.

This was originally published in The National Interest on October 1, 2018. 

The latest National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), which allocates defense spending for the fiscal year 2019, sets the stage for a stronger U.S. response to China’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea. Passed by Congress on August 1 and signed by President Trump on August 13, the NDAA contains several promising measures, including authorization for greater transparency from the Pentagon on China’s coercive activities.

Following “any significant [land] reclamation, assertion of an excessive territorial claim, or militarization activity by the People’s Republic of China in the South China Sea,” Section 1262 of the NDAA calls for the Secretary of Defense to “immediately” submit a report to Congress and the public.

Up until this point, a persistent lack of transparency has plagued the South China Sea, forcing the public, researchers, and the media to rely on commercial satellite technology for information on these disputes. Advocates for greater transparency such as Ely Ratner have argued, “the dearth of public information about China’s activities in the South China Sea has hampered regional coordination and abetted China’s ability to take incremental steps to consolidate control.”

Considering the concurrent evolution of China’s assertive behavior in, U.S. policy toward, and the American conversation on the South China Sea, the reports mandated by the NDAA would be game changers if effectively implemented. Seizing control of the narrative would help Washington to reinvigorate public interest in the disputes, unite regional partners, and pressure China.

Creeping Coercion

The South China Sea territorial disputes began in the mid-twentieth century,periodically heating up between the 1970s and 1990s. After a period of relative stability in the early 2000s, tensions steadily increased from 2009 onward thanks to Beijing. Notably, China wrested control of Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012, and a sparked a two-month-long standoff with Vietnam by deploying an oil rig in contested waters in 2014.

The next phase of escalation began when China’s land reclamation projects took off in 2014. Evidence of China’s island-building in the Spratly Islands first hit the news in May 2014. Researchers report that China actually began its land reclamation in late 2013. China’s island-building projects grew rapidly, in total reclaiming over 3,200 acres of land.

Since 2014, China has installed radar facilities , airstrips , structures intended to house missiles, and military jamming equipment on its artificial islands. Though China is not the first country to construct such facilities in the South China Sea, the scope of its activities far surpasses that of any other claimant.

On May 2, 2018, a bombshell CNBC report revealed that China deployed YJ-12B anti-ship cruise missiles and HQ-9B surface-to-air missiles on Fiery Cross Reef, Subi Reef, and Mischief Reef. Though China installed missiles in the Paracel Islands in 2016, this incident marked the first time that China placed missiles in the Spratly Islands—an unambiguous escalation of its militarization program. Later that May, China landed long-range bombers in the Spratly Islands for the first time.

In reaction to these developments, the United States disinvited China from the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC). The Department of Defense described this disinvitation as an “initial response.” Now, with the fiscal year 2019 NDAA passed, we are about to see the follow-up from Congress.

Increasing Involvement

In recent years, growing instability has pushed the United States to intervene more directly in the South China Sea. At a meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in July 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton announced that the United States was now prepared to play a direct mediating role in the disputes—a significant policy shift. In the years following Clinton’s announcement, the United States upgraded its defense partnership with the Philippines, lifted its lethal weapons embargo on Vietnam, and deepened its ties with ASEAN—among other measures.

Since October 2015, the U.S. Navy has conducted several Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs) in the South China Sea to challenge the legitimacy China’s land reclamation projects. However, as the past few years demonstrate, FONOPs cannot halt China’s steady military buildup, nor are they designed to do so.

The American Conversation

Washington’s reactions to turmoil in the South China Sea receive the lion’s share of attention, but rising tensions have also drawn the interest of broader American audiences. According to ProQuest’s U.S. Newsstream database, coverage of the South China Sea in American newspapers increased from 239 articles tagged as “news” in 2009 to a peak of 4061 articles in 2016.

While the media started devoting greater attention to the disputes, so too did American politicians. Candidates from both major U.S. political parties debated the South China Sea for the first time during the 2016 presidential election cycle—further evidence of the issue’s increased saliency in the American public sphere.

However, interest in the South China Sea seems to have slipped since 2016. Only 2245 news articles mentioned the South China Sea in 2017, reflecting a “ false calm” narrative that emerged in the wake of the 2016 Hague ruling and the absence of any significant incidents. This downward trend appears to have continued so far in 2018, with potential for China’s recent provocations reinvigorating American interest.

Seizing the Narrative

Section 1262 of the NDAA will be crucial in reversing this worrying trend. Washington will need the American public’s support if it hopes to counter China’s “maritime insurgency” in the South China Sea. If evidence of China’s coercion remains shrouded behind layers of classification, Americans will have little reason to support tougher and possibly riskier measures. The White House, Congress and the Pentagon all must take their case to the people.

Moreover, Washington needs the support of regional partners and their publics, especially the Philippines. Since coming into power, the Duterte administration has frequently downplayed the significance of the disputes and yielded to China. If the people of the Philippines had greater access to information about China’s coercion, Duterte might face pressure to stand up to China.

Additionally, the NDAA offers Washington an opportunity to counter Beijing’s disingenuous narrative. For example, Beijing often responds to criticism by accusing the United States of militarization and pretending that other claimants engage in similarly assertive behavior. Regular public reports on China’s coercion and militarization would go a long way in challenging Beijing’s disinformation campaign.

Information Is King

The potential benefits of greater transparency become even more obvious when considering the efficacy of previous transparency efforts. The availability of public information about the South China Sea expanded from 2014 onward, facilitating an explosion of interest that lasted through 2016.

Most notably, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) launched the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI) in late 2014. CSIS launched AMTI with the explicit purpose of increasing Americans’ access to information about the South China Sea—as well as other Asian maritime issues. By 2015 media outlets heavily circulated AMTI’s satellite imagery of China’s land reclamation projects.

Actors in the U.S. government also appear to have initiated a campaign to raise the profile of the South China Sea. For one matter, starting around the first U.S. FONOP, “unnamed [defense] officials” began leaking information about the South China Sea to the Reuters on a regular basis. Given the consistency of these “leaks,” there is a good chance that somebody authorized them.

Furthermore, the Pentagon allowed CNN reporters on board a P-8A Poseidon for the first time, allowing them to capture and publish attention-grabbing footage of the Chinese navy warning off the American plane over the South China Sea. The U.S. Navy itself also published surveillance footage from the flight and the audio of the incident on its YouTube page.

The information provided by AMTI and U.S. government actors allowed interested parties across the world to grasp the extent of China’s maritime coercion, generating much interest in the disputes. However, these measures themselves were implemented by several different parties, each faced with their own limitations. Section 1262 of the NDAA promises a coordinated transparency effort, synthesizing government resources to provide Congress and the public with timely intelligence.

On April 17, 2018, the new head of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Adm. Philip Davidson informed Congress, “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios short of war with the United States.” While greater transparency alone cannot counter China’s coercion, seizing control of the South China Sea narrative is a necessary step in the right direction.

Zachary Haver is a research assistant for George Washington University focused on China. Parts of this article are adapted from his working paper, “Constructing a Revisionist China: American Narratives of the South China Sea Territorial Disputes, 2009-2016.” Find him on Twitter at @zacharyhaver.

Image: A Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II Joint Strike fighter jet touches down on the amphibious assault ship USS Wasp, marking the first time the aircraft has deployed aboard a U.S. Navy ship and with a Marine Expeditionary Unit in the Indo-Asian-Pacific region in East China Sea, March 5, 2018. Picture taken March 5, 2018. Michael Molina/U.S. Navy/Handout

A Viewpoint on the Great Australian China Debate

By Yehna Bendul, Research Staff Assistant, Sigur Center for Asian Studies

Earlier this year, Australia passed legislation that would combat and criminalize malicious foreign interference. While the laws were not targeted at a single country, Australia’s recent banning of high-profile Chinese companies from developing its 5G network suggests that Australia’s most immediate concern is China. On September 10th, 2018, the Sigur Center hosted Professor Rory Medcalf for a presentation titled “The Great Australian China Debate: Issues and Implications for the United States and the World.” Professor Medcalf is the Head of the National Security College at the Australian National University in Canberra and has had a career in diplomacy, intelligence analysis, and journalism. With this unique perspective, Professor Medcalf aimed to answer the question of how to manage rising Chinese power and assertiveness in a way that neither leads to conflict nor contradicts Australia’s national interests and values.

According to Professor Medcalf, Australia’s relationship with China has been long and only recently complicated. Australia is home to around 1.2 million residents of Chinese heritage that include both recent immigrants and well established communities that go back to the 1850s. Medcalf explained that this deep societal connection and China’s role as Australia’s largest trading partner created the perception of a good relationship. However, tension in the relationship became most evident in the last three or four years after what Medcalf calls a “reality check.”

This “reality check” included the recognition that China was not going to liberalize under Xi Jinping, that China has been taking advantage of Australia’s open democracy through its dominance of Chinese language media and its infiltration of Australian community organizations, and that resisting Chinese interference would only get more disruptive and difficult the longer Australia waited to act. These insights were first brought to the Australian public discourse by persistent journalists and intelligence agencies. Political parties and members of the business community were slower to pay attention to the issue due to dependencies on Chinese political donations and financial investments respectively.

Medcalf cited four reasons as to why China chooses to engage in disruptive activities in Australia. First, Australia is a key ally to the United States, so any disruption of Australia would also be a disruption to China’s main rival. Second, Australia has important technology and intelligence secrets. Third, Australia has a reputation of being outspoken and resistant against China. Lastly, China is interested in ensuring that the large populations of Chinese peoples in Australia are either supportive of the Communist Party of China or otherwise silent and passive.

As mentioned previously, Australia has taken steps to resist Chinese interference through a number of new laws that criminalize foreign attempts to disrupt Australian society, politics, and economy. However, the passage of these laws led to a period of intense heat and tension within the country due to worries that the broad definitions of criminal activity violate civil liberties and would promote racist tendencies. Medcalf outlined and responded to seven myths about Australia’s relationship with China that arose from these debates.

The first myth is that Australia faces a crude choice between committing to China or the United States. Medcalf called this a “characatured notion” of Australia’s interests and foreign relations that ignores the many levels at which foreign relationships function. The second myth is that Australia only pushed back against China as a proxy of the United States. Medcalf’s response was that Australia passed the new legislation for its own sovereign reasons and that,  if anything, the United States has been the one to follow Australia’s resistance to China. The third myth is that national security institutions have taken over Australian policy making. Medcalf countered that the recent actions are new methods of solidarity and transparency and that caution towards China is a multilayered effort by the economic establishment, defense institutions, and domestic policy makers. The fourth myth is that everything will go back to how it was before the “reality check”. Medcalf pointed to “full bipartisan support” for the new laws as reason to believe change is permanent.

The fifth myth Professor Medcalf addressed was the idea that Australia will be more accommodating to Chinese preferences because of its economic dependency on Chinese businesses. Medcalf argued that Australia’s greater vulnerability is political and not economic, as Chinese economic leverage is limited by its equal dependency on Australian resources. The sixth myth is that resistance against China is influenced by racism and will unleash racist sentiments. Medcalf argued that careful outreach and public engagement can ensure that national interests will be protected in an inclusive way. The last myth is that Australia did not need new laws as they would be too prohibitive to civil society. Medcalf responded that bipartisan revisions to the law have eliminated these critiques.

Professor Medcalf ended his presentation with the actions he thinks Australia must take in the future to protect its national interests. He argued that the primary concern of Australia should be to distinguish between criminal interfereence and mere influence and diplomacy (with foreign interference being covert, coercive, or corruptive behavior). He then explained that the spirit of the China debate moving forward must be focused on finding a new equilibrium, not on rejecting China outright. Moreover, there must be consistent transparency and outreach to all parties involved including the Chinese-Australian communities, business communities, and other countries about Australia’s actions. Lastly, Medcalf stressed that Australia must be clear that it is acting in accordance with its own national interest and not as a pawn of U.S.-Chinese competition.

While Professor Medcalf briefly addressed the concerns of those opposed to Australia’s new laws, his responses seemed to downplay the gravity of dissent and did not engage with the core arguments of the opposition. This may just have been a function of time constraints on the presentation; however, it is still important to fully understand the hesitancy behind supporting Australia’s new laws given that Medcalf correctly suggested that many other liberal democracies may follow in Australia’s footsteps.

Australia’s new legislation created 38 new crimes and broadened the definition of multiple existing crimes like espionage. Those opposing these laws are concerned that the legislation can be implemented in ways that infringe upon civil liberties. The New York Times article “How Australia’s Espionage Laws Could Silence Whistleblowers and Activists” outlines several scenarios in which this would occur. Professor Medcalf mentioned that revisions to the laws have limited the potential for these negative repercussions; however, the amendments to which he referred to only narrowed secrecy offenses and allowed for a “public interest” defense for journalists. Political scientist Joseph Nye has not directly addressed Australia’s new legislation but would most likely join the opposition, as he posits that a democracy’s openness remains its best defense. In his article “How Sharp Power Threatens Soft Power,” Nye argues that democracies “have to be careful not to overreact [to Chinese and Russian sharp power], so as not to undercut their own soft power by following the advice of those who advocate competing with sharp power on the authoritarian model.”

Medcalf stated he was confident that the new legislation would act mostly as deterrence and thus would not lead to any prosecutions. However, the potential for Australia’s quality of democracy to be degraded warrants continued monitoring. Furthermore, Medcalf’s faith in the Australian parliamentary system and resilience of Australia’s civil society may not apply to other liberal democracies, so following this model may have even more dangerous consequences in the United States and elsewhere.

It is interesting to see this debate play out in public discourse, but it is also surprisingly intriguing to see it seep into popular culture. In 2016, Netflix released a show titled Secret City, which focused on an Australian journalist as she uncovers conspiracies involving Chinese attempts to interfere in Australian politics. The show ended on ominous notes, but hopefully reality will prove to be more positive.

Yehna Bendul is a sophomore in the Elliott School studying Philosophy and International Affairs with a concentration in international politics. She is currently studying Spanish but is also interested in U.S. relations with East Asia. In her position as Research Assistant with the Sigur Center, Yehna hopes to learn more about other regions of Asia and develop a more holistic understanding of the continent.